United States v. Roberson
| Decision Date | 15 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 21-102 (JDB) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Michael ROBERSON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Nicholas George Miranda, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for United States of America.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a panoply of critical rights to criminal defendants, among them the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. These Amendments also impose several concomitant procedural obligations on law enforcement, including the requirement that confessions be "voluntary" rather than coerced by police and, most famously, the rule that a suspect in custodial interrogation must be apprised of, and then must voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive, his " Miranda rights."1 These rights represent our system's promise of equal justice under law, and their accompanying procedural protections are "bulwark[s] against the coercive power of being taken into police custody and interrogated." United States v. Burden, 934 F.3d 675, 693 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
In the instant motion, defendant Michael Roberson alleges multiple violations of the aforementioned constitutional protections during four different encounters with federal agents. See generally Mot. to Suppress ("Def.’s Mot") [ECF No. 22]. Accordingly, he seeks to suppress his statements in those interviews and the results of a search of his cell phone. But Roberson's shotgun blast of constitutional argumentation ultimately fails. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny Roberson's motion to suppress in full.
Beginning in 2017, federal agents with Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI") investigated an online distribution network for child pornography based out of Norfolk, Virginia. Suppression Hr'g Tr. ("Tr.") 2:12–24.2 In the course of this investigation, HSI agents uncovered several email communications from an email address later identified as belonging to defendant Michael Roberson. Id. at 2:25–3:9. These communications discussed the correspondents’ sexual interest in children, and one message included a video depicting the sexual abuse of a prepubescent girl. Id. at 3:4–15. HSI Special Agent Ray Abruzzese began investigating these particular communications and, eventually, Roberson.
Abruzzese made contact with Roberson for the first time on March 7, 2019, outside of a Boys & Girls Club in Northeast Washington, D.C., where Roberson taught a dance class for children. Id. at 3:21–4:10. Roberson spoke with Abruzzese and two other HSI agents for approximately one hour, a conversation the Court refers to as "Interview 1." During this encounter, Roberson consented to the agents searching his phone using a technique called "imaging." The next week, Roberson and Abruzzese had two follow-up conversations via telephone: they spoke for twenty minutes on March 11 ("Interview 2"), and on March 12 they spoke again for around eighty minutes ("Interview 3").
On February 9, 2021, Roberson was indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia on one count of distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). See Indictment [ECF No. 1]. After learning that a warrant had been issued for his arrest, Roberson turned himself in on February 25, 2021. See id. at 87:4–11. Shortly thereafter, Abruzzese and Detective Tom Sullivan of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department interviewed Roberson at a police precinct for approximately one hundred minutes ("Interview 4").
On October 7, 2021, Roberson timely moved to suppress all of his statements from these four interviews, as well as the evidence acquired from the agents’ imaging of his phone. In particular, Roberson contends that:
• His statements in all four interviews were "involuntary" and thus may not be admitted against him for any purpose, Def.’s Mot. at 1–3;
• Interviews 1 through 3 ("the 2019 Interviews") constituted "custodial interrogations" for purposes of the Miranda doctrine, such that Abruzzese's failure to provide Miranda warnings mandates suppression of Roberson's statements in those interviews, id. at 16, 18–19;
• The contents of his cell phone constitute testimonial statements which were also "involuntary" under the Due Process Clause, id. at 31–32;3 and
• He did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his rights in Interview 4, requiring suppression of those statements, id. at 28–30.
The government timely filed a response opposing Roberson's claims, see generally Gov't’s Mem. in Opp'n to Def. Mot. ("Gov't Opp'n") [ECF No. 24], and on October 28, 2021, this Court held an evidentiary hearing in which both Abruzzese and Roberson testified. In addition to that testimony, Roberson submitted recordings of all four interviews with his motion, see Def.’s Mot. App'x 4; Notice [ECF No. 23], which the parties agree are properly before the Court as joint exhibits, Tr. at 92:15–93:1.4 The motion is fully briefed, and the Court has had ample opportunity to review the evidence—the motion therefore is now ripe for decision.
The Due Process Clause forbids the admission of a confession "if under the totality of the circumstances it was involuntarily obtained." United States v. Reed, 522 F.3d 354, 358–59 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ). "The ultimate question is whether [a defendant's] ‘will’ was ‘overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired’ as a result of the agents’ conduct." United States v. Hallford, 816 F.3d 850, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (" Hallford I") (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) ). "[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause ...." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). As such, "[a]lthough the defendant's mental condition can be a factor in the ‘voluntariness calculus,’ ‘this fact does not justify a conclusion that a defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry.’ " Reed, 522 F.3d at 359 (cleaned up) (quoting Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. 515 ).
To determine whether a statement was made voluntarily, "an inquiring court must conduct the juridical equivalent of an archeological dig into the whole of the circumstances." United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 438 (1st Cir. 2011). "Pertinent factors in this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis include the defendant's ‘age, education, the length of detention, whether the defendant was advised of his rights, and the nature of the questioning.’ " United States v. Avitan, 349 F. Supp. 3d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting United States v. Murdock, 667 F.3d 1302, 1305–06 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ). But in general, " ‘egregious facts [are] necessary to establish that the statements ... made during questioning [are] involuntary,’ " and "[s]tatements made where the circumstances are less than ‘egregious’ are usually voluntary." Hallford I, 816 F.3d at 863 (Wilkins, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Mohammed, 693 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ).
" Miranda warnings are required ‘where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.’ " United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) ); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (). Whether an individual is "in custody" for Miranda purposes is a two-step inquiry, ultimately asking whether "the circumstances of the questioning ‘present a serious danger of coercion.’ " United States v. Cooper, 949 F.3d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012) ). The first step of this analysis asks a familiar question: whether "a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave."5 United States v. Hallford, 756 F. App'x 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (" Hallford II") (quoting Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181 ). "That ‘reasonable person’ is not the defendant, but the average person innocent of any crime." United States v. Lea, 839 F. App'x 551, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Goddard, 491 F.3d 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (per curiam)); accord Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). "Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning." Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181 (cleaned up).
Even if a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the encounter, the court's task is not done: it "must then ask ‘the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.’ " Cooper, 949 F.3d at 748 (quoting Howes, 565 U.S. at 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181 ). These kinds of "coercive pressures" include "the shock of being arrested and questioned after being yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside world and cut off from his normal...
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