United States v. New Jersey

• Decision Date: 26 January 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 20-1364 (FLW) (TJB)
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; PHILLIP D. MURPHY, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of New Jersey; GUBRIR S. GREWAL, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of New Jersey, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY;

PHILLIP D. MURPHY, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of New Jersey;

GUBRIR S. GREWAL, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of New Jersey, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-1364 (FLW) (TJB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

January 26, 2021

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

WOLFSON, Chief Judge

:

The United States of America has filed a Complaint against the State of New Jersey, Phillip D. Murphy, in his Official Capacity as Governor of the State of New Jersey; and Gubrir S. Grewal, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of New Jersey ("Attorney General Grewal") (collectively "Defendants"), seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2018-6, otherwise known as the Immigrant Trust Directive, violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.¹ Presently before the Court is Defendants'Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.² For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Federal Civil Immigration Law

"The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens" pursuant to its constitutional authority to "'establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization' and its inherent power as a sovereign to control and conduct relations with foreign nations." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (quoting U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4). Pursuant to this authority, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., "sets out the 'terms and conditions of admission to the country and thesubsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.'" Kansas v. Garcia, 140 S. Ct. 791, 797 (2020). The INA further governs "which aliens may be removed from the United States and the procedures for doing so." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 396. "Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security [("DHS")] play a major role in enforcing the country's immigration laws," including Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). Id. at 397. ICE "conducts criminal investigations involving the enforcement of immigration-related statutes" and operates the Law Enforcement Support Center, which "provides immigration status information to federal, state, and local officials around the clock." Id. ICE is additionally responsible "for the identification, apprehension, and removal of illegal aliens from the United States." Id. (quotation omitted).

Notwithstanding the federal government's "broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens," the "States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law." City of Philadelphia v. Att'y Gen. of United States, 916 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Arizona, 567 U.S. at 281). Consistent with that sovereign power, the INA contemplates states' participation in the enforcement of immigration law since "[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 411-12. However, § 1357(g) does not compel state and local governments to "cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).³ Rather, the statutespeaks in voluntary terms. States' cooperation may include "situations where States participate in a joint task force with federal officials, provide operational support in executing a warrant, or allow federal immigration officials to gain access to detainees held in state facilities." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 410. Furthermore, ICE may request state and local law enforcement agencies to furnish "information about when an alien will be released from their custody." Id. (citing § 1357(d)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (setting forth that DHS may issue a detainer, which acts as "a request that such agency advise the Department, prior to release of the alien, in order for the Department to arrange to assume custody, in situations when gaining immediate physical custody is either impracticable or impossible").

Specifically relevant to the instant action are 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and 8 U.S.C. § 1644, which govern the sharing of information between state and local governments and the federal government in the enforcement of immigration laws. These sections provide that

[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the [federal government] information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.

8 U.S.C. § 1373(a); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1644 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.").

Correspondingly, the federal government "shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the request verification or status information." Id. § 1373(c).

Finally, relevant to the parties' arguments, here, are sections 1226 and 1231(a). These provisions govern the arrest and detention of an alien by federal civil immigration authorities pending removal. Section 1226(a) provides that "[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." Except as provided in § 1226(c), the Attorney General is permitted to (1) "continue to detain the arrested alien"; and (2) release the alien on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). Section 1226(c) provides for circumstances under which the Attorney General is required to take mandatory custody of an alien subject to removal and specifically provides that:

The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—

(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) of this title,

(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title,

(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of a least 1 year, or

(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title,

when the alien is released, without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

§ 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D). 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the 'removal period')." The removal period begins to run on the latest date of the following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

b. The Immigrant Trust Directive & the Instant Case

On November 29, 2018, Attorney General Grewal issued Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2018-6 (the "Immigrant Trust Directive" or "Directive"), which was thereafter revised on September 27, 2019. The Immigrant Trust Directive was issued to amend certain policies governing the interaction of state and local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities. See State of New Jersey, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2018-6 v2.0 ("Directive No. 2018-6"). These amendments were necessary, according to Attorney General Grewal, based on the increased reliance of the federal government on state and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal civil immigration law, which has "present[ed] significant challenges to New Jersey's law enforcement officers who have worked hard to build trust with [the] state's large and diverse immigration communities." Id. Accordingly, the Immigrant Trust Directive places certain limitations on the ability of local, state, and county lawenforcement to assist the federal government with the enforcement of federal civil immigration law.

The United States specifically takes issue with two provisions of the Immigrant Trust Directive. First, Section II.B of the Directive limits the ability of state, local, and county law enforcement from providing certain "types of assistance to federal immigration authorities when the sole purpose of that assistance is to enforce federal civil immigration law." Relevant here, Section II.B.5 prohibits state, local, and county law enforcement from:

Providing notice of a detained individual's upcoming release from custody, unless the detainee:

a) is currently charged with, has ever been convicted of, has ever been adjudicated delinquent for, or has ever been found guilty by reason of insanity of, a violent or serious offense as that term is defined in Appendix A⁴;

b) in the past five years, has been convicted of an indictable crime other than a violent or serious offense; or

c) is subject to a

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