United States v. Santiago
| Decision Date | 16 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | C.R. No. 10-184 WES |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JOSE ALIBAL SANTIAGO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
This matter is before the Court on a Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (ECF No. 443, "First Motion to Vacate") filed by Defendant Jose Alibal Santiago. For the reasons stated herein, the First Motion to Vacate is DENIED and DISMISSED. Additionally, all remaining motions (ECF Nos. 493, 497, 499, 504, 507, 509, 513, 514, 524) are DENIED for the reasons stated herein.
Santiago was indicted on December 14, 2010, and charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 1915(a) (Count I); Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and 2 (Count II); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j)(1), and 2 (Count III). Santiago pleaded guilty to all charges and was sentenced on February 13, 2014, to concurrent terms of 240 months imprisonment on the Hobbs Act counts and a consecutive term of 240 months imprisonment on the firearm count, followed by five years of supervised release. Judgment (ECF No. 405) entered on February 19, 2014.
That same day, Santiago filed a Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 407), raising two issues: whether the record reflected that the Court and defense counsel had fully advised him of the mandatory consecutive sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(j); and, relatedly, whether he would have pleaded guilty had he known about the consecutive sentence. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit thereafter affirmed Santiago's conviction and sentence. United States v. Santiago, 775 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 2014). Santiago did not seek further review, and his conviction became final on March 24, 2015.
On March 15, 2016, Santiago timely filed the First Motion to Vacate, with supporting memorandum (ECF No. 443-1, "Santiago Mem."). On June 23, 2016, he filed a second motion to vacate (ECF No. 450, "Second Motion to Vacate") based on the Supreme Court'sruling in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (). By Order dated July 1, 2016 (ECF No. 454), the Court held the Second Motion to Vacate in abeyance pending clarification as to the applicability of Johnson to this matter. After the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 109 (1st Cir. 2018) ("Garcia IV") (), the Court, in an Order dated October 4, 2018 (ECF No. 496), denied the Second Motion to Vacate.
The still-pending First Motion to Vacate is addressed herein, as are several additional motions that Santiago has filed.
Section 2255 provides in relevant part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Generally, the grounds justifying relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) are limited, and a court may grant relief if it finds a lack of jurisdiction, a constitutional error, or a fundamental error of law. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979). "[A]n error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, § 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal. Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing cases).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). That said, "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee a defendant a letter-perfect defense or a successful defense; rather, the performance standard is that of reasonably effective assistance under the circumstances then obtaining." United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309-10 (1st Cir. 1991).
A defendant who claims that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel must show:
(1) that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and(2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. In assessing the adequacy of counsel's performance, a defendant "'must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment,' and the court then determines whether, in the particular context, the identified conduct or inaction was 'outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'" United States v. Manon, 608 F.3d 126, 131 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
As for the prejudice requirement under Strickland, a Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Reyes-Vejerano v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 2d 103, 106 (D.P.R. 2000) (). "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of theadversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
Strickland instructs that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. at 689; see also id. (). The court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Moreover, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 691. Finally, "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689.
The same principles apply in the context of guilty pleas. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). The Hill Court held that "the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 58; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 n.12 (2010) (). The first prong of the Strickland test is "nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence" described above. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
The second, or "prejudice," requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Id. at 59; see also Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017)(quoting Hill); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012)("In the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice."); Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (). These predictions, as the Supreme Courtreiterated in Hill, should be made objectively. See 474 U.S. at 59-60. Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967.
Santiago presents three grounds for relief in the First Motion to Vacate. First, he argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object at sentencing that Santiago's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) did not provide for a consecutive sentence. First Mot. to...
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