United States v. Randall, CRIMINAL NO. 08-8
| Decision Date | 11 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL NO. 08-8 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ANTHONY RANDALL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Moving for a reduction of his sentence under the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), Anthony Randall contends that the First Step Act's revision to the stacking penalties in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) reducing the penalties for successive Section 924(c) offenses warrants a reduction of his sentence. Randall argues that the significant disparity between his sentence and the sentence he would receive today constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason supporting compassionate release. He also contends that he is not a danger to the community, he has been committed to his rehabilitation in prison, and he suffers from several mental health conditions that make him more susceptible for severe illness or death from COVID-19.
The government argues that a change in the law does not provide a ground for compassionate release, contending that § 403 of the First Step Act does not apply retroactively. It cites the provision stating that the change in the stacking penalties only applies to defendants sentenced after the statute's enactment. It argues that a district court has no authority to define what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. It also contends that Randall is a danger to the community, citing various disciplinary infractions he has committed while incarcerated. The government argues alternatively that we should stay this matter pending the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Andrews, No. 20-2768.1
In 2006, Randall, then 20 years old, was arrested for a series of robberies of the same convenience store he committed while carrying an unloaded firearm. Randall entered a guilty plea to two counts of carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under Section 924(c) and six counts for Hobbs Act robbery. Upon application of the stacking penalties under Section 924(c) in place at the time of his sentencing, Randall was sentenced to seven years on the first Section 924(c) count and a consecutive twenty-five years on the second Section 924(c) count, for a total of thirty-two years. His expected release date is December 9, 2035. Under the current Section 924(c) statutory scheme, he would receive a sentence of fourteen years. He has already served almost fourteen years.
After considering the circumstances of the case, including the significant disparity between the sentence Randall received and the sentence he would receive if sentenced today in light of the First Step Act, we conclude that Randall has presented an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting a sentence reduction. We also find that he is not a danger to the community. Therefore, we shall grant his motion for a sentence reduction.
A court may reduce a defendant's sentence, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), if it first finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction and "a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Before ordering the release of a prisoner, the court must determine that he is not a danger to the safety of others or the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
Congress did not define what constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason, leaving it to the Sentencing Commission to do so. In its policy statement and commentary addressing Section 3582(c)(1)(A), the Sentencing Commission set forth three specific extraordinary and compelling reasons. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n. 1. Application Notes 1(A) through 1(C) detail qualifying medical, age and family circumstances.
Making it clear that these were not the only reasons that may be considered extraordinary and compelling, the Sentencing Commission added an "other reasons" category that provides a reduction may be warranted by an "extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C)." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n. 1(D). At the same time, it delegated the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") Director to define what other reasons qualified under subdivision 1(D). Id.
In exercising its delegated authority, the BOP issued Program Statement 5050.49 setting forth its criteria for compassionate release.2 The Program Statement includedcriteria for granting requests based on medical, age and family circumstances. It also listed factors to be considered for all requests.3 After passage of the First Step Act (FSA), the BOP amended the Program Statement outlining the circumstances that it deemed may justify relief.4 However, those circumstances were limited to the same bases identified by the Sentencing Commission - medical, age and family circumstances. Significantly, despite having been given the authority to do so, the BOP has not identified what other reasons may support compassionate release.
Until Congress amended the compassionate release statute in the FSA, the BOP had the exclusive authority to move for a sentence reduction.5 With that authority came the sole responsibility for determining what reasons other than medical condition, age, and family circumstances qualified as extraordinary and compelling. If the BOP did not consider a defendant's reason extraordinary and compelling and did not file a motion, the defendant had no recourse to the courts.6 Consequently, there was no way to discernwhat reason, other than the enumerated ones, constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason.
The process changed when Congress passed the FSA in December 2018. Congress displaced the BOP as the exclusive gatekeeper of motions for sentence reductions. Now, a defendant, after exhausting administrative remedies, may move for a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Congress changed the process in reaction to the BOP's inconsistent and infrequent use of the compassionate release mechanism. The BOP had filed few motions.7 From 1984 to 2013, the BOP filed only approximately 24 motions annually.8 From 2013 to 2017, of the 5,400 applications for compassionate release, the BOP approved only six percent.9 During that period, 266 people who had requested compassionate release died while awaiting the BOP's determination to file motions on their behalf.10 The Inspector General's report finding that the BOP rarely moved for compassionate release under its own policies led the Sentencing Commission to amend its policy to encourage the BOP to use the mechanism more frequently. See "§ 1B1.13 (Policy Statement) - Compassionate Release," U.S. Sentencing Commission (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/elearning/2016-guideline-amendments/story content/external files/Comp%20Release.pdf (announcing the broadening of eligibilitycriteria for compassionate release to expand the pool of candidates). A defendant himself may now move for a sentence reduction after exhausting administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
To exhaust administrative remedies, a defendant must first present his request for compassionate release to the warden. After 30 days of submitting the request, the defendant may move for compassionate release in the district court if the warden has denied the request or has not acted. Id.; United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 595-96 (3d Cir. 2020).
Randall has properly exhausted administrative remedies. He filed a written request with the warden on August 11, 2020.11 More than 30 days have passed since the warden received Randall's request.12 Therefore, we may now consider the motion.
The threshold issue is whether the change to the Section 924(c) stacking penalties is an extraordinary and compelling reason for reducing the defendant's sentence. Neither the Sentencing Commission nor the BOP has determined that it is. Indeed, as we previously noted, they have not identified any "other reasons" that qualify for a sentence reduction. Thus, the question is whether, absent such a determination, a court may decide what is an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.
The Third Circuit has not ruled on this issue.13 The Second, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have, holding that district courts have discretion to determine what constitutes an "extraordinary and compelling" reason justifying compassionate release.U.S. v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020); U.S. v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 281 (4th Cir. 2020); U.S. v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1108 (6th Cir. 2020); U.S. v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020). They reason that until the Sentencing Commission updates the policy statements to reflect the FSA's changes, there is no applicable policy statement for prisoner-initiated motions for compassionate release. No circuit has held otherwise.
The Sentencing Commission, for lack of a quorum,14 has not updated Sentencing Guideline Section 1B1.13, its commentary or application notes. The outdated guideline does not take into account that the BOP is no longer the gatekeeper to the courts and the sole determiner of what "other reasons" are extraordinary and compelling. The Sentencing Commission itself recognizes that its policy statement and commentary are outdated in light of the FSA's changes. See "Compassionate Release," The First Step Act of 2018: One Year of Implementation, United States Sentencing Commission, at 47 (August 2020), www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/ 2020/20200831 First-Step-Report.pdf. As the Commission acknowledges, Id.
It was not unreasonable for the Sentencing...
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