United States v. Ransom

• Decision Date: 16 June 1955
• Docket Number: No. 11328.,11328.
• Citation: 223 F.2d 15
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Wilbur LeRoy RANSOM.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

223 F.2d 15 (1955)

UNITED STATES of America v. Wilbur LeRoy RANSOM.

No. 11328.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

June 16, 1955.

Karl M. Milgrom, Chicago, Ill., Hayden C. Covington, Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellant.

Robert Tieken, U. S. Atty., William T. Hart, John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Attys., Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for appellee.

Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, and LINDLEY and SWAIM, Circuit Judges.

SWAIM, Circuit Judge.

The defendant was indicted for violating the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 451-473, by refusing to perform civilian work prescribed by the Act for conscientious objectors. He was convicted in the lower court and sentenced to two years imprisonment.

The defendant was classified IV-E (conscientious objector) in 1951. This classification then required neither military nor civilian service. In 1952 the law as to conscientious objectors was changed, and defendant's classification was changed to I-O requiring him to perform civilian work contributing to the national interest. After notification of his I-O classification, defendant asked to appear before his local board. At this hearing the defendant told the board that since his first classification as a conscientious objector he had become associated with the religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses, and now considered himself a minister. He asked to be classified IV-D. The board refused his request, and, according to the defendant's uncontradicted testimony, said that Jehovah's Witnesses was not a recognized religion and that its members were not ministers.

Defendant appealed this decision, and his file, including several affidavits from members of his company of Jehovah's Witnesses stating that defendant was a minister, was sent to the state appeal board. The appeal board continued defendant in class I-O. Shortly after his file was returned to the local board, the defendant was appointed a "pioneer" minister of his church and he forwarded the letter so notifying him to the local board, and asked that his classification be reopened. The board refused to reopen, saying that this was not "new evidence." The defendant then appeared before the board in person, called attention to the new material in his file, told the members that he was spending 100 hours per month "preaching," and asked that they therefore reopen his classification. The board refused to do so, and according to defendant's uncontradicted testimony in the criminal trial, one member of the board told the defendant that they believed everything he said but did not think those facts made him a minister.

Defendant next submitted a certificate from the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society which stated that he had been appointed a "pioneer" minister and was required to spend 100 hours per month "preaching" from door to door and on street corners. He asked again that his classification be reopened and changed to IV-D. The board again refused.

In his final letter to the local board, the defendant told the board members that he had been appointed a "Territory Servant" and "Assistant to the Company Servant," and again asked them to reopen his file to investigate his right to a IV-D classification. The board refused and then ordered defendant to report for civilian work as a conscientious objector. Defendant refused and was indicted under the Act.

The defendant makes only two contentions in this court: (1) that he was denied due process of law when the local board refused his ministerial claim on the erroneous theory that Jehovah's Witnesses was not a recognized religion and its members were not ministers; and (2) that he was denied due process of law when the local board refused to open his case after he had presented new evidence making a prima facie case for a ministerial classification. We are reversing defendant's conviction on the strength of his second contention, and, thus, will limit our discussion to it.

The general picture presented is that of a conscientious objector who joined the church known as Jehovah's Witnesses, and thereafter became progressively more active and was given more and more responsibility. Both the local and the state appeal boards decided at an early period in their dealings with the defendant that he was not a minister, and then as evidence of more and more religious and ministerial activity was presented, the local board refused to reopen his classification to consider such evidence and thereby prevented any further appeal. The local board's original determination was probably correct, but the question before us is whether or not it could constitutionally refuse to reconsider defendant's classification in the face of the defendant's subsequent allegations and the evidence tending to support them.

It has been firmly established by the Supreme Court that when a registrant makes a prima facie showing for a desired classification, the board may not deny him that classification unless it has a "basis in fact" for the denial. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132; Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567. Selective Service System regulations recognize that "no classification is permanent" (32 C.F.R. § 1625.1), and empower the local board to "reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant (1) upon the written request of the registrant, * * * in a case involving occupational deferment, if such request is accompanied by written information presenting facts not considered...