United States v. Robinson, Civil Action 20-5752
| Decision Date | 15 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action 16-144,Civil Action 20-5752,21-1355 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAVID ROBINSON |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
David Robinson has filed two pro se Motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, with multiple pro se supplements.[1] The Government has responded and the motions are ripe for disposition. For the following reasons they shall be denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND[2]
On April 7, 2016, Robinson was charged in a grand jury indictment in this Court with two counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). These charges arose out of two robberies which occurred on March 19 and March 21 2016 at two PNC Bank branches in close proximity to one another on North Broad Street in Philadelphia. In both robberies, the perpetrator made no attempt to conceal his appearance and he was seen clearly by bank personnel, other customers and the security cameras inside the lobbies of both banks. In each robbery, the perpetrator carried a curved, wooden walking cane and wore the same clothing: a gray sweatshirt and sweatpants, gray knit cap, gray and black two-tone gloves and navy-blue New Balance sneakers. On both occasions, the perpetrator submitted a demand note to the tellers demanding that they give him all of their cash. The victim teller in the first robbery handed over some $3, 020 in cash; the second victim relinquished $1, 190.
Following the robberies, the FBI circulated photographs along with a detailed physical description of the perpetrator to local law enforcement. The suspect was said to be:
United States v. Robinson, 821 F. App'x. at 142.
On the evening after the second robbery, U.S. Probation Officer Akaga Campbell contacted the FBI after seeing and recognizing Robinson from the circulated photographs. Probation Officer Campbell had been Robinson's supervising probation officer for the past several months and she recognized and identified him as the individual depicted in the photos and described in the notices. Robinson had been scheduled to meet with Officer Campbell earlier that day but had failed to report. She informed the FBI agents that Robinson struggled with drug addiction and had failed to report for treatment and other scheduled meetings in the days leading up to the robberies. His failure to report constituted a violation of the conditions of his supervised release, and the U.S Probation Office therefore sought and secured an arrest warrant for Robinson.
The following morning, on March 22, 2016, Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) Police Officer Jeffrey McKee saw Robinson while on patrol in the area near the banks that had been robbed in North Philadelphia. Officer McKee had begun his shift that morning by reviewing the “Be On the Lookout” notices issued by the FBI regarding the robberies which included both the description and the photographs of the suspected perpetrator. When Officer McKee saw Robinson, Robinson was wearing the exact same clothing depicted in the photographs and described in the notices and was carrying the same black, curved wooden walking cane. Officer McKee radioed to report he saw the robbery suspect, requested backup, exited his patrol car, and approached Robinson. As he did so, the officer directed Robinson to put his hands in the air, but Robinson “kept reaching around in his waistband, ” prompting Officer McKee to draw his service weapon while commanding Robinson to face a nearby wall with his hands raised. Two Philadelphia police officers arrived and placed Robinson in custody. Robinson was handcuffed and patted down for weapons and the officers ran a warrant search, although it is unclear whether they learned of any outstanding warrants for Robinson's arrest at that time.
While Robinson was being detained, another SEPTA police officer went to the bank which had been robbed the preceding day and returned to the scene with two bank employees who witnessed the robbery. Both employees immediately and firmly identified Robinson as the robber. Robinson was transported to the FBI's Philadelphia offices where he was processed and placed into the custody of the United States Marshals Service.
Following the denial of his motions to suppress evidence of his clothing and cane and his out-of-court identifications by the robbery witnesses, and after several continuances and the appointment of five different attorneys to represent him, Robinson elected to plead guilty to both counts of the indictment on May 10, 2019. He was sentenced on August 28, 2019 to 151 months of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release and ordered to pay $4, 210 in restitution and a $200 special assessment. Under the plea agreement, Robinson could file a direct appeal of his sentence if the Government appealed from the sentence and could file a direct appeal or petition for collateral review only to raise a claim (1) that the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory maximum for any count or the sentencing judge imposed an “upward departure” from the Sentencing Guidelines or an “upward variance” above the final sentencing guideline range determined by the court; (2) an attorney who represented him during the course of his case provided constitutionally ineffective assistance; or (3) the district court's decision on the motion to suppress witness identifications and physical evidence was erroneous. (Guilty Plea Agreement, ¶ 12, ECF No. 100). Robinson's court-appointed counsel filed a timely Notice of Appeal on the suppression issue, and Robinson thereafter filed several pro se “motions for reconsideration” in the district court seeking to challenge, inter alia, several of the representations made in the pre-sentence investigation report as well as the Court's determination that he was a career offender and its application of a career offender enhancement under the federal sentencing guidelines. The motions for reconsideration were denied by this Court on July 28, 2020 and the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress on August 12, 2020. Robinson then filed this timely motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on November 16, 2020.
As noted, Robinson invokes 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to obtain relief from his conviction and sentence. Section 2255 authorizes the filing of petitions seeking habeas corpus relief by prisoners “in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress, ” 28 U.S.C. §2255(a), and authorizes the sentencing court to grant appropriate relief upon finding “that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, ” id. §2255(b).[3] There remains a basic distinction between direct review and collateral review under §2255. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979). “It is well-established that ‘to obtain collateral relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.'” United States v. Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 310 (3d Cir. 1995)(quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). "[A]n error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment." Id. “The alleged error must raise a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Id., at 185; United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 977, n. 25 (3d Cir. 1993). “Moreover, ‘in considering a motion to vacate a defendant's sentence, the court must accept the truth of the movant's factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous on the basis of the existing record.'” United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)(quoting Gov't. of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989)).
While district courts generally have discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on § 2255 claims, exercise of that discretion is cabined by subsection (b) of the statute itself. An evidentiary hearing is dictated “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also, United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 2005). As the Third Circuit recently clarified, “[t]his involves a two-pronged inquiry.” United States v. Arrington, No. 19-2973, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27130, at *6 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2021). “First, the district court ‘must consider as true all appellant's nonfrivolous factual claims.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Dawson, 857 F.2d 923, 927 (3d Cir. 1988)).
“Second, it ‘must determine whether, on the existing record, those claims that are nonfrivolous conclusively fail to show'” any entitlement to relief. Id. Bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient grounds to require an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion. United States v. Donahue, No. 18-1907, 792 F. App'x. 165, 168 (Nov. 1, 2019); Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 395 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, where the motion, files and records conclusively show that the movant is not entitled to relief, courts maintain the discretion to summarily dismiss a § 2255 motion. United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 1994).
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