United States v. Poole, 19213.

Decision Date21 September 1971
Docket NumberNo. 19213.,19213.
Citation450 F.2d 1082
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. James POOLE et al. Appeal of William FINKLEY.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Raymond H. Conaway, Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.

Samuel J. Orr, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa. (Richard L. Thornburgh, U. S. Atty., Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before STALEY and ADAMS, Circuit Judges, and GARTH, District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STALEY, Circuit Judge.

William Finkley was convicted, following a jury trial, of having violated 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). The two-count indictment charged that Finkley, along with James Poole and Willie Thomas, robbed a Pittsburgh bank while armed with hand guns.

Finkley and Thomas were tried together, Poole having decided to plead guilty and testify for the Government. Of the veniremen from which the petit jury was selected, one was a bank teller and another was married to a bank teller. Counsel for Finkley moved to challenge both for cause, which motion was denied. Both defendants had submitted requested interrogatories to be put to the proposed jurors by the court. Number One of these interrogatories asked, "Have you or any member of your family ever been the victim of a robbery or other crime?" This requested interrogatory was denied.

On this appeal, Finkley assigns as error the district court's denial of his challenge of the two jurors for cause and the denial of his requested interrogatory. In addition, he argues that the evidence adduced against him by the Government was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

Appellant contends that the district court erred in refusing to grant requested interrogatory Number One pertaining to a juror's prior experience as a victim of crime. He argues that a defendant has a right to probe for the hidden prejudices of jurors which could affect their deliberations independent of the evidence, and specifically for prejudices resulting from a prospective juror's experience as a victim of a crime similar to that of which the defendant stands accused.

In support of his argument, appellant relies on the decisions of this court in United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 248 F.2d 1 (C.A. 3), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873, 78 S.Ct. 121, 2 L.Ed.2d 77 (1957); and United States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350 (C.A. 3, 1965). In DeVita, supra, a habeas corpus case, one of the jurors who had found the petitioner guilty of murder in the course of an armed robbery had failed to disclose on voir dire that he himself had been a recent robbery victim.1 In directing that the writ should issue, we stated that "the admitted facts demonstrate bias to the extent that it voids the process." 248 F.2d at 6. No such bias has been demonstrated in the instant case. The juror in DeVita had concealed information that the panel had been asked to disclose. The obvious conclusion is that an individual whose desire to be a juror is so great as to cause him to conceal relevant information on voir dire must certainly be incapable of objectivity. DeVita then is a case involving actual and demonstrated bias. The instant case involves only the denial of an opportunity to probe for possible bias. In that regard, our decision in United States v. Napoleone, supra, is more in point.

In Napoleone, the defendant had been convicted of falsely pretending to be an investigator for the Veterans Administration. We reversed, finding prejudicial error in the district court's refusal to ask two requested interrogatories designed to elicit any prejudice or bias that the prospective jurors might have had against one who had intentionally misrepresented himself. We held that since the crux of the defense was that while Napoleone had lied about the purpose of his investigation, he had not presented himself as an employee of the Veterans Administration, and he had the right to have prospective jurors questioned with regard to their moral or ethical repugnance...

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  • United States v. Tiangco
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • December 5, 2016
    ...in an armed robbery case, the court declined to ask whether prospective jurors had been the victim of a robbery, United States v. Poole , 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971).The concerns of juror bias raised in Poole and Segal were specific and direct. The concerns expressed in Ms. Tiangco's case,......
  • Com. v. Bailey
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 7, 1976
    ...cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829, 83 S.Ct. 1870, 10 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1963). As to prior experience as a victim of crime, see United States v. Poole, 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971). As to willingness to apply the appropriate standard of proof, see United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651--652 (6th Ci......
  • State v. Singletary
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • May 23, 1979
    ...104 Ohio App. 223, 148 N.E.2d 120 (Ct.App.1957) (juror in bastardy trial had been plaintiff in prior bastardy case); United States v. Poole, 450 F.2d 1082 (3 Cir. 1971) (observing it would be difficult to hold a robbery victim capable of objectivity in armed robbery case (Dictum )); Cf. Wri......
  • United States v. Bamberger
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • February 17, 1972
    ...v. United States, 267 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Napoleone, 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965); United States v. Finkley, 450 F.2d 1082 (3d Cir. 1971). We hasten to add, however, that the trial judge has wide discretion in determining what questions should be asked during v......
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