United States v. Smith

• Decision Date: 03 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1117,20-1117
• Citation: 989 F.3d 575
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Martez L. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

989 F.3d 575

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Martez L. SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-1117

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued October 28, 2020

Decided March 3, 2021

Katherine Virginia Boyle, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Urbana, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

J. Steven Beckett, Attorney, Audrey Thompson, Attorney, Beckett Law Office, P.C., Urbana, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Ripple, Wood, and Brennan, Circuit Judges.

Brennan, Circuit Judge.

Illinois law enforcement agents received a tip from a confidential source claiming that Martez Smith had been dealing methamphetamine in Mattoon, Illinois. The agents conducted controlled buys between Smith and the source, and in the course of the investigation, requested a patrol officer stop Smith's vehicle. During that stop, the officer found marijuana, a marijuana grinder, and a firearm in Smith's vehicle. The officer arrested Smith and seized the gun. A federal grand jury indicted Smith on one count of distributing methamphetamine and one count of possessing a firearm as a felon.

Represented by court-appointed counsel, Smith pleaded guilty to both counts. He then sought to retract his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied Smith's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, rejected his request for an evidentiary hearing, and sentenced him on the two counts. On appeal, Smith challenges the district court's denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his career offender sentencing enhancement. We affirm the district court's decision in full.

I

A

In July 2018, Illinois law enforcement agents received a tip from a confidential source, who claimed he had been purchasing methamphetamine from Martez Smith in the Mattoon, Illinois area for the past two months. Based on this information, the agents arranged a series of controlled buys between Smith and the source.

The first controlled buy occurred on July 9, 2018. After the transaction, the source returned to the agents and gave them approximately 46 grams of "ice" methamphetamine that he had just purchased from Smith. With a failed attempt in the interim, the agents conducted another controlled buy on July 27. As instructed, the source text messaged Smith to purchase three ounces of methamphetamine. Smith replied "yea" and agreed on a time for the transaction. That day, the agents observed Smith driving as if to avoid surveillance while en route to the scheduled transaction and requested a nearby patrol officer to pull him over. The officer identified Smith's vehicle, noticed it had "extremely dark window tinting," and ordered Smith to stop. When he attempted to measure the window tint, the officer realized that the batteries of his tint meter had failed, so he radioed other officers to bring him a new one.

During the approximately ten-minute wait, the officer learned that Smith's driver's license had been suspended. He asked Smith if he had any contraband in the vehicle. Smith said no. The officer then searched the vehicle and found a small amount of marijuana, a marijuana grinder, and a 9mm pistol with a 30-round extended magazine attached.¹ In a later interview, Smith admitted to possessing the firearm but denied selling methamphetamine.

B

In August 2018, a federal grand jury indicted Smith on two counts: (1) distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) ("Count 1"); and (2) possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ("Count 2"). Smith pleaded not guilty to both counts.

The district court appointed Attorney Johanes Maliza to represent Smith. With Maliza's representation, Smith changed his plea to guilty in November 2018. During the change-of-plea hearing before the magistrate judge, the parties agreed that, in addition to the felon-in-possession charge, Smith would plead guilty only to the lesser-included offense of distributing controlled substance between 5 and 50 grams because the laboratory results revealed that Smith sold less than 50 grams of methamphetamine.

The ensuing plea colloquy was thorough. Smith testified under oath in response to the court's questions. The magistrate judge asked Smith whether he had sufficient time to review the case with his counsel, whether he was satisfied with his counsel's representation, and whether he discussed the specific charges with his counsel. Smith answered "yes" to all three questions and admitted under oath that he distributed methamphetamine on July 9, 2018, and knowingly possessed a firearm as a felon on July 27, 2018. The court then asked Smith how he wanted to plead, to which Smith answered "guilty" on both counts.

Following his guilty plea but before sentencing, Smith filed two pro se motions seeking to withdraw his pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Among various claims, Smith alleged that Maliza failed to investigate and to file a motion to suppress the firearm found in his car. Simultaneously, Maliza moved to withdraw as counsel, citing "a direct and irreconcilable conflict of interest" with Smith. The court granted Maliza's motion and appointed new counsel. By counsel, Smith then moved to withdraw his guilty plea and requested that the court hold an evidentiary hearing on Maliza's alleged ineffective assistance. The district court denied both requests and proceeded to sentencing.

The presentence investigation report recommended a career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 for Smith's two prior convictions: a 2009 federal conviction for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and a 2013 Indiana conviction for attempted armed robbery. Smith objected to this enhancement, arguing that his conspiracy conviction does not constitute a predicate "controlled substance offense" as required by the provision. Specifically, he asserted that the plain language of the Sentencing Guidelines does not include inchoate offenses like § 846 narcotics conspiracy.

Relying on United States v. Adams , 934 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2019), the district court rejected Smith's argument and held that § 846 conspiracy constitutes a predicate "controlled substance offense." It concluded that Smith qualified for the career-offender enhancement under § 4B1.1. The district court sentenced Smith to 214 months’ imprisonment on Count 1 and 120 months’ imprisonment on Count 2 to be served concurrently. Smith timely appealed to this court.

II

A

Smith first challenges the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Barr , 960 F.3d 906, 917 (7th Cir. 2020).

A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after the district court accepts the plea, but before it imposes a sentence, by showing "a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). Ineffective assistance of counsel serves as a "fair and just" reason for withdrawing a plea. See United States v. Graf , 827 F.3d 581, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2016) ; see also Hurlow v. United States , 726 F.3d 958, 967 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that a plea that resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be knowing and voluntary). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel rendered deficient performance and that the deficiency prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In other words, a defendant must show that his counsel rendered objectively unreasonable performance and that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome would have been different. Id. We need not address both deficient performance and prejudice prongs "if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one." Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; see Armfield v. Nicklaus , 985 F.3d 536, 548 (7th Cir. 2021) (same).

In the guilty plea context, we apply the modified Strickland analysis articulated in Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). See Gish v. Hepp , 955 F.3d 597, 605 (7th Cir. 2020). Under Hill , the deficient performance prong remains largely unchanged. A defendant must show that his counsel rendered objectively unreasonable performance and "performed seriously below professional standards." United States v. Williams , 698 F.3d 374, 386 (7th Cir. 2012). On the prejudice prong, a defendant must show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Lee v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017) (quoting Hill , 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 ). The prejudice inquiry into counsel's failure to investigate "will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea." Hill , 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366 (adding that "[t]his assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial").

A guilty plea, however, "should not lightly be with-drawn." United States v. Brown , 973 F.3d 667, 715 (7th Cir. 2020). Courts must "not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies." Lee , 137 S. Ct. at 1967. We instead "look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences" and only allow a withdrawal if we are convinced that the defendant would have pleaded differently. Id.

Smith alleges three deficiencies in Maliza's performance: (1) failure to investigate and file a motion to suppress the firearm found in the car; (2) pressure to hastily plead guilty; and (3) general unfamiliarity with the facts of the case. The district court denied these claims as either lacking merit or otherwise undermined by the record. We agree and analyze each of Smith's arguments in turn.

Motion to...