United States v. Sears

• Decision Date: 03 April 1893
• Citation: 55 F. 268
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. SEARS.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kentucky

55 F. 268

UNITED STATES v. SEARS.

United States District Court, D. Kentucky.

April 3, 1893

George W. Jolly, U.S. Atty., and W. McD. Shaw, Asst. U.S. Atty.

Bishop & Dishman and Gilbert & Kahn, for defendant.

BARR District Judge.

This indictment was under section 3995, which provides that--

'Any person who shall knowingly and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or any carriage, horse, driver, or carrier carrying same, shall, for every such offense, be punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.'

There can be no doubt under the evidence that the defendant stopped the mail carrier while he was carrying the United States mail, and that the defendant did this because he did not pay his toll for the use of the gravel road in advance, and also for some toll past due, and that he did this knowing he las the mail carrier, and was at the time carrying the mail. The only questions which were considered by the jury under the instructions of the court were whether he could lawfully stop said mail carrier, and whether the stoppage under the circumstances was 'willful,' within the meaning of this section.

The state statute authorized the defendant, who was a toll-gate keeper on a gravel road, to collect in advance the toll for the use of the road, and to stop persons from passing through the gate and using the road who did not pay their toll in advance. See chapter 110, sec. 3, subsec. 2, Gen. St. Ky ^[1] But this statute did not and could not authorize a toll-gate keeper to stop a mail carrier while he was carrying the mail because he did not pay in advance the toll for the use of the road. The authority of the United States was supreme in that matter, and if the defendant did knowingly and willfully obstruct or detain the mail of the United States he cannot defend by proving that he had the state of Kentucky's authority to thus obstruct and detain the mail. If the authority to obstruct or detain the passage of the United States mails be conceded to the states for a purpose like this, there can be no litigation to the power to prevent the passage of the mails in and through the states at all. It is not intended to indicate that a state may not grant any remedy it chooses in the enforcement or collection of tolls on bridges or roads which do not encroach upon the rights and powers of the United States, but we think whatever remedies may be granted are subordinate to the power and authority of the United States under the federal constitution. Nor is it intended to assert that the United States can take private property intended to assert that the United States can take private property for this public use without just compensation. It is not the right of the company to the tolls under the state law which is doubted, but the right to stop the passage of the mails to enforce their collection which is denied. Congress had, under the constitution, the authority to enact this section, and the only question in this case is whether the defendant Sears did 'knowingly and willfully' obstruct or retard the passage of the mail or the mail carrier while he was carrying the mail

This question seems to be answered in the opinion of the supreme court. In U.S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 485, the court say:

'The statute of congress by its terms applies only to persons who 'knowingly and willfully' obstruct or retard the passage of the mail or its carrier,--that is, to those who know that the acts performed will have that effect, and perform them with the intention that such shall be their operation. When the acts which create the obstruction are in themselves unlawful, the intention to obstruct will be imputed to their author, although the attainment of other ends may have been his primary object. The statute has no reference to acts lawful in themselves, from

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