United States v. Pennell

• Decision Date: 26 July 1956
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 11616.
• Citation: 144 F. Supp. 317
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. William W. PENNELL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

144 F. Supp. 317

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. William W. PENNELL, Defendant.

Crim. No. 11616.

United States District Court N. D. California, N. D.

July 26, 1956.

Robert E. Woodward, Asst. U. S. Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiff.

Robert A. Zarick, Sacramento, Cal., for defendant.

HALBERT, District Judge.

Defendant is charged by an indictment with the interstate communication of a threat to injure another in violation of Title 18 United States Code, § 875(c).¹ The charging portion of the Indictment reads as follows:

"* * * the defendant herein, did knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully transmit and cause to be transmitted in interstate commerce from Tuscon, Arizona, to the City of Sacramento, County of Sacramento, in the Northern Division of the Northern District of California, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, a communication, to-wit: a letter addressed to Mrs. Gloria Pennell, Secretary, Western Pacific Railroad, 3500—24th Street, Sacramento, California, containing a threat to injure the person of another, Mrs. Gloria Pennell."

Defendant has made a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it "does not state facts sufficient to constitute an offense against the United States."

In support of his motion, defendant has advanced two arguments. They are:

1. That under § 875(c) of Title 18 United States Code, a threat to injure, in and of itself, does not constitute an offense, but to be an offense the threat to injure must be coupled with an intent to extort money or other thing of value; and

2. That the letter in question does not contain a threat to injure the person of another.

Both the defendant and the Government have submitted to the Court their respective positions in connection with defendant's motion. No case authorities dealing with the precise points raised by defendant have been submitted by either party, and none has been found by the Court. It is, therefore, necessary to make an initial examination of the statute in question in the light of the arguments advanced by the defendant.

Defendant's first argument might have been a valid one if it had been advanced prior to the amendment of the Statute on May 15, 1939. However, the plain language of the Statute, as it now reads, and the legislative history of the Statute, make it clear that Congress intended that the transmitting in interstate commerce of a communication threatening to injure the person of another should be, in and of itself, sufficient to constitute a violation under the Statute. A reading of the Statute as a whole, and subsection (c) in particular, patently shows the intention of Congress to make the threat to injure the person of another an offense, in and of itself, as well as to make it an offense when the threat is coupled with an attempt to extort. In subsection (c), there is no requirement of an intent to extort as there is in subsections (b) and (d), and further, it is to be noted that Congress has provided for a distinction in the penalty depending upon whether there was or was not an intent to extort, when there was a communication threatening to injure the person of another. Congressional intent is to be sought and, if possible, found primarily in the Statute under consideration, and when the language of the Statute expresses an intention reasonably intelligible and plain, this intent, thus expressed, must be accepted by the courts without modification by resort to construction or conjecture or otherwise. In re Shear, D.C., 139 F.Supp. 217.

From the legislative history of § 875 (c), it is apparent that Congress meant what it plainly and obviously said in this section, namely, that anyone who transmits in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another commits a violation of this Statute. As originally enacted on May 18, 1934, C. 300, 48 Stat. 781, this Statute required that the threat to injure the person of another be coupled with the intent to extort money, or other thing of value, before there could be a violation of the law. Congress, at the request of the Department of Justice, amended the Statute on May 15, 1939, C. 133, Sec. 2, 53 Stat. 743, for the purpose of making the various extortion Statutes uniform, and for the further purpose of making the transmitting in interstate commerce of a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another an offense, in and of itself. Sen.Rep.No. 349, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H. R. No. 102, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). There can be no doubt that Congress intended to make a charge, such as the one now before this Court, a criminal offense under this statute.

The second argument advanced by defendant in support of his motion to dismiss the indictment is that the letter (communication) transmitted in interstate commerce does not in fact...