United States v. Tiangco

• Decision Date: 05 December 2016
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 15–567 (KM)
• Citation: 225 F.Supp.3d 274
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Margaret TIANGCO, a/k/a "Greta"
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

225 F.Supp.3d 274

UNITED STATES of America

v.Margaret TIANGCO, a/k/a "Greta"

Crim. No. 15–567 (KM)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed December 5, 2016

Adam Nelson Subervi, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Newark, NJ, for United States of America.

Paulette L. Pitt, Paulette Pitt, Esq., Woodbridge, NJ, for Margaret Tiangco.

OPINION

KEVIN MCNULTY, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the post-trial motion of defendant Margaret Tiangco for a judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), or in the alternative for a new trial, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. (ECF no. 180) I have considered the proffered grounds separately and in combination. For the reasons expressed herein, the motion will be denied.

I. Procedural Background

On October 29, 2014, the defendant, Margaret Tiangco, a/k/a "Greta," was arrested on a criminal complaint that charged her and eleven codefendants with a single count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (ECF nos. 1, 86) On November 2, 2015, Ms. Tiangco was charged in a two-count indictment. (ECF no. 132) Count 1 charged that "[f]rom in or about January 2013 through in or about July 2014" Ms. Tiangco was part of a conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 2 charged that, on April 29, 2014, Ms. Tiangco distributed and possessed with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(A).

Ms. Tiangco moved to dismiss Count 1 because the unexcluded time between arrest on the complaint and the filing of the indictment added up to 36 days, in excess of the 30 day limit imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).¹ On April 13, 2016, I granted the motion for reasons expressed on the record, and dismissed Count 1 without prejudice (ECF no. 148)

On April 25, 2016, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment. (ECF no. 150) It was identical to the original Indictment, except that the time frame of the Count 1 conspiracy had been expanded greatly, from 2013–14 to "[f]rom in or about 2004 through in or about July 2014."

Ms. Tiangco, represented by Paulette L. Pitt, Esq., went to trial. Trial occupied six days from July 5 through 12, 2016. On July 12, 2016, the jury entered a verdict of guilty on both counts of the Superseding Indictment. (ECF no. 176) In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that each count involved 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, as charged. (ECF no. 178)

On July 25, 2016, Ms. Tiangco filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), or in the alternative for a new trial, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. (ECF no. 180)² Ms. Tiangco has submitted a brief ("Tiangco Br.", ECF no. 183); the government has submitted a response ("Gov't Br.", ECF no. 185); and Ms. Tiangco has submitted a reply ("Tiangco Reply Br.", ECF no. 186).

II. Standards Under Rules 29 and 33

Under Rule 29, a defendant who asserts that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction shoulders "a very heavy burden." United States v. Anderson , 108 F.3d 478, 481 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Coyle , 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995) ). The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Hence it must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, resolving all credibility issues in the prosecution's favor. United States v. Hart , 273 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Scanzello , 832 F.2d 18, 21 (3d Cir. 1987). Having done so, the court must uphold the conviction if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). Accord United States v. Caraballo–Rodriguez , 726 F.3d 418, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (reaffirming principle and reversing a line of drug conspiracy cases that seemingly undermined it); United States v. Silveus , 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 2008) (issue for trial or appellate court is "whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence"); United States v. Smith , 294 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002).

The standard under Rule 33 is more general; a court "may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. When a defendant seeks a new trial claiming that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, the court's review is less restricted than it is under Rule 29. "However, even if a district court believes that the jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, it can order a new trial ‘only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred—that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.’ " United States v. Silveus , 542 F.3d at 1004–05 (quoting United States v. Johnson , 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002) ). "Such motions are not favored and should be ‘granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases.’ " Id. at 1005 (quoting Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Derricks , 810 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)). A Rule 33 motion may also be based on an alleged error or combination of errors at trial. Borrowing the appellate concept of harmless error, district courts have held that a new trial will be ordered when it is "reasonably possible that such error, or combination of errors, substantially influenced the jury's decision." United States v. Crim , 561 F.Supp.2d 530, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing U.S. v. Copple , 24 F.3d 535, 547 n. 17 (3d Cir. 1994) ), aff'd , 451 Fed.Appx. 196 (3d Cir. 2011) ; accord United States v. Bryant , Crim. No. 07–267, 2009 WL 1559796 at *6 (D.N.J. May 28, 2009). I remain cognizant, however, that the Rule 33 standard is both discretionary ("may") and flexible ("interest of justice").

III. Discussion

Because the grounds for the motion are focused and particular, I dispense with an overall statement of the evidence at trial. Suffice it to say that it was persuasive and overwhelming. Ms. Tiangco acted as a broker, transporting or sending methamphetamine from a California supplier, Javier Diaz, to New Jersey distributors—originally Arlon Macatangay, and later John Freehauf. The evidence included the testimony of three coconspirators (Diaz, Freehauf, and Kristie Navarro); video of Ms. Tiangco at a UPS center sending a package containing methamphetamine (later intercepted by the agents in New Jersey); telephone calls and text messages arranging shipments; evidence that Ms. Tiangco was pulled over in Missouri with a pound of methamphetamine in her car; Navarro's eyewitness account of deliveries by Tiangco; a post-arrest letter in which Tiangco asked Freehauf to sign a false statement that she was not involved in the distribution conspiracy; and more.

A. Evidence of Missouri Arrest

Ms. Tiangco here revives her objection to the admission of evidence of her arrest near Joplin, Missouri, on September 15, 2009, with approximately one pound of methamphetamine in her car. On June 29 and July 6, 2016, I held a suppression hearing after which I found, based on the testimony of the officers involved, that the traffic stop was proper and that Ms. Tiangco made self-incriminatory statements after proper Miranda warnings.³ Ruling orally, I denied suppression and permitted this evidence to be admitted conditionally, subject to connection to the conspiracy. (See Order, ECF no. 171)

At trial, the jury heard testimony from two of the police officers involved in the 2009 Missouri traffic stop and arrest. (7/7 Tr. at 73, 107) Officer Blane Cornelius described the stop for speeding and the consent search that followed. That search yielded the following, documented by photographs placed in evidence: a candy tin containing a glass methamphetamine smoking pipe, and a backpack containing a gallon ziplock bag approximately 1/3 full of methamphetamine. (7/7 Tr. 86–90; see also 110–11; Exhibs. 6B–1, 6B–2, 6B–5, 6B–7, 6B–10) Officer Schanot testified that this "large quantity" of the drug field-tested positive for methamphetamine. (7/7 Tr. at 111–12). He also introduced a recording of Ms. Tiangco's statement to the police, in which she admitted possession of the methamphetamine and stated that she was en route to New Jersey. (Exhib. 6A (transcript)). Also read into evidence was a stipulation that in 2014, Ms. Tiangco admitted that she knowingly possessed the methamphetamine that was recovered from the car in Missouri. (7/7 Tr. at 131–33)⁴

Ms. Tiangco argues that this evidence of her transportation of methamphetamine in 2009 should be analyzed as extrinsic "prior bad acts" evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). True, this evidence would have been extrinsic to Count 1 of the original Indictment, which was confined to the 2013–14 period. But the original Indictment created no vested entitlement to that time frame. When the government superseded the Indictment, it extended the beginning of the conspiracy period back to 2004. At trial, it introduced ample evidence of methamphetamine dealing throughout that period, supporting the expanded time frame. (See, e.g. , Testimony of Javier Diaz, 7/7 Tr., passim. )

The arrest in Missouri occurred in 2009, squarely in the middle of the ten-year conspiracy charged in the Superseding Indictment. The acts involved—transportation of methamphetamine obtained from Diaz in California to a recipient in New Jersey—were part and parcel of the conspiracy. This therefore was not extrinsic evidence, but direct evidence of the conspiracy as charged. I do not accept Ms. Tiangco's argument that the government was "getting in the back door what it could not get in the front door." This was evidence of the charged offense, brought in...