United States v. Patel
| Decision Date | 28 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cr-220 (VAB) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MAHESH PATEL, ROBERT HARVEY, HARPREET WASAN, STEVEN HOUGHTALING, TOM EDWARDS, and GARY PRUS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
The United States of America (the “Government”) has charged Mahesh Patel (“Mr. Patel”), Robert Harvey (“Mr. Harvey”), Harpreet Wasan (“Mr Wasan”), Steven Houghtaling (“Mr Houghtaling”), Tom Edwards (“Mr. Edwards”) and Gary Prus (“Mr. Prus”) (collectively “Defendants”) in a one-count Indictment with conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 (the “Sherman Act”). See Indictment, ECF No. 20 (Dec. 15, 2021) (“Indictment”).
Defendants jointly filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, Defs.' Joint Mot. for J. of Acquittal, ECF No. 579 (“Mot.”), and Mr. Wasan and Mr. Harvey separately filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of the motion for judgment of acquittal, Mr. Harvey's and Mr. Wasan's Suppl. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Joint Mot for J. of Acquittal, ECF No. 591 ( ).
On April 25, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on the pending motions, and subsequently issued an order permitting the Government to supplement its oral argument with a written submission. Order, ECF No. 591.
On April 26, 2023, the Government filed a written opposition to Defendants' motions. See Gov. Opp'n to Defs.' Rule 29 Mots., ECF No. 593 (“Opp'n”).
On April 27, 2023, the Defendants filed a reply to the Government's opposition. Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Joint Mot. for J. of Acquittal and Suppl. Mot. for Acquittal, ECF No. 595 (“Reply”).
On April 27, 2023, the Government filed a sur-reply to Defendants' motions. Gov't's Surreply to Defs.' Rule 29 Mot., ECF No. 595 (“Sur-Reply”).
Having considered all of the filings and the various arguments of the parties, for the following reasons, Defendants' joint motion for judgment of acquittal is GRANTED.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the factual and procedural background and therefore, the Court will only address the background issues relating to the pending motions. See, e.g., Ruling and Order on Pretrial Mots. at 3-11, ECF No. 458; Ruling and Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 5-9, ECF No. 257 (“MTD Ruling”).
On December 15, 2021, the Government charged Defendants in a sealed single-count Indictment alleging conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Indictment. Later unsealed, the Indictment alleges that Defendants “competed against one another to recruit and hire engineers and other skilled workers” and “knowingly entered into . . . [a] conspiracy . . . to suppress competition by allocating employees in the aerospace industry working on projects for Company A.” Indictment ¶¶ 4, 19. More specifically, the Government alleged that Defendants agreed to “restrict the hiring and recruiting of engineers and other skilled-labor employees between and among Companies A-F.” Id. ¶ 19. The Indictment then provides various specific examples of the alleged enforcement of the agreement. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20-29.
On June 29, 2022, Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss the Indictment. See Defs.' Joint Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 174 (“Mot. to Dismiss”). Defendants argued, inter alia, that the alleged no-poach agreement fell outside the “limited categories of conduct” that justify per se treatment, and that prosecuting the conduct alleged in the Indictment violated the Due Process Clause. See id. at 2-3. The Government argued, in response, that a no-poach agreement pleaded as a market allocation is properly subject to the per se rule. See Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss at 16-22, ECF No. 216 (“Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss”). The Government further argued that procompetitive justifications are irrelevant to the motion to dismiss because the indictment properly pleads a per se illegal offense, and the Court had no pretrial obligation to consider a defendant's evidence of competitive effects in order to determine whether the Indictment properly charges a per se offense. See id. at 22-25.
Accepting these arguments and the facts pled in the Indictment-as it was required to do at that stage of the case-the Court denied the motion to dismiss. MTD Ruling. In doing so, the Court stated that: “While the no-poach agreement alleged in the Indictment does not qualify as a new category of restraint subject to per se treatment, the alleged conduct is subject to per se treatment because it is properly pled as a market allocation.” Id. at 17. The Court also noted that “not all no poach agreements are market allocations subject to per se treatment and therefore, determining whether a no poach agreement is a market allocation is highly fact specific.” Id. at 21. This holding was premised solely on the allegations in the Indictment. Id. at 22 . The case then proceeded to trial.
On April 24, 2023, the Government rested its case-in-chief. Tr. Vol. XIII at 3058:5-6.
On April 24, 2023, Defendants jointly filed a motion for judgment of acquittal based on several arguments. Mot. On April 25, 2023, Mr. Wasan and Mr. Harvey jointly filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of the joint motion for judgment of acquittal. Suppl. Mot.
On April 25, 2023, the Court held oral argument on the pending motions. Min. Entry, ECF No 592.
On April 25, 2023, after hearing arguments, the Court issued an order inviting the Government to file a written opposition to Defendants' motions. Order, ECF No. 591.
On April 26, 2023, the Government filed a written opposition to Defendants' motions. Opp'n.
On April 27, 2023, Defendants filed a reply in support of their motions for judgment of acquittal. Reply.
On April 27, 2023, the Government filed a sur-reply to Defendants' motions. Sur-Reply.
On April 27, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to strike the sur-reply. Defs.' Mot. to Strike Gov't Surreply, ECF No. 596. The Court denied the motion to strike on April 28, 2023. Order, ECF No. 597.
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, the court “on the defendant's motion” or “on its own” must “enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” When reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).
“A court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Facen, 812 F.3d 280, 286 (2d Cir. 2016) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 1999)). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence thus “bears a heavy burden.” United States v. Si Lu Tian, 339 F.3d 143, 150 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[C]ourts must be careful to avoid usurping the role of the jury when confronted with a motion for acquittal.” United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003). Under this standard, the court “may not usurp the role of the jury by substituting its own determination of the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury.” United States v. Heras, 609 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2005)). A court must “defer to the jury[ the] assessment of witness credibility and . . . resolution of conflicting testimony.” United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87, 9394 (2d Cir. 2000). In sum, “[t]he government's case need not exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence,” United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1042-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), and where “either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, [the court] must let the jury decide the matter,” Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 129 (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
At the same time, the Court is also mindful of its responsibility to protect Defendants' Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g., United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 2015). If courts “are to be faithful to the constitutional requirement that no person may be convicted unless the Government has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we must take seriously our obligation to assess the record to determine . . . whether a jury could reasonably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 515 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Clark, 740 F.3d 808, 811 (2d Cir. 2014)). In particular, “specious inferences are not indulged, because it would not satisfy the Constitution to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty.” Id. (quoting United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008)).
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States” violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 1, despite its expansive language, “outlaw[s] only unreasonable...
To continue reading
Request your trial