United States v. Richardson
| Decision Date | 12 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–1901.,14–1901. |
| Citation | 780 F.3d 812 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jackie H. RICHARDSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Matthew J. Rinka, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Richard Kammen, Attorney, Kammen, Maryan & Moudy, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant–Appellant.
Before POSNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial.” The brevity of the provision is striking. There is no quantification of “speedy” and no specification of when in the course of a criminal investigation or prosecution the speedy-trial clock begins to tick. But the Supreme Court has held that it does not begin to tick “before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982). To the same effect see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), and United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 310, 106 S.Ct. 648, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986). The question presented by this appeal is whether or in what circumstances the clock begins to tick when a federal complaint and detainer are served on a person who is being prosecuted by a state.
In United States v. Zukowski, 851 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir.1988), we interpreted MacDonald to hold that the “official accusation” to which the Supreme Court referred in that case must be a formal charging document, such as an indictment or information. We'll see that a complaint, affidavit of probable cause, and detainer (the documents at issue in this case), even in combination, are not the equivalent of an indictment or information.
“Someone who is only the target of a criminal investigation has no right to have the government wrap up its investigation quickly and bring charges, even if the target is aware of the investigation.” United States v. Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 405 (7th Cir.2014); see also, e.g., Pharm v. Hatcher, 984 F.2d 783, 785 (7th Cir.1993). “[E]ven an arrest by the federal authoritiesis insufficient if the person is immediately released without any federal charges being filed.” United States v. Clark, supra, 754 F.3d at 405. Only if an arrested person is detained pending indictment does the speedy-trial clock begin to tick upon arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, supra, 474 U.S. at 310, 106 S.Ct. 648 (); Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975) (per curiam).
Richardson was arrested by Indiana police on December 17, 2011, for committing a vicious domestic battery and intimidation with a deadly weapon, in violation of Indiana law. A search of his home, conducted the same day, revealed a remarkable collection of guns and ammunition—apparently he manufactured guns (from the gun parts) and also ammunition. Because he previously had been convicted in federal court of illegal possession of a firearm by a felon, his gun-related activities violated federal as well as state law. So just four days after his arrest the U.S. Attorney filed a criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause in a federal court in Indiana, and a federal detainer in the jail in which Richardson was being held on the state charges.
Such a complaint must not be confused with a civil complaint. A civil complaint initiates a civil suit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 3. A criminal complaint can initiate only a misdemeanor prosecution. Fed.R.Crim.P. 58(b). A complaint that charges a felony can establish a basis for an arrest warrant, justify an arrest made without a warrant, initiate, continue, or expand an investigation, and notify other law enforcement agencies of its concern with the person arrested or investigated. Fed.R.Crim.P. 3, 4(a), 5(b); United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 200 (4th Cir.2006). But unlike an indictment or information, it cannot initiate a felony prosecution. An indictment or information must be signed by a government lawyer; a complaint, because it cannot initiate a felony prosecution, need not be, Fed.R.Crim.P. 3, 7(c)(1), and was not in this case. And even a complaint plus a detainer imposes no deprivation of liberty on the defendant.
All that the complaint in this case said is that the agent of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives who signed it was swearing that “to the best of [her] knowledge and belief,” on a specified date the “defendant did unlawfully possess a firearm as a convicted felon” and was thus “in violation of” of the federal criminal code. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This signals an investigation rather than a prosecution.
No more does an affidavit (filed with the complaint in this case) in support of a search warrant kick off a prosecution. United States v. Alvarado, supra, 440 F.3d at 200. As for a detainer, it merely informs the jail that a person held there is wanted on other criminal charges and the jail should therefore notify the agency that issued the detainer of the prisoner's imminent release, so that the agency can arrest him. The federal court issued a warrant for Richardson's arrest, but of course the warrant wasn't executed, because he was already in jail. The state court set his bail at $500,000. He couldn't make bail, and so remained in jail throughout the state proceedings against him.
On March 21, 2013, approximately fifteen months after his arrest, Richardson pleaded guilty in state court to felony intimidation and was sentenced to time served. He would thus have been a free man had it not been for the federal detainer. The day after he was sentenced the federal warrant for his arrest that had been issued immediately after his state arrest was executed, and he was jailed. The following month he was indicted on federal charges of being a felon in possession of firearms and also for illegal possession of a submachine gun (35 of the items found on his property were either submachine guns or parts of such guns).
Initially he was disposed to plead guilty to the federal charges, but he changed his mind and on January 28, 2014, filed a motion to dismiss the federal case on the ground that the government had violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. He argued that the speedy-trial clock had started to tick when the federal complaint and detainer had been filed four days after his arrest on state charges. Between then and the issuance of his federal indictment 16 months had elapsed, which would indeed have been a considerable delay, raising a colorable speedy-trial issue, had the federal prosecution begun back in December 2011 when the gun cache was discovered. The government argues that the clock did not begin to tick until the federal warrant for Richard-son's arrest was executed in March 2013 upon the completion of his state sentence.
His federal trial was scheduled for June 2013 and would thus have been “speedy” relative to the federal indictment had the trial not been delayed—but the delay was at the behest of Richardson, who that month said he would plead guilty and therefore asked for a continuance of the trial. Not until January of the following year did he repudiate his agreement to plead guilty, and move to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds. The district judge denied the motion. Richardson then pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. His appeal is from the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. If it should have been granted, his conviction and sentence must be reversed.
He argues that he was “officially accused” of a federal crime when the federal government filed its complaint and detainer the day after his arrest by state officers. Now the Supreme Court in MacDonald did not actually say that the speedy-trial clock begins to tick when there is an official accusation of a federal crime—rather that it doesn't begin to tick before then; the official accusation is the earliest time at which it begins to tick. But subsequent cases, while continuing to cite MacDonald approvingly, regard “arrest [provided the person arrested isn't immediately released], indictment, or other official accusation” as a trigger rather than merely as an analytical starting point. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); United States v. Loera, 565 F.3d 406, 412 (7th Cir.2009); Pharm v. Hatcher, supra, 984 F.2d at 785. That evolution of the law can't help Richardson, however. The relevant arrest (that is, one followed by detention) must be for a suspected federal crime, and there was no federal arrest when he was arrested on state charges, even though the feds were in the vicinity, so to speak, having accompanied state officers on the search of his premises. See United States v. Clark, supra, 754 F.3d at 405.
The distinction is important. To hold that the clock began to run upon the commencement of the state proceeding against Richardson, on the theory that he was in effect officially accused of a federal as well as a state crime, would produce a messy clash of governments (Indiana's state government and the federal government) with no likely benefit to the defendant. The state had arrested him primarily for domestic battery, a state not federal offense. The purpose of filing the federal complaint...
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