United States v. Smith
| Decision Date | 02 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL 17-00020 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MARK S. SMITH, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Guam |
Before this Court is Defendant Mark Smith's motion to dismiss based on an invalid designation. (Mot., ECF No. 358.) The matter was fully briefed and came on for a hearing on September 30, 2021 (Am. Min., ECF No. 373), during which time this Court DENIED the motion for the reasons set forth below. While framed as a motion to dismiss, Defendant's motion in substance seeks my disqualification[1] on the premise that Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Sidney Thomas' designation of a current judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to sit as a judge for the District Court of Guam exceeded the statutory scope permitted under 48 U.S.C § 1424b(a), such that any orders issued pursuant to my designation should be null and void. Specifically, the statutory language at issue provides that:
The Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the United States may assign a judge of a local court of record or a judge of the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or a circuit or district judge of the ninth circuit or a recalled senior judge of the District Court of Guam or of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands . . . to serve temporarily as a judge in the District Court of Guam whenever it is made to appear that such an assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the court.
48 U.S.C. § 1424b(a) (emphasis added). Defendant contends that a current judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands is neither a “district judge of the ninth circuit” nor a “recalled senior judge.”
The question before this Court is therefore: “Did Congress grant the Chief Judge of the Ninth
Circuit authority to designate a current judge from the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to hold court in the District Court of Guam?” In light of the statutory framework and legislative history under Title 48 of the United States Code, this Court answers in the affirmative.
On March 14, 2017, a grand jury returned an Indictment against Defendants Mark S. Smith and Glenn D. Wong for: Count 1, Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349 and 1343; Count 2 to 27, Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; Count 28, Theft of Government Property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641; Count 29, Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (h) and 1957; Counts 30 to 36, Engaging in Monetary Transactions with Proceeds of Specified Unlawful Activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2; Counts 37 to 55, Laundering of Monetary Instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2; and Count 56, False Statement on Loan Application (against Wong only), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1014 and 2. (Indictment, ECF No. 1.)
Chief Judge Frances Tydingco-Gatewood of the District Court of Guam shortly thereafter recused herself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), requiring a judge to disqualify herself where impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (See Am. Order of Recusal, ECF No. 5.) I, the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, was subsequently designated to preside over this matter pursuant to Chief Judge Thomas' general designation order. (Notice of Designation, hereinafter “Designation Order, ” ECF No. 17.) Specifically, Chief Judge Thomas' General
Designation Order, dated December 27, 2016, provides that:
Pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1424b(a), I hereby designate Ramona Villagomez Manglona, United States Chief District Judge from the District of the Northern Mariana Islands, to sit in the District of Guam on an as-needed basis beginning January 1, 2017, and ending December 31, 2017, and for such additional time required in advance to prepare or thereafter to complete unfinished business.
(Id.) Jury trial was held beginning on September 12, 2017 (Min., ECF No. 148), but after five days of jury trial, this Court declared a mistrial out of manifest necessity (see Min., ECF No. 175; Order
Declaring Mistrial, ECF No. 174). Jury trial is now set to begin on October 19, 2021. (Min., ECF No. 340; Third Amended Scheduling Order, ECF No. 356.) Defendant Glenn Wong has since passed away such that the Court dismissed the Indictment against him, and the sole remaining defendant is now Defendant Mark Smith. (Order Dismissing Wong, ECF No. 345.)
On September 1, 2021, Defendant filed this instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) and 47, arguing that the case should be dismissed against him on the bases of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of the United States Constitution, and on the basis of the invalid designation under 48 U.S.C. § 1424b(a) of the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands to hold court and preside over this matter in the District Court of Guam. (Mot. at 1, ECF No. 358.) Defendant therefore argues that any orders issued by me in the District Court of Guam should be illegal, null, and void. (Id. at 7-8.) Defendant also subsequently filed its errata to make grammatical corrections. (ECF No. 359.) Given that the trial date is approaching, this Court set the matter for an expedited briefing. (See Order Setting Briefing, ECF No. 360.) The Government timely filed its opposition (Opp'n, ECF No. 361), and Defendant filed a reply (Reply, ECF No. 365). Having reviewed the parties' written submissions and the relevant law, and having heard oral arguments from both counsel at the hearing held on September 30, 2021 (Am. Min., ECF No. 373), the Court DENIED Defendant's motion for the following reasons.
“The Supreme Court has directed that the first step in interpreting a statute ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.'” Texaco Inc. v. United States, 528 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340. Such inquiry ceases “if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In other words, “[i]f the plain language of a statute renders its meaning reasonably clear, the court will not investigate further unless its ‘application leads to unreasonable or impracticable results.'” United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 883 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999)); see Arizona State Bd. for Charter Schools v. United States Dep't of Educ., 464 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2006) (). “When a statute does not define a term, we generally interpret that term by employing the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of the words that Congress used.” United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, it is “a cardinal principle of statutory construction” that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Where a statute is ambiguous, however, a court “may use canons of construction, legislative history, and the statute's overall purpose to illuminate Congress's intent.” United States v. Gallegos, 613 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009)).
Defendant's motion asks this Court to consider whether the phrase “district judge of the ninth circuit” as used in 48 U.S.C. § 1424b(a) includes a judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. Guam's designation statute specifically provides that:
The Chief Judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the United States may assign a judge of a local court of record or a judge of the High Court of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or a circuit or district judge of the ninth circuit or a recalled senior judge of the District Court of Guam or of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, or the Chief Justice of the United States may assign any other United States circuit or district judge with the consent of the judge so assigned and of the chief judge of his circuit, to serve temporarily as a judge in the District Court of Guam whenever it is made to appear that such an assignment is necessary for the proper dispatch of the business of the court.
48 U.S.C. § 1424b(a) (emphasis added). The parties take contrary positions on the statute's plain language. Defendant is of the view that the “district judge of the ninth circuit” does not include a judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. The Government views the statute to the contrary.
First in arguing that the phrase “district judge of the ninth circuit” does not include a current judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, Defendant relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003). (See Mot. at 2-5.) In Nguyen, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “district judges” in 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) pertaining to the appointment of judges to sit on a Ninth Circuit panel to not include judges from the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands. ...
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