United States v. Roland
| Decision Date | 18 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 12–0298 (ES) |
| Citation | 281 F.Supp.3d 470 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Farad ROLAND, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Courtney A. Howard, James Brandon Nelson, Desiree Grace Latzer, Office of the U.S. Attorney District of New Jersey, Newark, NJ, Robert L. Frazer, Office of the US Attorney, Newark, NJ, Andrew Joseph Bruck, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of New Jersey, Newark, NJ, for United States of America.
Richard Jasper, Michael Keith Bachrach, Susan K. Marcus, New York, NY, Richard Ware Levitt, Levitt & Kaizer, New York, NY, Stephen Turano, Newark, NJ, for Defendant.
The United States charged Defendant Farad Roland with crimes that qualify him for possible imposition of the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3591 through § 3598. (D.E. No. 273, Amended Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty). Roland moved for a pretrial determination of intellectual disability under the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act ("FDPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c), which provides that a "sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded."1 (D.E. No. 453 ( )). The Government opposed Roland's motion. (D.E. No. 360 ("Gov. Opp. Br.")). The Court has thoroughly analyzed the extensive evidence—including testimony from seven expert witnesses and nine fact witnesses, and over 360 exhibits—presented during the eighteen-day evidentiary hearing and has carefully considered the parties' written and oral arguments. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Roland has abundantly satisfied his burden of proving his intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence and is thus ineligible for the death penalty. Accordingly, the Government is precluded from seeking a sentence of death.
In 1988, Congress enacted the FDPA, which provides that a "sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally retarded." 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c). The Supreme Court, in Atkins v. Virginia , later articulated the constitutional dimension to this prohibition, holding that in light of "our evolving standards of decency," executing the intellectually disabled violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 536 U.S. 304, 311, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). The Court recognized a national consensus that intellectually disabled persons are "categorically less culpable than the average criminal." Id. at 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242.2
The Atkins Court acknowledged the difficulties inherent in defining intellectual disability, but it did not define the condition. See id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (). Instead, it left "the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce [this] constitutional restriction" to the states. Id. Put differently, Atkins "did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides" to determine who qualifies as intellectually disabled. Bobby v. Bies , 556 U.S. 825, 831, 129 S.Ct. 2145, 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009). The Court did, however, point to the clinical definitions of intellectual disability promulgated by the American Association on Mental Retardation ("AAMR")3 and the American Psychiatric Association ("APA"). See Atkins , 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 122 S.Ct. 2242 ().4 It explained that "clinical definitions of mental retardation
require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18." Id. at 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242.
In Hall v. Florida , the Supreme Court clarified that these "clinical definitions of intellectual disability ... were a fundamental premise of Atkins. " ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 1995, 1999, 188 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2014) (). "The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework." Id. at 2000. "In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled," the Court instructed, "it is proper to consult the medical community's opinions." Id. at 1993.
Further clarifying Atkins , the Supreme Court instructed in Moore v. Texas that "[e]ven if 'the views of medical experts' do not 'dictate' a court's intellectual-disability determination, ... the determination must be 'informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework.' " ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1039, 1048, 197 L.Ed.2d 416 (2017) (citing Hall , 134 S.Ct. at 2000 ). The "current manuals," the Court stated, "offer the best available description of how mental disorders are expressed and can be recognized by trained clinicians." Id. at 1053. So, while "being informed by the medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical guide," courts may not disregard current medical standards nor "diminish the force of the medical community's consensus." Id. at 1044, 1048–49 (); see also Hall , 134 S.Ct. at 1995 (); Ybarra , 869 F.3d at 1023 ().
To warrant an evidentiary hearing, Roland bears the burden of making an initial showing of "reasonable doubt" about ID.5 Brumfield v. Cain , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2281, 192 L.Ed.2d 356 (2015) (); United States v. Watts , No. 14-40063, 2017 WL 413164, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2017) (). Roland easily met this burden in his moving submission. . Roland concedes that he also carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is ID at the evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 5). But if he is successful, Roland argues, the Government bears the burden of rebutting his prime facie case beyond a reasonable doubt or (at the very least) by clear and convincing evidence. (Id. at 5–13). Roland's burden-shifting argument is unpersuasive.
As the Court indicated during prehearing oral argument, Roland bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is ID and therefore cannot receive the death penalty. (See D.E. No. 381, Tr. at 118).6 The preponderance burden—the lowest of the three standards of proof—adequately reflects the degree of confidence society demands for establishing ID. See Watts , 2017 WL 413164, at *4. Indeed, this burden is consistent with every case, including those cited by the parties, to have addressed this issue (often without much controversy).7
As instructed by Moore , the Court will rely on the clinical definitions of ID promulgated by the AAIDD and the APA manuals: (i) AAIDD, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (11th ed. 2010) ("AAIDD–11" or "AAIDD Manual"); and (ii) APA, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. 2013) ("DSM–5"). See Moore , 137 S.Ct. at 1045 ( AAIDD–11 and DSM–5).8 These manuals are the most current iterations of the authoritative sources in the field, and the parties do not dispute their application.9 Following the Supreme Court's guidance, this Court will also rely on the AAIDD, User's Guide: Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (11th ed. 2012) (the "User's Guide"), over the Government's objections.10
The "generally accepted, uncontroversial intellectual-disability diagnostic definition ... identifies three core elements: (1) intellectual-functioning deficits (indicated by an IQ score approximately two standard deviations below the mean— i.e. , a score of roughly 70—adjusted for the standard error of measurement); (2) adaptive deficits (the inability to learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances); and (3) the onset of these deficits while still a minor." Moore , 137 S.Ct. at 1045.11 Each of these three prongs must be met for a person to be positively diagnosed.12
APA Definition. The APA defines ID as "a disorder with onset during the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains." DSM–5 at 33. The following three criteria must be met before an individual may receive a diagnosis of ID:
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