United States v. Poynter

Decision Date07 December 2012
Docket NumberCriminal Case No. 07–48.
Citation908 F.Supp.2d 30
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. William F. POYNTER, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Anthony F. Scarpelli, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Danielle Courtney Jahn, Federal Public Defender, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EMMET G. SULLIVAN, District Judge.

Defendant William F. Poynter, who is proceeding pro se, has filed a motion and various supplemental motions for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Defendant has also filed a separate motion to correct alleged inaccuracies in transcripts of his trial and a subsequent hearing, and several other procedural motions regarding his receipt of trial transcripts and his legal representation. For the reasons explained below, defendant's motions will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 1, 2007, defendant William Poynter was charged with one count of Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments,in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Two alleged co-conspirators, James Franklin “Frank” Smith and Christopher Cook, were also charged. On December 12, 2007, a jury returned a verdict of guilty against Mr. Poynter.1 On April 2, 2008, prior to sentencing, defendant requested and received the assistance of a new court-appointed attorney.

On September 12, 2008, defendant, through counsel, filed a motion for a new trial, citing ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant subsequently filed several lengthy pro se supplements to his motion for a new trial. In those supplemental motions, defendant made many arguments, including that he was entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial because prosecutors engaged in misconduct and presented false evidence. Defendant also argued that his alleged co-conspirator, Frank Smith, should not have been permitted to avoid testifying in Poynter's trial by exercising his Fifth Amendment rights. On November 6, 2008, the Court held a hearing on defendant's motions for a new trial and heard testimony from several witnesses. The Court subsequently denied defendant's motions. On February 13, 2009, defendant was sentenced to 108 months incarceration and 24 months of supervised release.

After defendant was sentenced, he continued filing various requests for relief from this Court. On April 6, 2009, defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, followed by a pro se motion to reduce his sentence filed on June 16, 2009. Several months later, defendant filed a request to withdraw all of his pending pro se motions and “any motion which may have been characterized as a motion under Section 2255.” ECF No. 141.

On December 7, 2010, defendant filed the first of many motions for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Those motions are the subject of this Memorandum Opinion. In his first motion, defendant argues that his conviction was obtained through the prosecution's tampering with evidence, perjury by various witnesses, and improper jury instructions given by the Court. See ECF No. 144. On December 17, 2010, defendant filed a pro se “Motion for Reversal of Conviction or a New Trial” that was substantially similar to his December 7 filing and which appeared to only contain minor edits. ECF No. 146. Pursuant to the Court's Order, the government responded to defendant's motions on June 17, 2011. ECF No. 154. In its response, the government argued that defendant's motions should be characterized as arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, rather than Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, because they did not concern any newly-discovered evidence and merely sought to challenge the validity of defendant's conviction.

On June 22, 2011, defendant filed a pro se “addendum” to his Rule 33 motion. ECF No. 155.2 In that motion, he argues that the government fabricated evidence during his trial to create “an illusion of criminal conduct.” He also contends that prosecutors accused him of making statements under oath that he never actually made, then conspired to change the trial transcripts in order to conceal their wrongdoing. On August 15, 2011, defendant filed a pro se reply in further support of his Rule 33 motion. ECF No. 157. In the reply, he rejects the government's argument that the motion should be converted into a Section 2255 motion, and argues that there are various categories of newly-discovered evidence that require a reversal of his conviction.3

On December 8, 2011, defendant filed another pro se motion seeking reversal of his conviction on the grounds of “prosecutorial misconduct.” ECF No. 159. Defendant argues again that prosecutors fabricated evidence, including statements made by the defendant while on the stand. On March 9, 2012, defendant filed a pro se addendum to his December 8, 2011 Motion for Reversal of Conviction. ECF No. 160. Defendant argues again that prosecutors knowingly solicited perjured testimony from trial witnesses.

In addition to his various Rule 33 motions and supplemental briefs, defendant also filed a pro se “Motion to Settle Record—Inaccuracies in Transcript” on September 14, 2012. ECF No. 164. Defendant lists several parts of his trial transcript that he claims contain errors and requests that the Court correct them. The motion merely repeats defendant's prior arguments that testimony was fabricated. On October 3, 2012, the government filed an opposition to defendant's motion to settle inaccuracies in the transcripts. ECF No. 166. The government argues that defendant's motion should be denied for two reasons: 1) because defendant filed a pro se motion even though he is represented by counsel; and 2) because defendant has proffered no evidence in support of his argument that the transcript is inaccurate, and defendant therefore cannot overcome the presumption that official court transcripts are accurate.

Despite the many documents that have been filed, there are essentially only two motions pending before the Court.4 The first is defendant's motion for reversal of the verdict or for a new trial under Rule 33. ECF Nos. 144, 146, 155, 159, 160. Defendant also seeks to settle alleged inaccuracies in the record. ECF No. 164. The Court will address these categories in turn.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 permits “a court [to] vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). “The Rule does not define ‘interests of justice’ and the courts have had little success in trying to generalize its meaning.” United States v. Cabrera, 734 F.Supp.2d 66, 87 (D.D.C.2010) ( quoting United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466 (7th Cir.1989)). “Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the rule to require a new trial ‘in the interests of justice’ in a variety of situations in which the substantial rights of the defendant have been jeopardized by errors or omissions during trial.” Id. A defendant has a heavy burden under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). [T]he evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand.... This power should be exercised with caution, and is invoked only in those exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Howard, 245 F.Supp.2d 24, 30 (D.D.C.2003) ( quoting United States v. Edmonds, 765 F.Supp. 1112, 1118 (D.D.C.1991)). [A] new trial should be granted only if the defendant has shown that the error was substantial, not harmless, and that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.” United States v. Williams, 825 F.Supp.2d 128, 132 (D.D.C.2011) (internal quotations omitted). “An error affecting ‘substantial rights' must have a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the ... verdict.’ United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d 1046, 1053 (D.C.Cir.2007) ( quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004)).

Since defendant's motion was not filed within 14 days of the verdict, the only ground upon which he can seek a new trial is the existence of “newly discovered evidence.” SeeFed.R.Crim.P. 33. In order to be considered newly-discovered, the evidence must have been in existence at the time of trial, United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C.Cir.1993), and “discovered since the trial.” United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 168 (D.C.Cir.1998). See also United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 839 (D.C.Cir.1993) (emphasizing that because the evidence must have been discovered since trial, the “post-trial testimony of a co-conspirator who refused to testify at trial” would not be considered newly discovered); United States v. Howard, 267 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.2003) (finding that information revealed to the defendant several years earlier “cannot be characterized as ‘newly discovered’). Defendant must also establish that (1) the party seeking the new trial showed diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; (2) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it must be material to the issues involved; and (4) [it must be] of such nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. United States v. Johnson, 519 F.3d 478, 487 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C.Cir.1993)) (brackets in original).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court notes at the outset that much of what defendant alleges to be “newly-discovered” evidence is based on defendant's post-trial examination of the trial transcripts. Because defendant and his counsel were present at the trial, nothing in the transcript of the trial could properly be considered “newly-discovered.” See, e.g.,

Johnson, 519 F.3d at 487 (newly-discovered evidence must be discovered after the trial). To the extent that the defendant is seeking to challenge his counsel's failure to address certain issues...

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