United States v. Parker
| Decision Date | 13 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 5:15-cr-55-MHH-HGD |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. ERIC SLOAN PARKER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This matter is before the Court on defendant Eric Parker's renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal. Mr. Parker asks the Court to enter judgment in his favor on the charge that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 242. Section 242 states:
Whoever, under color of any law, . . . willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 242.1 Officer Parker contends that the Court should grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the Government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he willfully violated Mr. Sureshbhai Patel's asserted Fourth Amendment right to be free from law enforcement officers' unreasonable use of force. Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs Officer Parker's motion.
Rule 29 provides, in pertinent part, that a defendant "may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days . . . after the court discharges the jury," and the court may enter a judgment of acquittal "[i]f the jury has failed to return a verdict." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1)-(2). The jury failed to return a verdict after the second trial in this case. Officer Parker orally renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal after the jurors advised the Court that they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict, and the Court took up the renewed motion after the Court discharged the jury. (Doc. 110, pp. 4-5, 7-12). Therefore, the Court may enter a judgment of acquittal if the record supports such a judgment.
United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953, 959 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Sellers, 871 F.2d 1019, 1021 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also United States v. Taylor, 972 F.2d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 1992) ( ) (quoting United States v. Varkonyi, 611 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1980)).2
The Government asserts that Eric Sloan Parker, while serving as an officer of the Madison Police Department, violated 18 U.S.C. § 242 by willfully depriving Mr. Sureshbhai Patel of his asserted right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from the use of unreasonable force by a law enforcement officer. (Doc. 1, p. 1).3 The charge against Officer Parker arises from an encounter that Officer Parker had with Mr. Patel on February 6, 2015 that ended with Officer Parker taking Mr. Patel to the ground. A jury may find Officer Parker guilty of a violation of § 242 only if the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt: that Officer Parker acted under color of law; that he deprived Mr. Patel of a right secured to him and protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, in this case, the right to be free from the unreasonable use of physical force by law enforcement officers; that Officer Parker acted willfully; and that his actions resulted in bodily injury to Mr. Patel. (Doc. 107, pp. 141-42). There is no doubt that Officer Parker was acting under color of state law when he encountered Mr. Patel, and the record contains clear evidence that Mr. Patel suffered bodily injury.4 A reasonable jurycould find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government proved these two elements of the charge against Officer Parker. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to find otherwise on the evidence in the record in this case.
The evidence relating to the questions of whether there was an unreasonable use of force and whether Officer Parker willfully deprived Mr. Patel of rights that may be secured to Mr. Patel under the United States Constitution is another matter. The evidence relating to use of force and willfulness is hotly contested. These two elements of the charge against Officer Parker must be assessed independently because the first—reasonable use of force—is measured by an objective standard while the second—willfulness—involves a subjective test. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).5 The Court examines these elements in turn.
"Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. And "reasonableness" must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances confronting an officer at "the moment" the officer employed force: "'[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers,' violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). "[T]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id. at 396-97.
Consistent with these principles of law concerning reasonable use of force, the Court instructed the jurors as follows:
(Doc. 107, pp. 143-44; see also Doc. 69, p. 152).
The Madison Police Department's "Response to Resistance" policy, which governed Officer Parker's conduct on February 6, 2015, incorporates many of the legal principles contained in the Court's use of force instruction. That policy states:
It is the policy of the Madison Police Department that sworn personnel use that amount of force which is reasonable to accomplish the lawful objectives of the [MPD] in order to gain compliance and bring incidents or persons under control.
(GX26, p. 1, admitted at Doc. 106, p. 12). The policy authorizes sworn personnel:
(GX26, p. 2). The policy defines "Objectively Reasonable" as "[a] circumstance or a set of circumstances which would likely cause a reasonable officer to act or think in a similar way under similar circumstances." (GX26, p. 1). The policy requires officers who use force to "be able to articulate that their decisions and actions were reasonable at the time of a response to resistance incident based on the totality of the circumstances and information available to them at the time." (GX26, p. 2).
The parties developed a robust evidentiary record concerning the totality of the circumstances surrounding Office Parker's use of force. That evidence starts with the call that brought Officer Parker to the Hardiman Place neighborhood in Madison, Alabama on the morning of February 6, 2015. Around 8:00 a.m. that morning, the Madison County 911 center received a suspicious subject call on its nonemergency line from a known caller6 who lived in the Hardiman Place neighborhood.7 The caller reported that a black male wearing a toboggan cap,sweater, and jeans was walking into yards, standing in driveways, and looking into garages. (Doc. 105, pp. 6-7, 9-11, 84-85, 114-15; Doc....
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