United States v. Squires

Decision Date10 March 1972
Docket NumberDocket 71-2018.,No. 469,469
Citation456 F.2d 967
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Frank SQUIRES, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Pierce Gerety, Jr. (Robert Kasanof, The Legal Aid Society, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Carter LaPrade, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U.S. Atty., S. D. N.Y., and Henry Putzel, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., of counsel), for appellee.

Before FRIENDLY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and BONSAL, District Judge.*

BONSAL, District Judge:

Appellant Frank Squires appeals from a judgment of conviction of concealing and storing an automobile, knowing it had been stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. Appellant was convicted following a 3-day trial before Judge Ryan.

The only issue raised by appellant is the denial of his pretrial motion before Judge Metzner to suppress certain evidence, which motion was heard on July 24, 1969 and decided by Judge Metzner on August 12, 1969.

On January 22, 1969, three detectives of the Yonkers, New York Police Department arrested appellant while he was sitting in a 1967 Cadillac, with the engine running, in the parking lot behind the apartment building in which he lived. The arresting officers had a warrant charging appellant with a traffic violation (a noisy muffler). It does not appear whether the traffic violation related to the Cadillac. Detective Gebbia asked appellant whether he owned the Cadillac, and when he replied that he did, Detective Gebbia asked for the registration—which disclosed that the Cadillac was registered in the name of Dine-Art Furniture Company and was signed by Philip Squires. Appellant told Detective Gebbia that Philip was his father's name and that he was sometimes known as Philip Squires and used the name, and that he was an officer of Dine-Art Furniture Company. (It was stipulated at trial that appellant told Gebbia that he was President of Dine-Art Furniture Company, and that the Cadillac was his.) Detective Gebbia then checked the vehicle identification number (VIN) on the doorpost of the Cadillac, and it corresponded to the number on the registration. The detectives searched appellant for weapons and found none. The detectives then asked appellant for the keys to the Cadillac, Detective Gebbia explaining that he was not satisfied with the registration and that it was customary to bring in the automobile for safekeeping. Thereafter, appellant was driven to the police station by two of the detectives while Detective Gebbia drove the Cadillac to the police station.

On arrival at the police station, Detective Gebbia checked the confidential vehicle identification number (CVIN) on the chassis and found that it did not correspond to the VIN on the doorpost. Investigation disclosed that the Cadillac had been stolen in Newport, Rhode Island on August 27, 1967. Thereupon, appellant was arrested for possession of a stolen motor vehicle and the Cadillac was impounded. At appellant's request, an inventory was made of the contents of the Cadillac and among the items inventoried was a 22-caliber rifle.

At the suppression hearing, Judge Metzner found probable cause for making the search at the police station and denied appellant's motion to suppress, stating that—

"The suspicious nature of the story told by the defendant gave the officer probable cause to do what he did here.
"The officer knew the easy and simple way to check defendant\'s story. The confidential identification number was on the outside of the car. Not only was the matter sought on the outside of the car, but there was no `general search or rummage of the place.\' Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931)."

For the reasons hereinafter stated, we conclude that the officers did not have probable cause to seize the Cadillac and remove it to the police station, and that the results of the inspection made at the police station should not have been received in evidence.

At the time the officers arrested appellant while he was sitting in the Cadillac in the parking lot they had probable cause only to believe that he had committed a traffic offense with a noisy muffler. The Cadillac was in a parking lot used by the occupants of the adjoining apartment house where appellant lived. Therefore there was nothing suspicious about the place in which the officers found the Cadillac and no probable cause at that point to believe that the Cadillac had been stolen. The suspicion raised by the fact that the registration was in the name of Philip Squires and not Frank Squires did not constitute probable cause to believe the...

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21 cases
  • San Joaquin Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, CIV. S–12–1361 LKK/GGH.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • September 24, 2012
    ...not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a hazard to other drivers. Id. at 866 (citing United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 970 (2d Cir.1972)). A construction of Plaintiffs' allegations in the light most favorable to Poeun is that Poeun's vehicle was parked o......
  • People v. Class
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • November 27, 1984
    ...670, 317 N.W.2d 218, supra; Wood v. State, 632 S.W.2d 734 Fox v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 97, 189 S.E.2d 367, supra; cf. United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 970 ). Research has disclosed only six reported cases in which police inspection of a VIN has been struck down (United States v. Nikr......
  • Gombert v. Lynch, 3:01CV01913(DJS).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • March 27, 2008
    ...caretaking exception would not have permitted the police to take custody or control of the Plaintiffs car. United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 970 (2d Cir.1972) ("However, since the Cadillac was parked in the parking lot behind the apartment house in which appellant lived, which was an ......
  • Com. v. Navarro
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • May 1, 1974
    ...Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 646--648 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d 1120, 1122--1123 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 969--970 (2d Cir. 1972); and United States v. Ware, 457 F.2d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 139, 34 L.Ed.2d 1......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 9-01, September 1985
    • Invalid date
    ...one's home or even on a public street, however, may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested. United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 970 (2d Cir. 1972). Similarly, impounding is improper when the arrestee will be released imminently and the vehicle does not pose a safety......
  • Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 2005 Update
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 28-03, March 2005
    • Invalid date
    ...parked at one's home or even on a public street may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested. United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1972). Similarly, impoundment is improper when the arrestee's release is imminent and the vehicle does not pose a safety h......
  • Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1998 Update
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 22-01, September 1998
    • Invalid date
    ...parked at one's home or even on a public street may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested. United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 969-70 (2d Cir. 1972). Similarly, impoundment is improper when the arrestee's release is imminent and the vehicle does not pose a safety h......
  • Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update
    • United States
    • Seattle University School of Law Seattle University Law Review No. 11-03, March 1988
    • Invalid date
    ...one's home or even on a public street, however, may not be impounded simply because its owner has been arrested. United States v. Squires, 456 F.2d 967, 970 (2d Cir. 1972). Similarly, impoundment is improper when the arrestee's release is imminent and the vehicle does not pose a safety haza......

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