United States v. Reid

• Decision Date: 28 June 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16-4325,16-4325
• Citation: 861 F.3d 523
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Quantrell Dion REID, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

861 F.3d 523

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Quantrell Dion REID, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 16-4325

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: March 22, 2017

Decided: June 28, 2017

ARGUED: Richard Lamb Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD L. BROWN, JR., Monroe, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony Joseph Enright, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Harris joined.

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

After Quantrell Reid pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the district court sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") because he had three previous convictions for a "violent felony," id . § 924(e)(1). Specifically, the court found that Reid's three prior convictions under Virginia Code § 18.2-55, which has as an element the knowing and willful infliction of bodily injury, fell within ACCA's definition of "violent felony" because the state crime "has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person of another," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

Reid contends on appeal that his three prior convictions do not fall within ACCA's definition because § 18.2-55 can be violated in a variety of nonviolent ways. We disagree. Applying the categorical approach, we conclude that, to violate Virginia Code § 18.2-55, a defendant must necessarily use "force capable of causing physical pain or injury," which the Supreme Court has held brings a state crime within ACCA's ambit. Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133, 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010). Accordingly, we affirm.

I

The presentence report issued by the probation office recommended that Reid be sentenced as an armed career criminal based on three Virginia state court convictions for "Inflict Bodily Injury" committed in March 2004, April 2005, and July 2005. The report noted that in each case Reid was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with a portion of each sentence conditionally suspended. The report did not, however, identify the specific Virginia Code provision for "Inflict Bodily Injury."

At sentencing, Reid's counsel acknowledged that Reid had three times been convicted of violating Virginia Code § 18.2-55 for knowingly and willfully inflicting bodily injury on juvenile detention facility employees. But he argued that because common law battery is a lesser-included offense of § 18.2-55, the level of injury required to support a conviction under § 18.2-55 was no greater than that required for a common law battery conviction. Stated otherwise, he argued that § 18.2-55 was nothing more than a provision imposing a harsher penalty for a battery offense because the offense was committed against correctional facility employees. He reasoned that, because the Supreme Court has held that common law battery is not a violent felony, see Johnson , 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265, neither is a § 18.2-55 conviction.

The government acknowledged that battery was a lesser-included offense of § 18.2-55 but argued that one of § 18.2-55's additional elements—the knowing and willful infliction of bodily injury—distinguished it from mere battery and rendered it a violent felony for purposes of § 924(e)(1). The government asserted that because every § 18.2-55 conviction required the willful injury of a person, the offense categorically required "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person" and thus satisfied the Supreme Court's interpretation of ACCA's "force clause," contained in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Johnson , 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265.

The district court rejected Reid's objection and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. From the court's judgment dated May 18, 2016, Reid filed this appeal.

II

Reid contends first that the failure of the presentence report to identify the statutory citation for his convictions under Virginia law for "Inflict Bodily Injury" left the district court and the parties without "notice or certainty" about the nature of the predicate crimes, thus inviting "inference and speculation." Accordingly, he argues, the court could not properly determine whether his prior convictions satisfied ACCA's definition of "violent felony."

While the presentence report used only the label "Inflict Bodily Injury" to refer to Reid's three prior convictions, neither Reid, nor the government, nor the district court had any doubt that the offenses were violations of Virginia Code § 18.2-55, which prohibits the knowing and willful infliction of bodily injury on employees of correctional facilities. At sentencing, Reid's counsel stated to the court:

He was convicted, Your Honor, on an 18.2-55. And in the State of Virginia, what that breaks down to is a battery by a prisoner committed against an officer.

Later in the same proceedings, Reid's counsel again informed the court of the offenses for which Reid had previously been convicted:

I would like to say, Your Honor, you cannot get to the crime that he committed, which is 18.2-55, in Virginia without first going through battery.

Neither the court nor the parties raised any question about the prior convictions under consideration, and accordingly we reject Reid's argument that the district court was left to "inference and speculation."

III

Reid next contends that, in any event, a conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-55 does not categorically qualify as a violent felony under ACCA, arguing that it does not fall within its "force clause" because it does not have "as an element the use ... of physical force against the person of another," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). He reasons that a § 18.2-55 violation need not be committed by force at all but rather may be committed by indirect means , such as "intentionally (1) pouring water on the floor, causing an officer to slip, (2) pulling a chair out from underneath an officer before he sits, (3) removing screws from a chair or stair rail, or (4) even poisoning." These methods, he argues, cause injury passively so as not to constitute the "use of force" within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). He reasons further that because the force clause is not applicable, then a § 18.2-55 violation could only be a violent felony under the "residual clause" in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which the Supreme Court held was unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States ("Johnson II "), ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015).

The government contends that a conviction under § 18.2-55 is a violent felony under the force clause because the phrase "use of physical force" has been held by the Supreme Court to include force administered even by indirect means, such as by poisoning. See United States v. Castleman , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1414–15, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014).

As the parties recognize, ACCA provides that a person convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) —as Reid has been—and who has "three previous convictions" for a "violent felony" "committed on occasions different from one another" must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 15 years' imprisonment. Id . § 924(e)(1). As used in that subsection, "violent felony" is defined to mean:

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that—

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another [the "force clause"]; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another [the last clause referred to as the "residual clause."]

Id . § 924(e)(2)(B). The residual clause was held unconstitutional in Johnson II , 135 S.Ct. at 2563.

In Johnson , the Supreme Court explained that the term "physical force," as used in ACCA's force clause, means something beyond the "mere unwanted touching" necessary to prove common law battery. Johnson , 559 U.S. at 142, 130 S.Ct. 1265. Rather, because the term "physical force" contributes to the definition of a "violent felony," it is understood to mean "violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." Id . at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265.

In applying this definition of "physical force" to the assessment of whether a state crime qualifies as a violent felony, we use the categorical approach. See United States v. Doctor , 842 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2016). Under this approach, we may not look to the facts underlying the prior conviction, but instead must determine whether the state crime of conviction by its elements involves "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), i.e. , such "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person," Johnson , 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265 ; see also Doctor , 842 F.3d at 308–09. And in determining the nature of the state crime under this assessment, we are of course "bound by the interpretation of [the] offense articulated by that state's courts." United States v. Winston , 850 F.3d 677, 684 (4th Cir. 2017) (looking to decisions of the state supreme court and intermediate appellate courts).

The three predicate convictions in this case were for violations of Virginia Code § 18.2-55, which requires for conviction that a person "confined in a state, local or regional correctional facility" or a juvenile detention facility "knowingly and willfully inflict bodily injury on" any non-prisoner lawfully in that facility. Moreover, it must be shown that the defendant acted with the specific intent to inflict bodily injury, and an injurious result that simply follows from an intentional act is not sufficient. Seegars v....