United States v. Pye
| Decision Date | 21 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-10277,18-10277 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL JOHN PYE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20205-UU-1
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Pye appeals his convictions and sentences for traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct. On appeal, Pye first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Specifically, he argues that the government failed to disclose before trial certain conversations between one of the government's agents and certain witnesses. Those conversations, he contends, demonstrate that the witnesses, who were Haitian, had a motive to alter their testimony in exchange for immigration benefits. He argues that these conversations also demonstrated that the government's agent and the witnesses perjured themselves at trial when they denied the existence of promises for such benefits. Second, Pye contends that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court improperly applied grouping rules and a vulnerable-victim enhancement to his offense-level calculation. Third, Pye asserts that his 480-month sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court indicated at sentencing that 420 months' imprisonment may be sufficient. Finally, Pye argues that the district court erred by imposing a $15,000 assessment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3014, which did not exist at the time Pye committed the offense conduct.
Pye first contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial based on Giglio and Brady violations arising out of newly discovered evidence. We review the district court's denial of his motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 2002).
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must show that (1) the new evidence was discovered after the trial, (2) the failure to discover it was not due to a lack of due diligence, (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching, (4) the evidence was material, and (5) the evidence was such that a new trial would probably produce a new result. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Ramos, 179 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999)).
To succeed on a motion for a new trial based on a Brady violation, the defendant must show that "(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to him; and (3) the evidence was material to the establishment of his guilt or innocence." United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247, 1260 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 529 (2017) (quoting United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1426 (11th Cir. 1991)). Evidence that is favorable to the defendant may include impeachment evidence. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). Further, evidence is material "only if there is areasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Jeri, 869 F.3d at 1260 (citation omitted). In other words, the defendant must establish that the favorable evidence could reasonably undermine confidence in the verdict. Id. And to prevail on a Giglio claim, "the defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony, and that the falsehood was material." Vallejo, 297 F.3d at 1163-64 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Pye's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence because the government's post-trial disclosures, indicating that the government's Haitian witnesses were granted Deferred Action status to remain in the United States for an additional six months, was not evidence that would have affected the jury's verdict. Specifically, the trial record and the testimony from the hearing on the motion for new trial demonstrated that none of the witnesses believed they were promised immigration benefits in exchange for their testimony and the post-trial disclosures indicated that the witnesses did not know about the Deferred Action steps taken on their behalf until after the trial. Pye has not established that there is new material evidence that would probably lead to a different result at trial or help establish his innocence. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1287; Jeri, 869 F.3d at 1260.
Next, Pye argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court misapplied the grouping rules and the vulnerable-victim enhancement in the Sentencing Guidelines. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). To determine the reasonableness of a sentence, the first question we must address is whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as failing to calculate, or improperly calculating, the appropriate Sentencing Guideline range or selecting a sentence based on erroneous facts. Id. at 51.
A party waives an objection when, regardless of the objections included in the presentence investigation report ("PSI") addendum, he does not articulate his arguments when afforded the opportunity by the district court. United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds, United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Where the defendant fails to make objections before the district court, we will review them only for plain error. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005). Under plain-error review, there must be an error, the error must be plain, the error must have affected substantial rights of the defendant, and it must seriously affect "the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016).
The sentencing court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo, including whether the court correctly grouped the offenses of conviction. United States v. Doxie, 813 F.3d 1340, 1343 n.2 (11th Cir. 2016). This de novo review also includes whether the district court correctly applied a vulnerable-victim enhancement. United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1315 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1313. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, after reviewing all of the evidence before it, we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). The district court may base its factual findings on "evidence heard during trial, facts admitted by a defendant's plea of guilty, undisputed statements in the presentence report, or evidence presented at the sentencing hearing." United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1273 n.25 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004)).
"[O]nce the court of appeals has decided that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court concludes, on the record as a whole, that the error was harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed." Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992). For example, we have found that, even if the district court erred in calculating a defendant's Guideline range, such error would beharmless because the career-offender Guidelines raised his offense level such that the application of the enhancement in question was irrelevant. See United States v. Rubio, 317 F.3d 1240, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2003).
Section § 2G1.3 of the Guidelines provides, as relevant here, that the base offense level for a defendant convicted of traveling to engage in a commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct with a minor is 24. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(4). The section also provides for specific-offense-characteristic enhancements such as: (1) a 2-level enhancement if the minor was in the custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant, § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B); (2) a 2-level enhancement if the minor was unduly influenced to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B); (3) a 2-level enhancement if the offense involved the commission of a sex act or sexual contact, § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A); and (4) an 8-level enhancement if the offense involved a minor who was not yet 12 years old, § 2G1.3(b)(5).
For the purposes of the care-and-custody enhancement, the Guidelines note that it is "intended to have broad application and includes offenses involving a victim less than 18 years of age entrusted to the defendant, whether temporarily or permanently." U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.2(A). In determining whether the enhancement for undue influence applies, the district court should consider whether the defendant's "influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor's behavior," which may occur even without prohibited sexualconduct. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.3(B). Moreover, in a case where the defendant is at least 10 years older than the minor, there is a rebuttable presumption that such undue influence existed. Id.
Separately, when a defendant is convicted on multiple counts, the Guidelines instruct that the district court should "group 'closely related' counts of conviction according to the rules in § 3D1.2 before determining each group's offense level and the combined offense level for all...
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