United States v. Reeves
| Citation | 38 F. 404 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. REEVES. |
| Decision Date | 18 February 1889 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Rudolph Kleberg, U.S. Dist. Atty., and T. H. Franklin, for the government.
F. G Morris and Fiset & Miller, for defendant.
(charging jury.) The indictment preferred against the defendant in this case contains three counts. The first of those counts has been dismissed by the district attorney, and only the second and third remain for our consideration. The offenses charged in the second and third counts are separate and distinct, and each is punishable as an independent offense under the laws of the United States. In charging you as to the law by which you should be governed in reaching a conclusion, touching the guilt or innocence of the defendant, I will first direct your attention to the third count of the indictment, as by adopting that order in presenting the case you may the more readily understand the exact nature and meaning of the offense charged in the second count. It is also important to remind you that Ed Reeves is the only defendant now upon trial, and it is your sole duty to say by your verdict whether he is guilty or innocent of the crimes charged against him. With these observations, we will proceed to the third count of the indictment.
The Third Count. It is charged in the third count that, on the 18th day of June, 1887, in Fayette county, Tex., the defendant, Ed Reeves, and John Barber, Bud Powell, Will Whitley, Ike Cloud, and Charley Ross, unlawfully made an assault upon one T. B. Hart, 'he, the said T. B. Hart being then and there a person intrusted with the mail of the United States of America, and the life of him, the said T. B Hart, in jeopardy did put by the use then and there of dangerous weapons, and did feloniously, violently, and forcibly, take, steal, and carry away from the possession of the said T. B. Hart certain of said mail then and there intrusted to him, the said T. B. Hart, and then and there in his said possession. ' So much of the statute, upon which the third count is predicated, as may be necessary for you to consider, is expressed in the following words:
'Any person who shall rob any carrier, agent, or other person intrusted with the mail, of such mail, or any part thereof, shall be punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years, and not more than ten years; * * * if, in effecting such robbery the first time, the robber shall wound the person having custody of the mail, or put his life in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons, such offender shall be punishable by imprisonment at hard labor for the term of his natural life. ' Rev. St. U.S. Sec. 5472.
The offense consists in robbing the carrier, agent, or other person intrusted with the mail, of the mail, or any part thereof; and the question of law first to be considered is, what is a robbing of the carrier of the mail? The act of congress makes use of the word 'rob,' without defining it; but it is a word which, long before the act of congress, had received a settled construction by the common law. And, as understood at common law, 'robbery is the felonious and forcible taking of the property of another from his person, or in his possession, against his will, by violence, or putting him in fear.' 2 Whart.Crim.Law, § 1695. It is not necessary, in a case like the present, that the mail should have belonged to the carrier, for it is not his property. He is simply charged with its custody and preservation until it passes beyond his control and possession in the performance of his official duty. The law is satisfied upon this point when it is shown that the mail, or any part thereof, is unlawfully taken from the possession of the carrier, against his will by violence, or putting him in fear. You observe that by this law there are two species of robbery: (1) A robbery of the mail under such circumstances as amount to the offense by the principles of the common law; (2) a robbery effected by putting in jeopardy the life of the person who has it in custody, and this must be done with dangerous weapons. ' U.S. v. Wilson, Baldw. 93. If you find from the testimony that the robbery charged was committed on the 18th day of June, 1887, in Fayette county, the question then arises, was the life of the carrier put in jeopardy? 'Jeopardy' has been held to mean danger, peril, reasonable fear, and well-grounded apprehension. The testimony of the mail messenger, Hart, who was intrusted with the mail at the time stated, is before you. He explained to you how an entrance into the car was effected; how one of the intruders compelled the express messenger to open his safe, and how he was required by one of the men, who forced their way into the car, to open the mail-bag and deliver the mail. If, from the testimony, you believe that a robbery of the mail was committed at the time and place mentioned in the third count of the indictment, and that in effecting it the offenders or robbers did such acts as created in the mind of the mail messenger a well-grounded apprehension of danger to his life was actually in danger, or he really believed it to be so,-- then the robbery was committed by putting his life in jeopardy. U.S. v. Wilson, supra. You will next inquire whether the robbery and putting in jeopardy the life of the mail messenger (if such be the facts) were done with dangerous weapons. A dangerous weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily harm; and if you believe from the testimony that the life of the mail messenger was put in jeopardy by the use of a weapon likely to produce death or great bodily harm, then you are charged that the use of such a weapon is the use of a dangerous weapon. U.S. v. Williams, 6 Sawy. 244-247, 2 F. 61; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 96-97.
The next question, and one of supreme importance, is, did the defendant commit the offense as charged in the third count of the indictment, and as above explained to you in this charge? The testimony, without dispute or contradiction, clearly shows that during the night, on the 18th day of June, 1887, a railway train was stopped by armed men near the town of Flatonia, Fayette county, and that the men by force effected an entrance into the mail-car, compelled the mail messenger to cut open the mail-bag, and that they took from the bag a part of the mail. Counsel for the government maintain that the robbery was committed by the defendant, Barber, Powell and other persons named in the indictment. It is for you, gentlemen, to determine, from a consideration of all the testimony submitted to you, whether the defendant was one of the parties to the robbery; that is to say, whether he was present on the occasion of the robbery, consenting, aiding, procuring, advising, or assisting the commission of the crime. If he was so present, consenting, aiding, procuring, advising, or assisting the commission of the offense,-- if any offense was committed,-- he is regarded in law as a principal offender, and may be indicted and convicted as such. 'A crime may consist of many acts, which must all be committed in order to complete the offense; but each person present, consenting to the commission of the offense, and doing any one act which is either an ingredient of the crime or immediately connected with or leading to its commission, is as much a principal as if he had with his own hand committed the whole offense. ' Hence, if you find that the robbery was committed at the time and place and under the circumstances stated in the third count, and that the defendant was present, aiding, encouraging, advising, and procuring its commission, it would become immaterial whether he actually entered the mail-car or not, for he would be equally guilty with the man who forced his way therein, and compelled the messenger to open the mail-bag. Upon this branch of the case you must determine (1) whether robbery of the mail was committed at the time and place charged; (2) if so, was it effected by putting in jeopardy the life of...
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