United States v. Schneider
| Decision Date | 21 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 07-10234-02-JWB |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LINDA SCHNEIDER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Linda Schneider's motion to reduce sentence. (Doc. 855.) Defendant seeks early release due to her underlying health conditions and the current COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant also seeks review of this court's previous denial of her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.1 The motion has been fully briefed and the court is prepared to rule. (Docs. 857, 859.) For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's motion for compassionate release is DENIED.
Defendant Linda Schneider was a licensed practical nurse and her husband, co-defendant Stephen Schneider, was a doctor of osteopathic medicine. They provided pain management treatment in their clinic, including the prescription of controlled substances. The clinic was open long hours, seven days a week. Stephen was the only full-time doctor on staff.
On March 3, 2010, the grand jury returned a third superseding indictment charging both defendants as follows: Count 1—conspiracy to unlawfully distribute drugs, commit health care fraud, engage in money laundering, and defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; Counts 2-6—unlawful drug dispensing and distribution and unlawful drug distribution resulting in death in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Counts 7-17—health care fraud and health care fraud resulting in death in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347; and Counts 18-34—money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. (Doc. 414). The case proceeded to trial.
The evidence at the jury trial was that Defendants' clinic was a regular "pill mill," fraudulently generating significant amounts of money, and both Defendants had little to no concern for the patients. Linda managed the clinic and was in charge of the scheduling and the billing. She prioritized the patients who would be seen based on the type of insurance and she would "frequently knock on the exam room door to hurry the exam along." United States v. Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1202 (D. Kan. 2015), on reconsideration, No. CR 07-10234-01, 2015 WL 13679981 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 2015), and aff'd, 665 F. App'x 668 (10th Cir. 2016). The government's expert on patient care concluded that Defendants "(1) ran a practice that attracted drug addicts; (2) took inadequate medical histories; and (3) indiscriminately prescribed controlled drugs in excessive and escalating amounts." United States v. Schneider, 704 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 2013). Dr. Douglas Jorgensen, the government's expert on pain management and billing practices, opined that Defendants filed fraudulent claims to insurance providers. Id. Dr. Graves Owen, an expert in pain management, testified that Stephen did not prescribe controlled substances for a legitimate medical purpose. Id. From February 2002 to February 2008, sixty-eight patients died of drug overdoses. Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. During the same time period, over 100 clinic patients were admitted to local hospitals for overdoses. Id. Defendants receivedrepeated calls from law enforcement, concerned family members about patients' drug addictions, concerned pharmacists, and calls from emergency room physicians about the clinic's prescription practices. Id. Defendants' method of operation continued without change.
The jury found Stephen guilty of Counts 1-17 and two money laundering charges (Counts 26 and 28), and found Linda guilty of all charges save two money laundering charges (Counts 23 and 24). Judge Monti Belot sentenced Stephen to 360 months' imprisonment on counts 1-5 and 7-9, to run concurrently. (Doc. 529.) Linda was sentenced to 396 months' imprisonment on counts 1-5 and 7-9, to run concurrently. (Doc. 527.) Defendant timely appealed and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. Schneider, 704 F.3d 1287. Based on a change in the law after sentencing, Defendant successfully challenged some of her convictions—although that did not result in a different sentence upon resentencing. Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 1223. Defendant was resentenced to the same 396-month sentence. (Doc. 805.) The controlling sentence was based on Defendant's conviction on Count 4, unlawful dispensing and distribution of prescriptions drugs resulting in the death of Robin G. According to the statement of reasons and the presentence report, the guideline range was life. (Docs. 802, 806.) Defendant's judgment was affirmed on appeal. Schneider, 665 F. App'x at 676. Defendant then filed another motion to vacate her sentence on January 4, 2018. (Doc. 839.) This court dismissed the motion as a second or successive 2255 motion. (Doc. 841.)
Defendant is currently incarcerated at Carswell FMC in Fort Worth, Texas. Based on the information provided by the Bureau of Prisons, Carswell FMC currently has no active COVID-19 cases among inmates and staff. Federal Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last accessed July 15, 2021). Defendant's projected release date is June 11, 2037. See Federal Bureauof Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/mobile/find_inmate/byname.jsp#inmate_results (Linda K Schneider, last accessed July 15, 2021).
On June 14, 2021, Defendant filed a motion seeking early release due to her health conditions that make her more susceptible to serious health complications should she contract COVID-19. (Doc. 855.) The government opposes Defendant's motion on the basis that she has not shown extraordinary circumstances and the sentencing factors do not weigh in favor of a sentence reduction to a time served sentence. (Doc. 857.)
Although there is no right to counsel in the filing of these motions, District of Kansas Standing Order 19-1 allows the appointment of the Federal Public Defender ("FPD") to represent indigent defendants who may qualify to seek compassionate release under § 603 of the First Step Act. Administrative Order 20-8 supplements 19-1 and sets forth procedures to address compassionate release motions brought on grounds related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under 20-8, the FPD has fifteen days to notify the court whether it intends to enter an appearance on behalf of any pro se individual filing a compassionate release motion based on COVID. Here, the FPD notified the court that it did not intend to enter an appearance to represent Defendant.
The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), was amended by The First Step Act. Now, a defendant may file her own motion if certain conditions have been met. The Tenth Circuit has recently endorsed a three-step test for district courts to utilize in deciding motions filed under § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107 (6th Cir. 2020)). Under that test, the court may reduce a sentence if Defendant has administratively exhausted his claim and three other requirements are met: (1) "extraordinary and compelling" reasons warrant a reduction; (2) the "reduction isconsistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;" and (3) the reduction is consistent with any applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. A court may deny the motion when any requirement is lacking and the court need not address the other requirements. Id. at 1043. But all requirements must be addressed when the court grants a motion for release under the statute. Id. With respect to the second requirement, the Tenth Circuit has held that the current policy statement on extraordinary circumstances is not applicable to motions filed by a defendant. United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 837 (10th Cir. 2021). Defendant bears the burden of establishing that compassionate release is warranted under the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Dial, No. 17-20068-JAR, 2020 WL 4933537, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 24, 2020); United States v. Dixon, No. 18-10027-02-JWB, 2020 WL 6483152, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 4, 2020).
Here, the government argues that Defendant has not shown extraordinary circumstances and that the sentencing factors do not support a time served sentence.
In her motion, Defendant raises two grounds for compassionate release. First, Defendant argues that the COVID-19 pandemic and her health conditions create an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Second, Defendant argues that the court erred in treating her § 2255 motion filed in 2018 as a second or successive § 2255 motion. The government does not dispute that Defendant has presented her request for release to the BOP with respect to the argument related to the COVID-19 pandemic. But, the government asserts that Defendant has not exhausted her claim regarding the denial of her § 2255 motion as a second or successive motion and, therefore, that ground should be denied. Viewing the request submitted by Defendant, it is clear that she only raised the COVID-19 pandemic as a basis for compassionate release. (Doc. 857, Exh. 2.)
Therefore, the court finds that Defendant has not fully exhausted her request for relief to the extent that it is based on this court's prior denial of her § 2255 motion and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider her arguments.
Moreover, although Defendant's motion is one for compassionate release, her argument pertaining to the previous denial of her § 2255 could also be construed as a second or successive § 2255 motion. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider this argument as she has not obtained proper certification from the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
Turning to the reasons Defendant did present to BOP, Defendant argues that the current COVID-19 pandemic and her health conditions constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. Defendant's stated health conditions include...
To continue reading
Request your trial