United States v. Ramirez-Vargas

• Decision Date: 02 November 2020
• Docket Number: 13-CR-83S (8)
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. RAUL RAMIREZ-VARGAS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. RAUL RAMIREZ-VARGAS, Defendant.

13-CR-83S (8)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

November 2, 2020

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before this Court is Defendant Raul Ramirez-Vargas's Motion for Compassionate Release, which the government opposes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A). For the reasons discussed below, Ramirez-Vargas's motion is denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 21, 2016, Ramirez-Vargas pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, 1 kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. (Docket Nos. 457, 461.) Approximately four months later, on April 19, 2017, this Court sentenced Ramirez-Vargas to 130 months' imprisonment, 5 years' supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and no fine, fees or costs. (Docket Nos. 554, 556.) Ramirez-Vargas is presently serving his sentence at FCI Miami, with a release date of May 20, 2022.¹

On September 8, 2020, Ramirez-Vargas filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i). (Docket No. 708.) The Federal Public Defender thereafter supplemented Ramirez-Vargas's motion and filed a reply brief on hisbehalf. (Docket No. 721.) In his submissions, Ramirez-Vargas contends that compassionate release is warranted because he is at heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19 due to his medical conditions. The government opposes the relief sought. (Docket No. 717.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i)

"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti, 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). One such statute is 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i) which, as amended by the First Step Act of 2018,² provides as follows:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—in any case—the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553 (a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

The defendant carries the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to a sentencereduction under the statute. See United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). A defendant proceeding on his or her own motion may meet that burden by demonstrating (1) that he or she satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement, (2) that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction, and (3) that a sentence reduction is consistent with the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Perez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 288, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). If the court finds, after consideration of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors, that the defendant has met this burden, it may reduce the defendant's sentence under the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i); see also United States v. Gileno, 448 F. Supp. 3d 183, 185 (D. Conn. 2020).

The statutory exhaustion requirement is mandatory and "must be strictly enforced." United States v. Monzon, No. 99 Cr. 157, 2020 WL 550220, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2020) (citing Theodoropoulos v. I.N.S., 358 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir. 2004)); United States v. Cassidy, 17-CR-116S, 2020 WL 1969303, at *3-8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2020) (finding exhaustion mandatory). The exhaustion requirement is met when the earlier of two circumstances occurs: (1) the defendant fully exhausts all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion to modify an imposed term of imprisonment on his or her behalf,³ or (2) 30 days lapse from the date the warden of thedefendant's facility receives the defendant's request to file such a motion on his or her behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).

Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the task of "describ[ing] what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction" under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i). See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (t). The Commission, in turn, promulgated a Policy Statement concerning sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A) in § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Commentary to that section contains four examples of circumstances that constitute "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction: "Medical Condition of the Defendant"; "Age of the Defendant"; "Family Circumstances"; and "Other Reasons". See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

At issue here are the "Medical Condition of the Defendant" and "Other Reasons" examples. The "Medical Condition of the Defendant" example provides as follows:

Medical Condition of the Defendant—

(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e., a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease and advanced dementia.

(ii) The defendant is—

(I) suffering from a serious physical or medicalcondition,

(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or

(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process,

that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 comment n. 1 (A).

The "Other Reasons" example is a catch-all provision encompassing "an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the [other] reasons described."⁴ Id. n. 1 (D).

As it relates to the requirement that a sentence reduction be consistent with the applicable Sentencing Guidelines provisions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is once again the relevant provision. It provides that a court may reduce a sentence if, after consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) factors, it determines that

(1) (A) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; or

(B) the defendant (i) is at least 70 years old; and (ii) has served at least 30 years in prison pursuant to a sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (c) for theoffense or offenses for which the defendant is imprisoned;

(2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (g); and

(3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement.

See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.

Finally, district courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny motions for sentence reduction. See Gileno, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 186.

B. Ramirez-Vargas's Motion for Compassionate Release

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Rights

As indicated above, 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A) contains a threshold exhaustion requirement. To satisfy this requirement, a defendant must demonstrate that either (1) he or she fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion to modify an imposed term of imprisonment on his or her behalf, or (2) 30 days have lapsed from the date the warden of the defendant's facility received the defendant's request to file such a motion on his or her behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).

For reasons discussed at length in two previous decisions (fully incorporated herein), this Court has found that the statutory exhaustion requirement is mandatory and cannot be excused. See Cassidy, 2020 WL 1969303, at *3-8; United States v. Schultz, 454 F. Supp. 3d 217, 220-223 (W.D.N.Y. 2020); accord United States v. Montanez, 458 F. Supp. 3d 146, 149-160 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding § 3582 (c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement mandatory).

Here, Ramirez-Vargas submitted his request for compassionate release to thewarden of FCI Miami on May 6, 2020. (Docket No. 717-1.) The warden denied his request on July 14, 2020. (Docket No. 717-2.) Thirty days having lapsed since May 6, 2020, this Court finds that Ramirez-Vargas has satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement, and the government does not contend otherwise.

2. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons for Sentence Reduction

Ramirez-Vargas has served approximately 81 months of his 130-month sentence. He is 47 years old and suffers from multiple documented medical conditions, including Types I and II diabetes, asthma-like condition related to a past gunshot wound, sleep apnea, and Hepatitis C, all of which he argues makes him highly susceptible to severe illness from COVID-19. (Compassionate Release Motion, Docket No. 708, pp. 3, 4; Medical Records, Docket No. 724.) If released, Ramirez-Vargas plans to live with his wife in Niagara Falls, N.Y. (Supplemental Memorandum and Reply, Docket No. 721, p. 10.)

The government concedes that Ramirez-Vargas's diabetes condition constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction, and it does not dispute the existence of his other conditions. In particular, the government has reviewed Ramirez-Vargas's medical records from the Bureau of Prisons, which confirm his diabetes diagnosis. (Government Opposition, Docket No. 717, pp. 7-8.) The government agrees that Ramirez-Vargas's diabetes alone is severe enough that it substantially diminishes his...