United States v. Nieves-Meléndez
| Decision Date | 26 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 19-1331 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Iesús Juan NIEVES-MELÉNDEZ, Defendant, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Laura Maldonado Rodríguez for appellant.
Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.
Before Kayatta, Howard, and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
Iesús Juan Nieves-Meléndez challenges the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and its drug-quantity calculation under the Sentencing Guidelines. Finding his arguments unavailing, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
We assume familiarity with the record.1 Nieves pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). As indicated above, two parts of the record are at issue in this appeal: the district court's drug-quantity calculation for sentencing and its denial of Nieves's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We address the background of each in turn.
As part of the plea agreement he reached with the government in August 2018, Nieves admitted to possessing 87.23 grams of marijuana with the intent to distribute. However, the presentence investigation report ("PSR") prepared by the U.S. Probation Office calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range based on a converted quantity of 39.2 kilograms of marijuana, which was the equivalent of all the drugs seized from the apartment in which Nieves and his three codefendants were arrested. Nieves urged the court three times to adopt the plea agreement's drug-quantity calculation over that of the PSR: first in his sentencing memorandum to the district court, then -- after the court ordered him to do so -- in a formal objection to the PSR, and finally during his sentencing hearing. In the first two instances, he argued that the court was not obligated to hold him accountable for all the drugs found in the apartment under the Guidelines. The Probation Office countered by arguing that it was entitled to factor in the total amount of drugs seized from the apartment under the "relevant conduct" provisions of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
During the sentencing hearing, Nieves argued that the PSR amount was "not correct" and that -- as further explored below -- he never admitted to possessing the larger PSR quantity. The court explicitly said that it used the PSR calculation because "even though [the full drug quantity was] not charged, [it is] considered relevant conduct."
The district court's denial of Nieves's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is the other primary issue in this appeal. As noted above, Nieves pleaded guilty to two counts of the indictment against him in August 2018. As part of the plea agreement's factual stipulations, Nieves "acknowledge[d] that the possession of the ... firearms [found in the apartment in which he was arrested] was in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime" and that "he possessed with intent to distribute 87.23 [grams] of [marijuana]." He also "acknowledge[d] ... that he [was] pleading guilty freely and voluntarily because he is guilty." Nieves further confirmed both that his plea was voluntary and that he agreed with the substance of the plea agreement's factual stipulations during the change-of-plea hearing.
Nevertheless, Nieves moved to withdraw his guilty plea nearly six months after this colloquy, at a hearing that originally was intended for his sentencing. Despite the fact that he had previously agreed twice to the substance of the plea agreement's factual stipulations, he told the district court that he was "at that [apartment] and I was sleeping there, but I am being judged for something that was happening of which I had no knowledge" and thus wished to withdraw his plea.2 Nieves further detailed in a written motion to the court that he sought the withdrawal because "he faces being sentenced for facts other than what he conceded in his plea" (i.e., the PSR's larger drug quantity), and that "[h]e did not understand that by pleading guilty to [the drug possession count] and accepting certain facts, that he would be pleading guilty to other alleged facts, and ... sentenced accordingly."
The district court denied this motion and, in doing so, adopted the government's justifications for opposing it: namely, (1) that the district court's explanation to Nieves that it could impose a sentence in excess of the proposals in the plea agreement belied the notion that Nieves did not understand the sentencing consequences of his plea, and (2) that both the lack of an explicit claim of innocence in his motion and the nearly six-month gap between the colloquy and Nieves's attempt to withdraw his plea illustrated that he did not meet the standard for such a grant of relief. Despite this, Nieves reiterated at his sentencing hearing that he never admitted to the PSR's drug-quantity calculation as part of his plea agreement, since he told his counsel before signing the agreement that "I am not going to sign anything admitting I was doing anything [in the apartment], because what I was doing was sleeping." The court rejected Nieves's argument and told him that he should have refused to sign the agreement if that were the case.
Ultimately, having denied Nieves's motion to withdraw his plea and relying on the PSR's Guidelines drug-quantity calculation, the district court sentenced Nieves to a total of 72 months of imprisonment for both of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. Because the combined sentence exceeded 66 months, the government concedes that the waiver-of-appeal provision in Nieves's plea agreement does not apply. This appeal followed.
As noted above, Nieves argues that the district court erred both in denying his motion to withdraw his plea and in using the PSR's drug quantity in calculating his Guidelines range. We address each argument in turn.
"When the issue is preserved, ‘we review the district court's denial of ... a motion [to withdraw a guilty plea] solely for abuse of discretion.’ " United States v. Williams, 48 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Flete-Garcia, 925 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2019) ). Despite this standard being "highly deferential," United States v. Vázquez-Martínez, 812 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 229, 234 (1st Cir. 2014) ), our review also recognizes that the district court's discretion "may be ‘somewhat more limited’ when one of [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11's core concerns is implicated," Williams, 48 F.4th at 8 (quoting United States v. Abbott, 241 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) ). See also United States v. Kitts, 27 F.4th 777, 784 (1st Cir. 2022) ().
Because Nieves attempted to withdraw his guilty plea after the court's prior acceptance thereof, he had the burden of "show[ing] a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). In deciding whether a defendant has proffered a "fair and just reason" for withdrawal, a district court "must take into account the totality of the relevant circumstances." Flete-Garcia, 925 F.3d at 24. While we have never claimed to set forth an "exclusive list of reasons that might allow withdrawal of a plea," United States v. Gardner, 5 F.4th 110, 114 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Aker, 181 F.3d 167, 170 (1st Cir. 1999) ), our cases point to the following factors as worthy of a district court's consideration when evaluating a Rule 11(d)(2)(B) claim:
(1) whether the original plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and in compliance with Rule 11, (2) the strength of the reason for withdrawal, (3) the timing of the motion to withdraw, (4) whether the defendant has a serious claim of actual innocence, (5) whether the parties had reached (or breached) a plea agreement, and (6) whether the government would suffer prejudice if withdrawal is permitted.
Id. Nevertheless, "[d]espite its permissive nature, th[e] [fair and just reason] standard ‘does not endow [a defendant] with an unfettered right to retract a guilty plea.’ " Flete-Garcia, 925 F.3d at 24 () (quoting United States v. Merritt, 755 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2014) ). Indeed, " ‘buyer's remorse’ is not a valid basis on which to dissolve a plea agreement and ‘the fact that a defendant finds himself faced with a stiffer sentence than he had anticipated is not a fair and just reason for abandoning a guilty plea.’ " Moreno-Espada v. United States, 666 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir. 2012) (second quoting United States v. Mercedes Mercedes, 428 F.3d 355, 359 (1st Cir. 2005) ).
On appeal, Nieves claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea because it discredited what he characterizes as his repeated claims of innocence and failed to ascertain whether Nieves "understood that the court could find that he possessed a greater amount of drugs" than the quantity specified in the plea agreement.3 We address each claim in turn.
As a preliminary point, and as Nieves acknowledges himself, "the timing of [his] request to withdraw his guilty plea is bad." While the nearly six-month gap between his guilty plea and withdrawal attempt is not dispositive, "[t]his extended delay weighs against permitting withdrawal." United States v. Dunfee, 821 F.3d 120, 131 (1st Cir. 2016). Indeed, we have found on multiple occasions that delays as short as two months between guilty pleas and withdrawal attempts counsel against permitting withdrawal, especially when a defendant has received an unfavorable PSR. See,...
To continue reading
Request your trial