United States v. Orejel-Tejeda

• Decision Date: 28 April 1961
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 12743.
• Citation: 194 F. Supp. 140
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Alejandro OREJEL-TEJEDA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

194 F. Supp. 140

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Alejandro OREJEL-TEJEDA, Defendant.

Crim. No. 12743.

United States District Court N. D. California, N. D.

April 28, 1961.

Laurence E. Dayton, U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., Robert E. Woodward, Asst. U. S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff.

Jack T. Sherwyn, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.

OLIVER J. CARTER, District Judge.

Defendant was indicted in eight counts for the alleged illegal transportation of aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324 (a) (2),¹ hereinafter referred to as Section 1324. The case was tried to the Court without a jury, and, after the evidence was closed, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence did not show a violation of the statute. The evidence, while in stark contrast in some aspects, is virtually uncontradicted as to the basic elements of the alleged crime.

In the eight counts of the indictment defendant is charged with the illegal transportation of alien Mexican farm laborers from the vicinity of El Centro and Calexico in Imperial County, California, to the vicinity of Turlock in Stanislaus County, California. The Court takes judicial knowledge that El Centro and Calexico are cities in the Imperial Valley of California near the Mexican border, and that Turlock is in the San Joaquin Valley of California more than five hundred miles north of the Mexican border. The undisputed evidence establishes that the defendant transported alien Mexican farm laborers in two trips, four on each trip. The first trip was on June 26, 1960, from El Centro to Turlock, and the second trip was on July 10, 1960, from Calexico to Turlock. At the time of transportation the persons transported were alien, non-immigrant, Mexican farm laborers who had been lawfully admitted into the United States as agricultural workers for employment in Imperial, Riverside and San Diego Counties in California. All of the entries by the aliens were within three years of the transportation. The evidence is not clear as to whether all the transportees were restricted to employment in this particular area of California, but for the purposes of this memorandum it will be assumed that all the named persons were so limited by the entry permit form I-100C. There is also some conflict in the evidence as to whether the permits of some of the transportees had expired, and in this respect the Court finds that all of the entry permits were valid and unexpired at the time of transportation. There is also some intimation that, as to the group transported from Calexico, defendant had met them before the transportation in Mexicali on the Mexican side of the border, and had made the arrangements for transportation in Mexico. The evidence does not support this intimation, and the Court finds that the arrangements for transportation and the transportation itself occurred in the United States after the persons transported had lawfully entered the United States under valid entry permits. There is also conflicting evidence on whether defendant knew at the time of transportation that the transported laborers were limited to the indicated southern California area by their entry permits. In this respect the Court finds that the defendant did have such knowledge. It is clear from the evidence that the defendant had the purpose of transporting Mexican farm laborers to the Turlock area to supply labor to farmers in that area, and that he was doing so for a profit to himself. The evidence is clear that he charged a great deal more for the trip to each person transported than the cost of transportation.

In transporting the aliens from an area in California where the aliens were lawfully admitted for agricultural work to an area in California where the aliens were not lawfully permitted to work under their entry permits has defendant violated the provisions of Section 1324, supra, which makes unlawful the transportation within the United States of "any alien * * * not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens * * *" by any person "knowing that he the alien is in the United States in violation of law." I conclude that he has not.

At the time of transportation all of the transported aliens had been "duly admitted to the United States by an immigration officer," and were "lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States" under the appropriate statutes, regulations and treaties. See Title V of the Agricultural Act of 1949, 7 U.S.C. A. §§ 1461-1468; 8 C.F.R. 214.2(k).² Such aliens had a non-immigrant status (8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (15) (H) (ii)³ and as such were subject to deportation for violations of the conditions of such status. (8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (9)).⁴ It was only when the aliens were transported to the Turlock area, which was outside of their permitted area of labor, that they were subject to deportation, and, to that extent, illegally in the United States. It could be argued logically that at that time they were not "lawfully entitled to reside within the United States" and that defendant, in changing their lawful status by the transportation, came within the proscription of Section 1324. Such an interpretation would be at variance with some cardinal principles of statutory interpretation.

The first basic principle to be observed is that Section 1324 is a penal statute, and, therefore, is to be strictly construed. United States v. Fruit Growers' Express Co., 279 U.S. 363, 49 S.Ct. 374, 73 L.Ed. 739; McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816, 3 Sutherland on Statutory Construction, p. 49, § 5604. But, of course, this is only one factor bearing upon the construction of this statute, and second, and equally important, is the construction of the statute in accordance with the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 30 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed. 173; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226.

In discussing the role of courts in statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Carter v. Liquid Carbonic Pac. Corp., 1938, 97 F.2d 1, 3, stated:

"But in the construction of a statute the duty of the Courts is to ascertain the legislative intent `not by taking the word or clause in question from its setting and viewing it apart, but by considering it in connection with the context, the general purposes of the statute in which it is found, the occasion and circumstances of its use, and other appropriate tests for the ascertainment of the legislative will.' Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93, 55 S.Ct. 50, 54, 79 L.Ed. 211."

In Herrera v. United States, 9 Cir., 1954, 208 F.2d 215, 216, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in discussing Section 1324, said:

"Public Law 283 is entitled `An Act To assist in preventing aliens from entering or remaining in the United States illegally.' House Report No. 1377, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., indicates that the purpose of the legislation was to `overcome a deficiency in the present law making it an offense to harbor or conceal aliens who have entered this Country illegally, and to strengthen the law generally in preventing aliens from entering or remaining in the United States illegally.' Emphasis supplied. The legislation appears to have been an outgrowth of

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