United States v. Peoples

• Decision Date: 23 October 2012
• Docket Number: 11–4965.,Nos. 11–4963,s. 11–4963
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Robert PEOPLES, Defendant–Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Robert Peoples, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

698 F.3d 185

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Robert PEOPLES, Defendant–Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Robert Peoples, Defendant–Appellant.

Nos. 11–4963, 11–4965.

United States Court of Appeals,Fourth Circuit.

Argued: Sept. 21, 2012.

Decided: Oct. 23, 2012.

ARGUED:Parks N. Small, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Susan Zalkin Hitt, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kimberly H. Albro, Research and Writing Specialist, Caroline Scrantom, Second Year Law Student, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Jane B. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

No. 11–4963 affirmed; No. 11–4965 reversed by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judge NIEMEYER joined.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

Robert Peoples challenges two convictions for criminal contempt. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the first conviction and reverse the second.

I.

Peoples, a former inmate, has brought a number of § 1983 civil actions against prison officials in federal court in South Carolina. The district court scheduled jury selection in three of these cases for February 24, 2011 before Judge Cameron McGowan Currie.

After Peoples arrived late to court on the day of jury selection, Judge Currie cautioned him that he had to appear no later than 9:30 a.m. on March 21 for the first trial. Nonetheless, on March 21, Peoples arrived late for trial. Judge Currie warned him that if he was late again, she would dismiss his case with prejudice. The first trial concluded without further incident on March 22, with the second trial scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. on the next day, March 23.

At 9:15 a.m. on March 23, Peoples called Judge Currie's chambers to notify the court that he was stranded on the interstate, 10 to 15 minutes from the courthouse, with a flat tire and would be late for court. After speaking by telephone with Peoples and roadside assistance personnel, who confirmed that Peoples' vehicle was not drivable, Judge Currie directed a marshal to pick up Peoples and bring him to court. Although this delayed the second trial, Judge Currie did not dismiss the case; instead she found that Peoples had left his home in time to arrive by 9:30 a.m. but had been delayed by an unanticipated event. During the second trial, Peoples became disruptive and disrespectful to the court, and Judge Currie cautioned him that, if he continued to behave that way, he would be held in contempt and possibly incarcerated.

On April 11, the first day of the third trial, Judge Currie reminded Peoples that failure to appear on time for trial the next day could result in dismissal of his case with prejudice. Peoples noted his dissatisfaction with the admonishment by muttering disrespectfully. The following day, Peoples arrived 15 minutes late. After considering argument from the parties, Judge Currie determined that Peoples willfully failed to appear timely after numerous warnings and dismissed his case with prejudice. Judge Currie then directed that the jury be brought into the courtroom so that she could advise them of the dismissal. As the jury entered the courtroom, Peoples left muttering “I was wanting to dismiss my sh—anyway.”

After dismissing the jurors, Judge Currie, accompanied by the court security officer, went into the jury room to thank the jurors for their service. At that time, Peoples reentered the courtroom, and approached Deputy Clerk Sara Samsa, who was gathering jury certificates to bring to Judge Currie. Peoples interrupted Samsa and repeated several times, “Tell Judge Currie get the f–––off all my cases. I started to tell her something there. I started to tell her ass something today.” Upon hearing Peoples' remarks, Court Reporter Jenny Williams, who was finishing her work on the day's proceedings, turned on her voice recorder and recorded Peoples making some of these comments.¹ Samsa told Peoples if he had something to say to the judge, he should put it in writing, and then left the courtroom to tell Judge Currie and the court security officer of Peoples' outburst. The court security officer immediately returned to the courtroom.

The next day, Judge Currie issued a written Rule to Show Cause and Order of Referral, directing Peoples to “show cause why criminal contempt sanctions should not be imposed.” Judge Currie recused herself from further proceedings, asking that the criminal contempt trial be referred to another judge.

The criminal contempt trial was referred to Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief Judge of the Western District of North Carolina, who scheduled the trial for September 20, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. When Peoples arrived more than an hour late on September 20, Judge Conrad advised Peoples that, given his tardiness that morning, at the conclusion of the trial for contempt of Judge Currie, the court would hold a separate trial for criminal contempt to Judge Conrad himself. At this second contempt trial,Peoples and his attorney would be permitted to offer “any explanation [they] wish to offer with respect to Mr. Peoples showing up late for court this morning.”

During the first trial, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts as to Peoples' language in Judge Currie's courtroom. They also stipulated to the admission of the actual audio recording of Peoples' outburst and to the admission of FBI reports of interviews with Samsa and Williams setting forth the actions of court personnel in response to Peoples' outburst. In addition, Judge Conrad admitted a transcript from the March 23, 2011 trial in which Judge Currie admonished Peoples that his behavior could result in a contempt charge. After considering the evidence and the parties' arguments, Judge Conrad found Peoples guilty of criminal contempt of Judge Currie, and sentenced Peoples to four months' incarceration.

Immediately after concluding the first trial, Judge Conrad proceeded to a second trial to determine whether Peoples should be held in criminal contempt for his tardiness in appearing in court that day for the first contempt trial. The judge gave Peoples an opportunity to confer with his attorney in the courtroom, while court remained in session. When Peoples had done so, he addressed the court and explained that car trouble caused his tardiness. Judge Conrad found Peoples' explanation not credible and so found him guilty of a second charge of criminal contempt. Judge Conrad sentenced Peoples to an additional 30 days' incarceration consecutive to the four months previously imposed.

Peoples appeals both contempt convictions.

II.

With respect to his first contempt conviction, Peoples challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

“ ‘In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a bench trial, we must uphold a guilty verdict if, taking the view most favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.’ ” United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir.2009) (quoting Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 760–61 (4th Cir.2003)). “[S]ubstantial evidence” means “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc). We review questions of fact, other than the ultimate question of guilt, for clear error. See United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451 (4th Cir.2004). Determinations of the meaning of statutory phrases, however, constitute legal conclusions that we review de novo. See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir.2008).

Congress has provided federal courts with the power to impose criminal penalties for “contempt of [the court's] authority.” See18 U.S.C. § 401 (2006). Such acts include “[m]isbehavior of any person in [the court's] presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.” Id. § 401(1). To convict someone of criminal contempt in violation of § 401(1), the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) misbehavior of a person, (2) which is in or near to the presence of the Court, (3) which obstructs the administration of justice, and (4) which is committed with the required degree of criminal intent.” United States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 113, 115 (4th Cir.1984). Peoples maintains that the Government failed to offer sufficient evidence of the first and third elements. That is, Peoples contends that the Government failed to prove that his outburst in Judge Currie's courtroom constituted misbehavior or obstructed the administration of justice.

A.

Peoples asserts that his conduct did not amount to “misbehavior” because the words he “used have legitimate definitions,” were not directed at “Judge Currie personally,” and he “did not call Judge Currie these ... terms.” Peoples contends that he simply “expressed his unhappiness about Judge Currie's decision in his civil cases in terms ... possibly offensive to some,” but not rising to the level of misbehavior constituting criminal contempt. Appellant's Br. at 17.²

Criminal contempt does require more than just “[t]he vehemence of the language.” In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972). But Peoples did not just use vehement language. He targeted a judge, using profane language directed at the judge so that she would remove herself from his cases. Thus, Peoples did more than merely utter profane words; he profanely threatened judicial authority.

Courts repeatedly have found that offensive words directed at the court may form the basis for a contempt charge. As the Second Circuit has said, “there is an implicit standing order...