United States v. Rollerson
Decision Date | 13 April 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 24154.,24154. |
Citation | 449 F.2d 1000 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Roosevelt ROLLERSON, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. William H. Allen, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) and Mr. Allan J. Topol, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for appellant.
Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry and John R. Dugan, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and WILBUR K. MILLER, Senior Circuit Judge, and McGOWAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents a single question: may a criminal defendant who is summarily punished for contempt of court under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U. S.C. § 401(1) later be prosecuted under different penal statutes for the same act? We hold that he can.
Appellant was on trial for robbery in February 1963. On the third day of trial, February 14th, moments after the court convened and with the jury in the box, appellant threw an ice-filled plastic water pitcher at the prosecutor, hitting him in the shoulder and causing the pitcher to break. The trial judge immediately excused the jury and told appellant that whether he had been in contempt would be considered at sentencing if he were found guilty or, if he were acquitted, immediately thereafter. The trial resumed after a half hour recess. Later that same day, the trial was completed with a verdict of guilty as charged. One week later, on February 21, 1963, appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for three to nine years for the robbery offense. At the same time, the court found appellant in contempt of court and sentenced him to one year imprisonment, the sentence to be served consecutively to the sentence for the robbery conviction.1
Four days later, appellant was indicted for assault with a dangerous weapon (22 D.C.Code § 502) and assault on a federal officer engaged in the performance of his official duties (18 U.S.C. § 111). He was tried before a jury on July 15, 1963, and found guilty as charged. The trial judge sentenced him to one to three years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences previously imposed for robbery and contempt.
The ensuing procedural history of this case — recounted in the margin2 — is not directly relevant to the issue on this appeal. Appellant now seeks to reverse a judgment of the District Court denying his motion to void the assault conviction and sentence on the ground that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded the prosecution for assault, once appellant had been convicted and sentenced for contempt.
Appellant's double jeopardy claim would have received short shrift several decades ago. The contempt power was long considered to be sui generis, and the usual procedural protections accorded criminal defendants were not applicable to one charged with contempt.3 This view of criminal contempt, however, has been substantially eroded by numerous Supreme Court decisions which have tended to assimilate criminal contempt to ordinary crimes.4 Appellant's motion can only be denied, therefore, if a separate prosecution for a criminal offense, following a summary contempt conviction, does not violate the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Even with this different starting point, appellant's claim would still get short shrift if we were to follow the clearest statement from the Supreme Court on the double jeopardy rule for multiple prosecutions. In Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 31 S.Ct. 421, 55 L.Ed. 489 (1911), petitioner had been prosecuted and convicted first of disorderly conduct, then of insulting a public officer. Though the Court found that he had been twice prosecuted and convicted for exactly the same conduct, it upheld the second conviction. The Court endorsed what is known as the "same evidence" test:
5
Criminal contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) and the two assault offenses of which appellant in this case was convicted clearly have different elements,6 so this test, if still the law, would settle the question against appellant's claim.
We do not rest on this ground, however, for two reasons. First, the status of the Gavieres rule as a binding interpretation of the constitutional provision is in some doubt. The offenses in Gavieres were committed in the Philippine Islands, where the applicable provision was a congressional statute: "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment."7 The Court remarked that this provision had already been construed as enacting the sense and meaning of the constitutional provision,8 but the comparatively recent case of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), indicates that the Court may treat Gavieres as a case of statutory construction only.9
Second, the "same evidence" rule has been the subject of severe academic and judicial criticism for many years, most notably in Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinions in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959), and Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 449, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).10
In searching for broader grounds upon which to rest the decision in this case, we have the benefit of an excellent opinion by Judge Edelstein in a case on all fours with this one, United States v. Mirra, 220 F.Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Judge Edelstein examined the Supreme Court's dicta in In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L. Ed. 1154 (1897), and Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 55 S.Ct. 375, 79 L.Ed. 802 (1935), and found persuasive the observation that contumacious conduct in court can be an offense against the court's jurisdiction as well as an offense against the laws of the United States.11 He then continued:
Senior Circuit Judge WILBUR K. MILLER did not participate in the decision of this case.
1 Pursuant to Rule 42(a), Fed.R.Crim.P., the court filed the following document:
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...of multiple punishment through summary contempt proceedings and statutory criminal prosecution. For example, in United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000 (D.C.Cir.1971), defendant threw a water pitcher at the prosecutor during the course of a robbery trial. The judge immediately excused the......
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United States v. Haggerty
...fairness or finality which form the basis of the double jeopardy bar." Id. at 623. The district court, relying on United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000, 1004 (D.C.Cir.1971), distinguished cases involving summary contempt sentences, where courts had declined to impose a double jeopardy b......
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...criminal charges after a summary contempt proceeding based on the same conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Rollerson, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 343, n. 13, 449 F.2d 1000, 1005, n. 13 (1971); United States v. Mirra, 220 F.Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y.1963). The argument goes as follows: Because summary p......
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Williams v. State
...conduct in open court does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution concerning the same conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Rollerson, 449 F.2d 1000 (D.C.Cir.1971) (contempt sentence for assaulting prosecutor during trial did not bar later assault prosecution); United States v. Mirra, 220......
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Summary Contempt Power in the Military: A Proposal to Amend Article 48, UCMJ
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