United States v. Gardner

• Decision Date: 20 July 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-1584,19-1584
• Citation: 5 F.4th 110
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Louis GARDNER, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

5 F.4th 110

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.Louis GARDNER, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 19-1584

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

July 20, 2021

William S. Maddox for appellant.

Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Scott W. Murray, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

Before Lynch, Lipez, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Louis Gardner pled guilty to a variety of drug and firearm offenses in exchange for a 120-month sentence. While in custody prior to sentencing, he assaulted a fellow inmate, a breach of the plea agreement. In light of that breach, the government withdrew from the agreement. When Gardner then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, the government opposed, insisting that Gardner was still bound by the plea. The district court denied the motion to withdraw and sentenced Gardner to 160 months' imprisonment -- 40 months above the agreed-upon sentence. Gardner now appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea, as well as the length of his sentence. Because we agree that Gardner should have been allowed to withdraw his plea, we do not reach the sentencing issue.

I.

Louis Gardner was charged with six related drug and firearm offenses. He and the government negotiated a plea agreement. The agreement explained that "[i]n exchange for the defendant's guilty pleas" on three of the six counts, the government "agrees" to certain sentencing stipulations and to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment.¹ It also stated that the parties "stipulate and agree that 120 months' imprisonment is an appropriate disposition of this case," and that the parties intended this sentencing stipulation to be "binding" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C),² meaning that "if the Court will not accept the plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A),³ the plea agreement is null and void and the defendant will be allowed the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas." In addition to other recitals, waivers, and stipulations, the agreement included a breach provision, which specified that if, "before sentencing," Gardner "violates any term or condition of this Plea Agreement, engages in any criminal activity, or fails to appear for sentencing," the government "may consider such conduct to be a breach of the Plea Agreement and may withdraw therefrom."

The district court duly held a change of plea hearing. The court went over the agreement and confirmed that Gardner understood it and was entering into the plea knowingly and voluntarily. As part of its review, the district court also explained the significance of the stipulated sentence:

THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Gardner, you and the government have agreed that the total sentence that's to be imposed in this ... case is 120 months in prison. That's a binding agreement which means if the Court accepts that agreement and imposes that sentence, do you understand you cannot withdraw your guilty plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If the court does not accept that binding agreement and does not impose that sentence, do you understand that you would have the opportunity then to withdraw your guilty plea?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

In accordance with the agreement, the district court then accepted Gardner's guilty plea on the three counts and set a date for sentencing.

While in custody awaiting sentencing, Gardner assaulted a fellow inmate. Citing the breach provision that allowed it to withdraw from the plea agreement if the defendant committed criminal activity before sentencing, the government moved to withdraw. After a hearing, the district court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gardner did indeed commit the assault, granted the government's motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, and rescheduled sentencing on the previously-entered plea.

Sixteen days after the government's motion to withdraw from the plea agreement was granted, Gardner moved to withdraw the underlying guilty plea. At the hearing on the motion, his counsel argued that, given that "the government has withdrawn from the agreement," and assuming that "the Court is not going to accept the 120 month[ ]" stipulated sentence, Gardner "should be allowed the opportunity to withdraw his plea." The district court denied the motion, stating that, as a matter of fairness, Gardner's loss of the stipulated sentence was "a consequence of his own actions," and "the government's withdrawal from the plea agreement because of Gardner's breach is not a sufficient reason to permit him to withdraw his guilty pleas." Then, addressing the fact that the agreement allowed Gardner to withdraw his plea "if the Court will not accept the plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A)," the court reasoned that it had not actually rejected the plea agreement, a process which entails its own, somewhat elaborate procedures for rejection under Rule 11(c)(5).⁴ Instead, the court explained that it had simply allowed the government to withdraw (as permitted by the breach provision), meaning that Gardner's right to withdraw the plea was never triggered.

After denying Gardner's motion to withdraw his plea, the district court proceeded to sentencing. Now unbound by the agreement's 120-month stipulation, it applied the Sentencing Guidelines and ultimately imposed a sentence of 160 months. On appeal, Gardner challenges the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.

II.

Guilty pleas and plea agreements are distinct, governed by different parts of Rule 11. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a), (b) (guilty pleas); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) (plea agreements). Although a defendant usually pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, "[g]uilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time." United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997).

In general, we review a district court's denial of a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rodríguez-Morales, 647 F.3d 395, 397 (1st Cir. 2011). When presented with such a motion, a district court must determine whether there is a "fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B) ; see also United States v. Dunfee, 821 F.3d 120, 127 (1st Cir. 2016). In applying that standard, there is not an "exclusive list of reasons that might allow withdrawal of a plea." United States v. Aker, 181 F.3d 167, 170 (1st Cir. 1999). However, according to case law, relevant considerations include: (1) whether the original plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and in compliance with Rule 11, (2) the strength of the reason for withdrawal, (3) the timing of the motion to withdraw, (4) whether the defendant has a serious claim of actual innocence, (5) whether the parties had reached (or breached) a plea agreement, and (6) whether the government would suffer prejudice if withdrawal is permitted. See Dunfee, 821 F.3d at 127 ; United States v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 1992). The overall standard is "liberal," United States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 454 (1st Cir. 1983), and "permissive," United States v. Merritt, 755 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2014).⁵

Gardner's argument for allowing his withdrawal turns on the language of his plea agreement. When interpreting a plea agreement, we apply "[b]asic contract principles." United States v. Newbert, 504 F.3d 180, 185 (1st Cir. 2007). The touchstone is the "defendant's reasonable understanding" of the agreement. United States v. Conway, 81 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1996).⁶

III.

Our first task, then, is to determine the parties' reasonable understanding of the agreement, specifically as to whether Gardner would be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea if the government withdrew from the agreement because of Gardner's breach.

In our view, that question is resolved by the agreement itself, which states: "[I]f the Court will not accept the plea agreement under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A), the plea agreement is null and void and the defendant will be allowed the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas." Although this "opportunity to withdraw" provision refers to the court not accepting the agreement under Rule 11(c)(3)(A), it does not say that the right to withdraw is limited to any particular reason for non-acceptance. Rather, it says that Gardner will have the option to withdraw his plea if the event contemplated by the language -- the acceptance of the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(3)(A) and the imposition of the stipulated sentence -- did not occur for any reason. Here, undisputedly, that event never occurred.

In denying Gardner's motion to withdraw his plea, therefore, the district court misread the "opportunity to withdraw" provision. It first determined that the agreement allowed Gardner to withdraw the plea only if the court " ‘reject[ed]’ the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(3)(A) and (c)(5)." And then it reasoned that:

In this case ... the court did not "reject" the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(3)(A) and (c)(5). In granting the government's motion to withdraw from the agreement, the court enforced ... the plea agreement, which permitted the government to withdraw if Gardner engaged in criminal activity. ... Gardner cannot transform his breach of the plea agreement, which cost him his right to receive the agreed-upon sentence, into a rejection of the agreement by the court.

We see two difficulties with the court's approach. First, while the district court was undoubtedly "enforcing" the agreement by allowing the government to withdraw in light of Gardner's breach, that enforcement is only one half of the equation. Both parties to the agreement have a claim to its enforcement. The second question is what impact the government's withdrawal had on Gardner's rights -- and specifically, whether Gardner remained bound by his guilty plea or had a right to withdraw it.

On that question, the district court, in...