United States v. Pressley, CRIMINAL ACTION No. 11-262
| Decision Date | 15 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION No. 11-262 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JASON LAMAR PRESSLEY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Jason Lamar Pressley's pro se Motion to Modify, Correct, and/or Terminate Supervised Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583. (ECF No. 18.)1 For the following reasons, Petitioner's Motion will be denied.
On May 3, 2006, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to one count of use of a firearm during, in relation to, and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and (2). (Judgment 1, Receipt of Transfer Docs., ECF No. 3.) Petitioner was sentenced to a prison term of 60 months, followed by three years of supervised release. (Id. at 2-3.) As a condition of his supervised release, Petitioner was required to refrain from committing another federal, state, or local crime, and was prohibited from unlawfully possessing or using a controlled substance. (Id. at 3.)
Petitioner's period of supervised release began on March 13, 2010. (Transfer Order, Receipt of Transfer Docs.) Jurisdiction over Petitioner's supervised release was transferred from the Middle District of Pennsylvania to this Court on May 4, 2011. (Id.) On September 14, 2012, a summons was issued directing Petitioner to appear at a revocation of supervised release hearing. (Violation Report 3, ECF No. 5.) The Violation Report prepared by the United Stated Probation Office stated that Petitioner had committed a grade A violation of his supervised release by illegally possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. (Id. at 2.) The Violation Report stated that Petitioner had been arrested by the Philadelphia Police Department for engaging in the hand-to-hand sale of narcotics. At the time of his arrest, Petitioner was found to be in possession of five packets of crack cocaine and one packet of marijuana. (Id.)
On October 5, 2012, a violation of supervised release hearing was held. (Oct. 5, 2012 Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 20.) Petitioner was found in violation of the terms and conditions of his supervised release and taken into custody. (Id. at 58-59.) On October 12, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to 37 months in prison, followed by 18 months of supervised release. (Oct. 12, 2012 Hr'g Tr. 19, ECF No. 21.)
On March 14, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Motion to modify, correct, and/or terminate supervised release. (Pet'r's Mot., ECF No. 18.) On March 26, 2013, the Government sent the Court a letter requesting that we direct an order to Petitioner consistent with the requirements of United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d. Cir 1999). (Gov't's Mar. 26, 2013 Ltr. (on file with Court).)2 On April 1, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion to amend under Rule 15of civil and/or criminal procedure. (Pet'r's Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 19.) The motion acknowledges Petitioner's receipt of the Government's March 26 letter and requests that we rule upon his Motion as filed—without characterizing it as a petition under 28 U.S.C.§ 2255, unless re-characterization is necessary to deal with the issues. (Id. at 6.)
Petitioner makes a number of arguments in support of his claim that his constitutional rights were violated under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner maintains that because he "was not found guilty of the state charges before his supervised release was violated," this Court could not "conclusively establish that [he] committed an A, B, or C violation." (Pet'r's Mot. 1-2.) Petitioner also asserts that the pending state charges are not crimes of violence, and are not Class A felonies. (Id. at 2.) In addition, Petitioner contends that he should have had fewer criminal history points, and that his total sentence should be 21 months, because most of his past crimes were related under Amendment 493 to the United States Sentencing Guideline ("U.S.S.G."). (Id.) Finally, Petitioner requests "a judicial recommendation to the bureau of prisons [("BOP")] for 12 months" of pre-release custody, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621 and 3624. (Id. at 8.)
"Section 3583 is the general section instructing district courts on the parameters of supervised release." United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). The statute provides, in pertinent part, that district courts may:
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). "The plain language of the statute illustrates that § 3583(e), in the typical case, allows a conduct-based inquiry into the continued necessity for supervision after the individual has served one full year on supervised release." Pregent, 190 F.3d at 282-83. In contrast, "[t]he statute does not provide a mechanism for a collateral attack on an individual's original unappealed sentence." Id. at 283.
To the extent that Petitioner seeks termination of his supervised release under section 3583(e)(1), his claim fails because he is still in prison and has not served a full year of supervised release. United States v. Nestor, 461 F. App'x 177, 179 (3d Cir. 2012) (). Furthermore, to the extent that Petitioner seeksmodification of the term and conditions of his supervised release under § 3583(e)(2), his claim fails because he has not identified the conditions that he seeks to modify.
Petitioner's arguments appear to attack the legality of the sentence that he received for violating the conditions of his supervised release. These arguments should have been raised either on direct appeal or in a motion under section 2255. See Nestor, 461 F. App'x at 179 ; see also Pregent 190 F.3d at 283 (); Kirksey v. Samuels, 235 F. App'x 949, 950 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ().
"[D]istrict courts have 'routinely converted post conviction motions of prisoners who unsuccessfully sought relief under some other provision of law into motions made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and proceeded to determine whether the prisoner was entitled to relief under that statute."' Miller, 197 F.3d at 648 (quoting Adams v. United States, 155 F.3d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1998)). Prior to making this conversion, courts are required to inform a pro se petitioner of the consequences of filing a section 2255 petition. See supra at n.1; see also United States v. Gross,168 F. Supp. 2d 383, 385 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (). However, "the Third Circuit has excused the notification requirements when 'notice would serve no purpose.'" Roberts v. United States, No. 04-5045, 2007 WL 4591320, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2007) (quoting Smith v. Nash, 145 F. App'x. 727, 729 (3d Cir. 2005)).
It is not necessary to notify Petitioner of the re-characterization of his Motion under section 2255. Petitioner received notice from the Government concerning the consequences of conversion. Moreover, notice would serve no purpose here since the statute of limitations for filing a petition under section 2255 has expired. Smith, 145 F. App'x at 728 ().
Under section 2255, a federal prisoner may move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence "upon the ground[s] that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Relief under this provision is generally available "to protect against a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." United States v. DeLuca, 889 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1989)...
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