United States v. Nikolaos Vastardis
| Decision Date | 26 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 19-66-RGA |
| Citation | 448 F.Supp.3d 391 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. Nikolaos VASTARDIS, Evridiki Navigation, Inc., Liquimar Tankers Management Services, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Richard A. Udell and Kenneth E. Nelson, Environmental Crimes Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
George M. Chalos and Briton P. Sparkman, CHALOS & CO, P.C. Oyster Bay, NY; and Bruce M. Merrill, Portland, ME, Attorneys for Defendants.
Before me is Defendants' Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal, or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial. (D.I. 134). I have reviewed the parties' briefing. (D.I. 134, 139, 142). I will deny Defendants' motion.
The Defendants in this case are Chief Engineer Vastardis, who was onboard the M/T Evridiki at the time it was subject to inspection by the U.S. Coast Guard, Evridiki Navigation and Liquimar Tankers Management Services, the ship's corporate owner and corporate operator respectively. On May 16, 2019, Defendants were charged with failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book, falsification of records, obstruction of justice, and false statements. On December 19, 2019, after a seven-day trial, a jury found each of the three Defendants guilty on all four counts.
At the close of the Government's case-in-chief at trial, Defendants each presented motions for a judgment of acquittal. Defendant Chief Engineer Vastardis moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts of the indictment due to insufficiency of the evidence. As to Count One of the indictment, Defendant Vastardis claimed the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowingly and willfully caused the Master of the vessel to fail to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book. As to Count Four, Defendant Vastardis claimed that the indictment failed to specify which valve of the Oil Content Meter was fully open when the oily water separator was run at sea during normal operations.1
Defendants Liquimar and Evridiki each argued that it is entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that: (1) the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships and obstruction statutes do not apply to conduct aboard a foreign-flagged vessel outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States; (2) the evidence that the Government submitted at trial did not establish that the chief engineer had caused the Master of the ship to fail to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book while in U.S. waters and there was insufficient evidence of the attendant obstruction of justice and false statement charges. Defendant Evridiki argued that (1) the Government failed to establish that Chief Engineer Vastardis was an employee or agent of the corporation, and (2) the Government failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that Vastardis (a) acted within the scope of his employment and (b) with the intent to benefit the corporation.
Corporate Defendants now renew their oral motions for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (D.I. 134). In the alternative, Defendants request that the Court order a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Id. ).
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant to move for a judgment of acquittal following a jury verdict of guilt when the evidence is "insufficient to sustain a conviction" of the offense charged. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. "The dispositive question for any claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " United States v. Schaffer , 777 F. App'x 581, 583 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ); see also United States v. Johnson , 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).
In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and must presume that the jury has properly carried out its functions of evaluating credibility of witnesses, finding the facts, and drawing justifiable inferences." United States v. Lacy , 446 F.3d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 2006). Courts must be "vigilant not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence or by substituting its judgment for that of the jury." United States v. Brodie , 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005). The defendant bears a "very heavy burden" when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict. United States v. Coyle , 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995). A "finding of insufficiency should ‘be confined to cases where the prosecution's failure is clear.’ " United States v. Smith , 294 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2002).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 allows a court, upon motion of a defendant, to grant a new trial if mandated by the interest of justice. United States v. Brennan , 326 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2003). In considering a motion under Rule 33, "even if a district court believes that the jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, it can order a new trial only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred – that is, that an innocent person has been convicted." United States v. Silveus , 542 F.3d 993, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 2008). In reviewing a Rule 33 motion, the court exercises its own judgment in assessing the case against the defendant. United States v. Johnson , 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002). The decision whether to grant a new trial rests in the district court's discretion. United States v. Noel , 905 F.3d 258, 270 (3d Cir. 2018).
In their joint briefing, Defendants submit that (1) Evridiki is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish that Chief Engineer Vastardis was an agent or employee of Evridiki, and (2) both corporate defendants are entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to establish that they could be held vicariously liable for the acts of Defendant Vastardis. (D.I. 134 at 4-5).
A company may be vicariously liable for criminal conduct if the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the criminal act was done by a corporate agent or employee acting within the scope of his authority and with the intent to benefit the corporation. United States v. Am. Radiator & Stand. San. Corp. , 433 F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970).
Defendants argue that the record is devoid of proof that Evridiki had any employees or agents acting on its behalf and, therefore, no act charged in the indictment can properly be attributed vicariously to Evridiki. (D.I. 134 at 4). Defendants contend that the Government's evidence related to corporate vicarious liability, including the contract of employment for the chief engineer and the ship management agreement between the corporate owner and operator, failed to demonstrate that the chief engineer was an agent of Evridiki. (Id. ). Defendants state that the Government improperly imputed liability to Evridiki on the basis that Liquimar was an agent of Evridiki and Chief Engineer Vastardis was an agent or employee of Liquimar. (Id. ).
The Government's evidence, presented at trial, supports a basis for finding criminal liability. The record establishes that Defendant Vastardis was an agent or employee of Evridiki and that Defendant Vastardis acted as an agent of Defendants Liquimar and Evridiki with the intent to benefit the corporations.
First, the Government introduced evidence at trial that established that Defendant Vastardis was an agent of both Defendants Evridiki Navigation and Liquimar Tankers. The Government introduced the owner/operator "BIMCO" management agreement between Evridiki and Liquimar, establishing that Defendants were the owner and operator of the M/T Evridiki. Defendant Vastardis' employment contract with Defendant Liquimar indicated that Liquimar was "acting as agent of" Defendant Evridiki Navigation. The Government also presented evidence establishing Evridiki's power to hire, fire, and promote Defendant Vastardis. Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to establish that Defendant Vastardis was an agent of Evridiki.
Second, the Government's evidence established that Defendant Vastardis acted within the scope of his authority with respect to improper operation of the Oily Water Separator and Oil Content Monitor. Defendant Vastardis was the person who was assigned responsibility to operate the Oily Water Separator and the person responsible for maintaining the ship's Oil Record Book. The Government produced evidence that Defendant Vastardis made entries in the Oil Record Book and Defendant Vastardis' signature appeared on each entry claiming the use of the Oily Water Separator and Oil Content Monitor during the period of time when he was aboard the ship. Thus, given his responsibilities and actions onboard the ship, there is sufficient evidence to support a rational jury's finding that Defendant Vastardis acted within the scope of his authority.
Third, the evidence presented at trial established that Defendant Vastardis was acting with intent to benefit the corporations. The Government presented evidence regarding the Certificate of Compliance inspection that was a necessary precondition to conducting business in the United States. A failure to pass inspection could also lead to restrictions on the ship's ability to leave the port. Thus, intentional manipulation of the Oil Content Monitor such that oily water was improperly discharged overboard, if disclosed, would result in a failure to...
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