United States v. Smith, Crim. No. 1-55-B-S (D. Me. 1/8/2002)

• Decision Date: 08 January 2002
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 1-55-B-S.
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. TRAVIS SMITH, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. TRAVIS SMITH, Defendant.

Crim. No. 1-55-B-S.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

January 8, 2002.

RECOMMENDED DECISION

KRAVCHUK, District Judge.

Travis L. Smith has filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police interrogators on May 23, 2001, alleging that the statements were obtained in violation of the Miranda rule and were otherwise involuntary. I now recommend that the court adopt my proposed findings of fact and DENY the motion to suppress.

Proposed Findings of Fact

Richard Rolfe, a special agent with the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency ("MDEA"), who worked for nine years at the Baileyville police department before assignment to the MDEA, conducted an investigation in May 2001 relating to trafficking in dilaudid, a powerful narcotic. On May 23 the investigation centered on a number of individuals and the surveillance of Dawn Fitch's residence in Princeton, Maine. Rolfe contacted agent Brent McSweyn of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") because he believed that Travis Smith would be present at the residence on the date in question and he suspected that Smith would be armed with firearms. Smith's criminal history made him a prohibited person under federal law, thus engendering ATF's interest in the case.

After several hours of surveillance, the officers apprehended Fitch, Smith, and a third individual named Francis. A search of the vehicle and Fitch's purse resulted in the seizure of a number of firearms. The officers in attendance interrogated the three individuals. That interrogation took place at Fitch's kitchen table where these individuals were brought one at a time to meet with the officers. They were not taken to a police station because according to Rolfe there were no private interview rooms available at any police station within reasonable proximity to the scene.

Smith was brought into the kitchen from the police cruiser where he had been detained while others were interviewed. The officers present included Rolfe, McSweyn, and two Washington County deputy sheriffs, Frank Gardner and Chris Gardner. Frank Gardner had a tape recorder with him and apparently turned the recorder on to tape the interview. However, for some inexplicable reason, he did not do so until after Rolfe read Miranda to Smith.

The three officers present, Rolfe, McSweyn, and Frank Gardner,¹ all testified that Rolfe read Miranda from a card and that Smith indicated affirmatively that he understood his rights and would waive them. Field notes of each officer prepared during the interview corroborate the testimony. The written field notes were admitted, on re-direct examination, over objection by the defense. The notes were offered pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as a prior consistent statement by each officer. As I found that the notes, when offered by the United States on re-direct examination, were properly admissible pursuant to that rule, they, by definition, were not excludable as hearsay. There was no other evidence presented on the issue of whether or not Miranda was read and, based on the evidence I heard, I must conclude that Smith was read his rights and waived them.

I also find that Smith was not influenced by narcotic substances to such an extent as to render his statements involuntary. I listened to the entire tape and Smith's responses are cogent, his diction is relatively clear, and he does not sound at all as though he is experiencing any distress. My observations of the taped conversation are confirmed by the testimony of all three officers. None of them observed any signs of narcotic withdrawal while speaking with Smith. During the conversation Smith does not refer to any narcotic withdrawal difficulties and his only reference to a substance was a request regarding cigarettes. Agent McSweyn not only spoke with Smith during the interview, but also had the opportunity to speak with him a few additional minutes on the front porch of the residence and he observed no signs that Smith was under the influence when he walked out to the porch and stood there speaking with him. I am completely satisfied that narcotic substances did not render Smith's statements involuntary.

Discussion

In order for Smith's statements to the police to be admissible, the United States must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Smith "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waived his right to remain silent and to speak with counsel. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1972) (establishing preponderance standard); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."). The voluntariness of a waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991). The United States must demonstrate that Smith's will was not overborne and that his decision to speak was freely and voluntarily made. Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 367-68 (1st Cir. 1986). Relevant considerations include "both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (discussing voluntariness standard in the context of a consent to search).

The government must show that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the investigating agents neither "broke" nor overbore the defendant's will, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 (1940), and that his statements were "the product of a rational intellect and a free will," Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). See also Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963). As this language suggests, "coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary.'" Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Coercive police activity may include either the creation of a susceptible psychological state in the person interrogated, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-308 (1963) (concerning alleged administration of "truth serum" to quell heroin addict's withdrawal symptoms), or the exploitation of an existing psychological condition, Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207-208 ("[A] most basic sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis of a statement he made while insane.").

The First Circuit has noted that if a suspect is in a weakened condition because of his heroin withdrawal symptoms, it does not necessarily follow that his post-arrest statements are involuntary. United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000) ("In the context of the voluntariness of a confession, a defendant's mental state by itself and apart from...