United States v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., Misc. No. 83-026 P.
Decision Date | 10 November 1983 |
Docket Number | Misc. No. 83-026 P. |
Citation | 575 F. Supp. 138 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, and John L. Toti, Jr., Special Agent Internal Revenue Service v. NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY and Joan Carrigan. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Lincoln C. Almond, U.S. Atty., R.I., Providence, R.I., Steven Toscher, Tax Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.
The central issue here is whether or not the respondent, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company (New England Telephone) is a "third-party recordkeeper" within the meaning of Section 7609 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.). For reasons which follow, I answer in the affirmative; the respondents need not comply with the summonses served upon them on October 18, 1982 because there was a failure to comply with the notice requirements set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a).
The summonses in question were issued in connection with the investigation of the federal income tax liabilities of Stephen Saccocia, his wife Donna Saccocia and the Northeastern Metals and Refining Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "taxpayers"); and requested New England Telephone to produce for examination a variety of documents, all as listed in the margin hereof.1
Notice of the issuance of the summonses was not given to the taxpayers pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609 because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) claims that New England Telephone is not a third-party record keeper under § 7609(a)(3) and the summonses do not seek "credit card" data.
New England Telephone, having refused to comply with the IRS summonses, is now before the Court to show cause why it should not be compelled to obey.
Section 7609(a)(1) provides as follows:
Section 7602 provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return or the liability of any person for any Federal tax, any authorized employee of the IRS may examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be relevant or material.
The relevant section to this case is (3)(C).
Conclusions of Law
Is New England Telephone a Third Party Recordkeeper?
Petitioners in arguing that New England Telephone is not a third-party recordkeeper state that records of transactions between the "third-party recordkeeper" and the taxpayer, i.e., "two-party records" are not within the scope of Section 7609: they further state that though New England does issue "credit cards" and arguably can be termed a "person extending credit through the use of credit cards or similar devices" they do not believe this category of "third-party recordkeeper" could have been intended by Congress to include telephone companies; in support they point to legislative history.
United States v. New York Telephone Co., 644 F.2d 953 (2d Cir.1981) (New York Telephone I) and United States v. New York Telephone Co., 682 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1983) (New York Telephone II) held that since credit was extended by means of credit cards the telephone company was a "third-party recordkeeper" within the meaning of Section 7609(a)(3)(C) when the taxpayer involved held the credit card and the information sought was credit card data. New York Telephone I. In New York Telephone II it extended its holding and ruled that the statute applied to all customers whether or not credit card data is sought.
The petitioners feel the Second Circuit "strayed far from the statute", principally relying on Judge Newman's separate opinion in New York Telephone II, and on the following authorities: United States v. Exxon Company U.S.A., 450 F.Supp. 472 (D.Md.1978) ( ). United States v. Shivlock, 459 F.Supp. 1383 (D.Colo.1978), aff'd sub nom United States v. Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc., 612 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980) ( ); United States v. Connecticut Motor Club, 79-1 U.S.T.C., ¶ 9141 (D.Conn.1978) (); United States v. White Agency, 79-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9300 (W.D.Mich.1979), aff'g Magistrate's recommended decision at 79-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9265 ( )
The government also argues that a liberal construction of Section 7609 will give to persons subject to investigation a "potent" delaying device.
To begin with, it seems to me this IRS bureaucratic concern fails to appreciate the very purpose for which the statute was enacted. As counsel for New England Telephone points out, the House Committee on Ways and Means stated the reasons for changing existing law. The Committee declared:
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