United States v. Padilla-Diaz

Decision Date05 July 2017
Docket Number No. 15-30375, No. 15-30294,No. 15-30279,15-30279
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Armando PADILLA-DIAZ, aka Gordo, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffrey Allen Heckman, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bernardo Contreras Guzman, aka Chapparito, aka Chapparo, aka Huerro, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Elizabeth Gillingham Daily (argued), Research and Writing Attorney; Stephen R. Sady, Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Portland, Oregon; Bryan E. Lessley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Eugene, Oregon; for Defendants-Appellants.

Kelly A. Zusman (argued), Appellate Chief; Jeffrey S. Sweet, Assistant United States Attorney; Billy J. Williams, United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, Portland, Oregon; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, William A. Fletcher, and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Armando Padilla-Diaz, Jeffrey Heckman, and Bernardo Contreras Guzman ("Defendants") in these consolidated cases appeal the district courts' denials of their motions for sentence reductions under United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") Amendment 782 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Each defendant was denied a reduction based on an application of the Sentencing Commission's Policy Statement § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), which prohibits courts from reducing a defendant's "term of imprisonment" to "less than the minimum of the amended guideline range," absent circumstances not present here. All three defendants contend that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) is invalid because it conflicts with 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) and violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Defendants Padilla-Diaz and Heckman, who entered their pleas before the current version of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) was promulgated, further contend that the retroactive application of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) violates their right to due process. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. Statutory Overview

Congress has given the Sentencing Commission broad authority, set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 994, to promulgate guidelines, propose amendments, and prescribe the limits of possible sentence reductions. Section 994(a) authorizes the Commission to promulgate guidelines and general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines. Section 994(o) provides that the Commission "periodically shall review and revise ... the guidelines promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section," and § 994(p) permits the Commission to "submit to Congress amendments to the guidelines," which "shall be accompanied by a statement of the reasons therefor and shall take effect on a date specified by the Commission." When the Commission exercises its power to reduce a particular guideline range, "it shall specify in what circumstances and by what amount" sentences may be reduced. 28 U.S.C. § 994(u).

On November 1, 2014, the Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 782 pursuant to its authority under § 994(o). Amendment 782 revised the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, effectively lowering the base offense level by two levels for most federal drug offenses. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 782 (2014). Under Amendment 788, Amendment 782 applies retroactively. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 788 (2014).

A defendant may seek the benefit of Amendment 782 by moving for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2) provides that a defendant may seek a sentence reduction if he "has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)." A district court may "reduce the term of imprisonment" only "if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

The "applicable policy statement" at issue in this case is § 1B1.10(b). Section 1B1.10(b)(1) provides that, in determining "whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment ... is warranted," the court "shall determine the amended guideline range that would have been applicable to the defendant if the [relevant] amendment(s) ... had been in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." Section 1B1.10(b)(2) further provides that "the court shall not reduce the defendant's term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. [§] 3582(c)(2) and this policy statement to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline range," unless the defendant received a downward departure for substantial assistance at his original sentencing. This version of § 1B1.10(b)(2) became effective November 1, 2011. Prior to that time, § 1B1.10(b)(2) had generally permitted courts to reduce sentences to below the amended guideline range if the defendant received a below-guidelines sentence at his original sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2) (2010).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

In January 2010, Padilla-Diaz pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. In February 2011, Heckman pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of methamphetamine. In May 2013, Contreras Guzman pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and methamphetamine and to use communication devices. In their original sentences, each defendant received downward departures or variances that lowered their sentences below the initial guideline range generated by their total offense levels and criminal history categories.

After Amendment 782 was promulgated, Defendants each moved for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2). In accordance with § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), the district courts denied the motions because Defendants' sentences were already at or below the low end of their amended guideline ranges.

Defendants appeal, challenging the validity and application of § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). The parties agree that, absent the limitation in § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A), each Defendant would have been eligible to receive a lower sentence.

III. Standard of Review

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's denial of a sentence reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

United States v. Lightfoot , 626 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion "if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo the proper construction of a statute, Miranda v. Anchondo , 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2012), and the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Kuchinski , 469 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2006).

IV. Discussion

Defendants make three arguments on appeal. First, they contend that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) is invalid because it conflicts with 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). Second, they contend that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Third, two of the three defendants contend that even if § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) is valid, its retroactive application violates due process. We address each argument in turn.

A. Conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)

Defendants contend that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) conflicts with 28 U.S.C. § 991(b). Section 991(b) provides that one of the "purposes" of the Commission is to "establish sentencing policies and practices" that "avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). The government contends that the Ninth Circuit has already rejected an equivalent argument in United States v. Tercero , 734 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2013).

Like this case, Tercero involved an appeal from the denial of a sentence reduction motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Tercero received a downward departure at her original sentencing hearing, resulting in a 72-month sentence. Tercero , 734 F.3d at 980. When she applied for a sentence reduction based on a retroactive amendment to the crack cocaine guidelines, the district court found that she qualified for a reduction but reduced her sentence by only two months. The district court concluded that it could not depart below 70 months, the low end of Tercero's amended guideline range, because § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) prohibits reductions "below the low end of the adjusted Guidelines range." Id. at 981. We affirmed.

Tercero challenged § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) on a variety of grounds. Inter alia , she contended that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) conflicts with "the purpose of the Guidelines ... to bring about an effective, fair sentencing system, with honest, uniform and proportionate sentences." Id. at 983 (internal quotation marks omitted). Tercero contended that because § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)"prevent [ed] the district court from revising [Tercero's] sentence to reflect the very minor role she played in the drug conspiracy," it conflicted with the Guidelines' goal of proportionality. Id. We rejected this argument, noting that the original sentencing court had considered proportionality when it evaluated the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because a motion for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2)"does not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding," no further consideration of Tercero's particular circumstances was required. Id. (quoting Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 825, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) ).

Defendants contend that Tercero does not foreclose their argument because we did not specifically discuss § 991(b). While their argument is not, strictly speaking, foreclosed, the argument advanced and rejected in Tercero was equivalent in material respects to the...

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