United States v. Williams
| Decision Date | 17 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 09–0026 (PLF). |
| Citation | 825 F.Supp.2d 128 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Rico Rodrigus WILLIAMS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
April E. Fearnley, Debra L. Long–Doyle, John Leslie Hill, Christine L. Duey, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams for judgment of acquittal on Count Two of the Indictment or, in the alternative, for a new trial on that count. Upon consideration of the parties' papers, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in this case, the Court will deny Mr. Williams' motion.1
On February 3, 2009, a grand jury returned an Indictment charging defendant Rico Rodrigus Williams with one count of second degree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), and three counts of witness tampering, in violation of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). As alleged in the Indictment, on or about July 3, 2005, Mr. Williams unlawfully killed Sergeant Juwan Johnson during a gang initiation by striking Sergeant Johnson with his fists and kicking him with his feet. See Indictment ¶ 5. Mr. Williams then intimidated and threatened, or attempted to intimidate and threaten, other members of his gang with the intent to prevent them from communicating information about the events surrounding Sergeant Johnson's death to United States law enforcement authorities. See id. ¶ 7. Before trial, the government dismissed one of the witness tampering counts.
On October 25, 2010, trial began, and on November 9, 2010, the Court instructed the jury. In accordance with the parties' joint proposed instructions, the Court gave the following instruction to the jury on the two remaining witness tampering counts:
Counts Two and Three of the indictment charge Mr. Williams with tampering with a witness, which is a violation of federal law. In order to find the defendant guilty of these charges, or of either of these charges—because again, you should consider Count Two and Count Three separately, but I'm instructing you at once because the same elements apply in each case—you have to apply the elements to the facts that you find. In order to find the defendant guilty of these charges, you must find that the government proved each of the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
One, that the defendant knowingly used intimidation and threats, or attempted to do so, or caused another person to do so; second, that the defendant acted with the intent to hinder or delay or prevent the individuals named in the indictment from communicating to law enforcement authorities information relating to the commission or the possible commission of a crime; third, that the offense, the underlying offense that he hindered the communication with respect to, the underlying offense, was a federal offense.
In other words, the second element is that he acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent individuals from communicating with law enforcement authorities information relating to the commission or possible commission of an offense; the third element is that [the] particular offense must have been a federal offense. But the government does not have to prove that the defendant knew that the crime was a federal offense.
Fourth, that the defendant believed that these other persons might communicate with federal authorities regarding the alleged offense.
Now, when you read the indictment—and you'll have a copy of the indictment with you—this instruction may make more sense than in the abstract. But let me summarize briefly, just to remind you. What's alleged in Count Two is that on or about July 4th, 2005, the defendant knowingly committed the offense of tampering with a witness by using intimidation and threats, and attempting to do so toward the following individuals: Latisha Ellis, Nicholas Sims, Rodney Howell, and Terrence Norman. And the evidence you've got to look at is the evidence relating to that cookout or barbeque on July 4th.
Now, you the jury must be unanimous—that is, you must all agree—as to which of these individuals, if any, were the subject of such intimidation or threats. And I will remind you of that directive, and it will be reflected in the verdict form that I will be giving you.
Regarding Count Three of the indictment, it is alleged that in or about July 2005, the defendant knowingly committed the offense of tampering with a witness by causing Themitrios Saroglou to intimidate and threaten Nicholas Sims. So those are the two tampering charges.
Nov. 9, 2010 Trial Tr. at 41–43.2
On November 15, 2010, Mr. Williams was found guilty of Count One of the Indictment, second degree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a); and Count Two, witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). See Verdict Form at 1–2. The jury found him not guilty on Count Three, the second witness tampering charge. Id. at 2. As for Count Two, the Indictment stated:
On or about July 4, 2005, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the defendant, RICO RODRIGUS WILLIAMS, did knowingly intimidate, attempt to intimidate and threaten, persons known to the Grand Jury, and herein identified as Latisha Ellis, Nicholas Sims, Rodney Howell and Terrence Norman with the intent to hinder, delay and prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense.
Indictment ¶ 7 (emphasis in original).
Six months after the jury rendered its verdict in this case, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Fowler v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2045, 179 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2011). As Mr. Williams describes it, under Fowler “the instructions provided to the jury on the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1512 were clearly incorrect.” Mot. at 1. Furthermore, Mr. Williams asserts that “appropriate jury instructions under Fowler would have resulted in an acquittal on Count Two.” Id. Consequently, Mr. Williams requests that the Court vacate his conviction on Count Two or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial on that count. See id. The government opposes the motion.
Under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court must enter judgment of acquittal on any offense charged for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Safavian, 644 F.Supp.2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C.2009). In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must “ ‘consider[ ] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determin[e] whether, so read, it is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. Kayode, 254 F.3d 204, 212–13 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1464 (D.C.Cir.1997)). The Court must “accord[ ] the government the benefit of all legitimate inferences,” United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d 413, 437 (D.C.Cir.1983), and accept the jury's verdict of guilt if “ any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 48 (D.C.Cir.2002) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). Put another way, the Court may grant a motion for judgment of acquittal only where “a reasonable juror must necessarily have had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant['s] guilt.” United States v. Weisz, 718 F.2d at 437 (emphasis in original).
Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). “[A]ny error sufficient to require a reversal on appeal is an adequate ground for granting a new trial.” 3 Charles Alan Wright & Sarah N. Welling, Federal Practice & Procedure § 589 (4th ed. 2011). A new trial should be granted only if the defendant has shown that “ ‘the error was substantial, not harmless, and that the error ‘affected the defendant's substantial rights.’ ' ” United States v. Safavian, 644 F.Supp.2d at 8 (). Whether to grant a motion for a new trial is “a decision committed to the Court's sound discretion.” United States v. Neill, 964 F.Supp. 438, 441 (D.D.C.1997).
Mr. Williams challenges the Court's instructions to the jury on the elements of witness tampering. See generally Mot. But he did not object to those instructions at trial; to the contrary, the instructions provided to the jury were substantively identical to those jointly proposed by Mr. Williams and the government. Thus, where, as here, a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction before the jury retires to deliberate, this Court's review is only for “plain error” in accordance with Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Marcus, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010); see United States v. Laureys, 653 F.3d 27, 32 (D.C.Cir.2011) (citing United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349, 353 (D.C.Cir.2008)); United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1020 (D.C.Cir.2010); United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1049 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also United States v. Brandao, 448 F.Supp.2d 311, 318 (D.Mass.2006) () (quoting United States v. Washington, 263 F.Supp.2d 413, 426 n. 7 (D.Conn.2003)); United States v. Clarke, 767 F.Supp.2d 12, 24 (D.D.C.2011).
Under the plain error standard, a defendant must establish “that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Sitzmann
...a judgment of acquittal on any offense charged for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Williams, 825 F.Supp.2d 128, 132 (D.D.C.2011). In ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court must “ ‘consider[ ] the evidence in the light most favora......
-
United States v. Wheeler
...that the error was substantial, not harmless, and that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.” United States v. Williams, 825 F.Supp.2d 128, 132 (D.D.C.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An error affecting ‘substantial rights' must have a ‘substantial and injurious e......
-
United States v. Santiago
...Force Base in Germany, in a hazing ritual (called a “jump in”) to initiate Sergeant Juwan Johnson into a gang. United States v. Williams, 825 F.Supp.2d 128, 139–40 (D.D.C.2011). Johnson died from injuries sustained during the hazing. Had Williams not been honorably discharged two months bef......
-
United States v. Poynter
...that the error was substantial, not harmless, and that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.” United States v. Williams, 825 F.Supp.2d 128, 132 (D.D.C.2011) (internal quotations omitted). “An error affecting ‘substantial rights' must have a ‘substantial and injurious effect......