United States v. Riley
| Decision Date | 18 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No.: ELH-13-0608 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAMIEN RILEY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Damien Riley, the self represented Petitioner, has moved for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(iv). See ECF 162; ECF 164; ECF 165 (collectively, the "Motion"). He has also submitted several exhibits. The government opposes the Motion. ECF 167. Riley has replied. ECF 171. The Federal Public Defender ("FPD") has moved to submit an amicus brief on behalf of Riley (ECF 169) but declines to represent him. Id. I shall grant the FPD motion. The amicus brief is docketed at ECF 169-1.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Motion.
Riley was indicted on October 31, 2013. ECF 1. The case was assigned to Judge William D. Quarles, Jr.1 In a Second Superseding Indictment, filed on November 25, 2014 (ECF 41), Riley was charged in seven counts. Counts One, Three, Four, and Five related to possession with intent to distribute heroin, and Count Two related to possession with intent to distribute cocaine. CountSix charged Riley with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. Count Seven charged the maintenance of premises for the distribution of drugs.
Following a jury trial before Judge Quarles that began in February 2015 (ECF 67), Riley was convicted of Counts One, Two, Three, and Four. ECF 85. The jury did not reach a unanimous verdict as to Count Five (possession with intent to distribute heroin); Count Six (unlawful firearm possession); or Count Seven (maintenance of a place for the purpose of manufacturing, storing, distributing, and using controlled substances).
Sentencing was held on May 26, 2015. ECF 104. The defendant, born in June 1980, was 34 years old. According to the Presentence Report ("PSR," ECF 92), defendant had an offense level of 12, based on the drug quantity. Id. ¶¶ 16, 21. However, defendant qualified as a Career Offender under § 4B1.1(a) of the federal sentencing guidelines ("Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G."), based on his previous felony convictions under Maryland law for robbery with a dangerous weapon and a felony controlled dangerous substance. See id. ¶¶ 22, 27, 28; ECF 108 (Statement of Reasons). As a result, Riley's Offense Level increased dramatically, to a 32. ECF 92, ¶ 22. And, he did not receive deductions for acceptance of responsibility. Id. ¶ 23.
The defendant had 8 criminal history points, which equates to a Criminal History Category of IV. Id. ¶ 30. However, because defendant qualified as a Career Offender, defendant had a Criminal History Category of VI. Id. ¶ 31.
With an offense level of 32 and a Criminal History Category of VI, defendant's Guidelines called for a sentence ranging between 210 and 262 months of imprisonment. Id. ¶ 54. In contrast, an offense level of 12 and a Criminal History Category of IV results in Guidelines of 21 to 27 months' imprisonment.
Judge Quarles sentenced Petitioner to a Guidelines sentence. He imposed concurrent terms of incarceration of 210 months, with credit from October 24, 2013. See ECF 107 (Judgment); ECF 92 at 2.
Riley appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. ECF 109. He expressly challenged his designation as a Career Offender, arguing that his prior conviction for Maryland robbery with a dangerous weapon did not qualify as a predicate "crime of violence." ECF 121 at 3. On May 9, 2017, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. ECF 121; ECF 162-1; United States v. Riley, 856 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 273 (2017). The Court said, 856 F.3d at 328:
The only question on appeal is whether Maryland robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a "crime of violence." We conclude that it does.
Riley subsequently filed a post conviction petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting multiple grounds. ECF 123. A supplement was also filed. ECF 124. Due to the retirement of Judge Quarles, the case was reassigned to Judge Marvin Garbis. In a Memorandum and Order of May 14, 2018, Judge Garbis denied post conviction relief. ECF 146. Riley's appeal (ECF 151) was subsequently dismissed. ECF 157.2
On March 16, 2020, Riley moved for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(iv) (D-other Reasons)." ECF 162. He referenced "the 798 Amendment" to the Guidelines. Id. Thereafter, on March 24, 2020, Riley filed a motion "to correct clerical error . . . ." ECF 164. In particular, he asserted that the Clerk "'mistakenly'" entered his motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the retroactive application of Amendment 782 to the Guidelines. Id. And, on March 31, 2020, Riley asked the Court to construe his submission of March 16, 2020, asa request for immediate release under the First Step Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(iv)(D), for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." ECF 165 at 1. He cited, inter alia, Amendment 798 to the Guidelines, and complained about the "impact" of the "now defunct residual clauses," which "elevated" his Guidelines. Id. at 4. According to Riley, if Amendment 798 had been in effect at the time of his sentencing, his Guidelines range would have been 21-27 months of incarceration. Id. And, he argues that the Court may use the "catch-all provision" in the First Step Act to reduce the sentence. Id. at 3.
Riley seeks compassionate release based on Amendment 798 to the Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), not 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Amendment 798 went into effect in August 2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), as discussed, infra. Amendment 798 redefined "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 to omit reference to the so called residual clause, which was held unconstitutional in Johnson.
Riley does not rely on the pandemic or his health conditions as a basis for release. The government agrees that Riley has satisfied the administrative requirements to apply to the Court for compassionate release. ECF 167 at 3.
Ordinarily, a court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824-25 (2010); United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 495 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 2019). But, "the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions." Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011). One such exception is when the modification is "expressly permitted by statute." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); see Jackson, 952 F.3d at 495.
Commonly termed the "compassionate release" provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) provides a statutory vehicle to modify a defendant's sentence. Section 3582 was adopted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. It originally permitted a court to alter a sentence only upon a motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 224(a), 98 Stat. 2030 (1984). Thus, a defendant seeking compassionate release had to rely on the BOP Director for relief. See, e.g., Orlansky v. FCI Miami Warden, 754 F. App'x 862, 866-67 (11th Cir. 2018); Jarvis v. Stansberry, No. 2:08CV230, 2008 WL 5337908, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2008) ().
However, for many years the safety valve of § 3582 languished. The BOP rarely filed motions on an inmate's behalf. As a result, compassionate release was exceedingly rare. See Hearing on Compassionate Release and the Conditions of Supervision Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 66 (2016) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, Dep't of Justice) ( that, on average, only 24 inmates were granted compassionate release per year between 1984 and 2013).
In December 2018, Congress significantly amended the compassionate release mechanism when it enacted the First Step Act of 2018 ("FSA"). See Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5239 (2018). As amended by the FSA, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a court to reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment "upon motion of the Director of [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility," whichever occurs first. So, once a defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies, he may petition a court directly for compassionate release.
"When deciding whether to reduce a defendant's sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant a reduction only if it is 'consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.'" United States v. Taylor, 820 Fed. App'x 229, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1...
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