United States v. Pszeniczny, 18-CR-00433
Decision Date | 17 June 2019 |
Docket Number | 18-CR-00433 |
Citation | 384 F.Supp.3d 353 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Stanislaw PSZENICZNY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
For United States Andrew Grubin, United States Attorney's Office, 271 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, NY 11201, 718-254-6322
For Defendant David Jason Cohen, Cohen & Forman, LLP, 950 Third Avenue, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10022, 212-766-9166
Table of Contents
III. Motion to Dismiss... 355
IV. Relevant Statutes and Regulations... 356
V. Pereira v. Sessions ... 356
A. Support against Applying Pereira in Instant Case... 358
B. Support for Applying Pereira in Instant Case... 360
VI. Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) Framework... 361
VII. Discussion of § 1326(d)'s Requirements... 362
B. Entry of Order of Removal Was Fundamentally Unfair... 362
VIII. Waiver of Subject Matter Jurisdiction... 363
A. Waiver Generally... 363
B. Personal or Subject Matter Jurisdiction... 364
I. Introduction
Defendant Stanislaw Pszeniczny moves to dismiss his indictment. It reads as follows:
On or about June 13, 2018, with the Eastern District of New York, the defendant Stanislaw Pszeniczny, also known as "Stanislaw Pszenczny," an alien who had previously been removed and deported from the United States after a conviction for the commission of an aggravated felony, was found in the United States, without the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security and the United States Attorney General having expressly consented to such alien's applying for admission." ( Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2) ; Title 18, United States Code, Section 3551 et seq. )
He claims he never received a proper Notice to Appear ("NTA") since the notice he did receive did not specify a date and time for the hearing, thus nullifying the original removal order, and exempting him from an underlying void removal.
In fact, he received a full notice of his hearings, he and his trial counsel participated in full hearings of which he had notice, he was afforded full due process, he was properly ordered removed, he was properly removed, he returned illegally after deportation, and he was properly indicted—an indictment he is now challenging.
While the precedents are not completely compatible, they support rejection of his motion to dismiss in this particular case.
II. Chronology
A chronology of the relevant events is set out below.
III. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss his indictment on the ground that his underlying removal order was invalid because his NTA did not specify the date and time that the initial removal hearing would occur. He argues, relying on Pereira v. Sessions , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 201 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018), that this defect "deprive[s] the notice to appear of its essential character" and thus the NTA failed to vest jurisdiction in the immigration court. Def. Mem. at 3 (quoting Pereira , 138 S. Ct. at 2116–17 ).
A defendant charged with illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 has a right to challenge the removal order upon which the charge is predicated. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez , 481 U.S. 828, 837–38, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987).
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), a defendant must satisfy the following three elements to prevail on a collateral attack of a removal order in a criminal proceeding:
Defendant makes the following two arguments: (1) he need not satisfy the § 1326(d) framework because his removal order was void and a legal nullity; and (2) even if his attack on the indictment must be analyzed within the § 1326(d) framework, he can satisfy each of the three elements of § 1326(d).
IV. Relevant Statutes and Regulations
Section 1229a of Title 8 directs immigration judges to "conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1).
Section 1229 of Title 8 provides that "[i]n removal proceedings under section 1229a of [Title 8], written notice (in this section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given in person to the alien ... specifying" certain information, including, inter alia , "[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held." 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). "The statutory text does not ... explain when or how jurisdiction vests with the immigration judge—or, more specifically, denote which of the several requirements for NTAs listed in § 1229(a)(1) are jurisdictional." Banegas Gomez v. Barr , 922 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker , 911 F.3d 305, 313 (6th Cir. 2018) ).
Several regulations related to the jurisdiction of the immigration court have been promulgated. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 provides that "[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the Immigration Court by the Service." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 defines a "charging document" as "the written instrument which initiates a proceeding before an Immigration Judge ... includ[ing], a Notice to Appear."
8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b), which lists information that an NTA must include, does not require that the NTA contain the date and time of the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) requires that the immigration court provide notice of the initial removal hearing with an NTA that contains the date and time of the hearing only "where practicable ." It reads:
In removal proceedings pursuant to section 240 of the Act, the Service shall provide in the Notice to Appear, the time, place and date of the initial removal hearing, where practicable . If that information is not contained in the Notice to Appear, the Immigration Court shall be responsible for scheduling the initial removal hearing and providing notice to the government and the alien of the time, place, and date of hearing.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court in Pereira v. Sessions held that a "putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of a noncitizen's removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the stop-time rule." 138 S. Ct. at 2107.
Id. at 2108 ; see also Banegas Gomez , 922 F.3d at 111 ( .
United States v. Larios-Ajualat provides a useful summary of Pereira and the 10 year "stop time rule":
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