United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana

• Decision Date: 20 June 1907
• Citation: 154 F. 728
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF INDIANA.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

154 F. 728

UNITED STATES v. STANDARD OIL CO. OF INDIANA.

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division.

June 20, 1907

George Randolph, U.S. Dist. Atty., and Casey Todd, Asst. U.S. Dist Atty., for plaintiff.

C. G Bond, for defendant.

McCALL District Judge.

The defendant is charged with knowingly accepting and receiving concessions from the Illinois Central and the Southern Railway Companies in respect to the transportation of certain property of the defendant over the railroads of said companies, in violation of the interstate commerce law.

There are three questions before the court for consideration, as follows: First. Has this court jurisdiction or authority to issue process or summons, for the defendant, to the district of Indiana? Second. Is the return of the United States marshal, as indorsed upon the writ, a sufficient or proper return? Third. The sufficiency of the plea in abatement of the defendant, putting in issue the question as to whether the summons was executed on the highest agent or officer of the defendant company within the district of Indiana.

The first two questions are raised upon a motion by the defendant to quash the writ and the return indorsed thereon. The third question is made by demurrer, interposed by the government to the defendant's plea in abatement. Considering them in the order stated, we first come to the question of the power and jurisdiction of this court to issue process to the district of Indiana for the defendant.

It is well here to state the facts in the case. On the 17th day of October, 1906, the grand jury for the Eastern division of the Western district of Tennessee returned into court an indictment against the Standard Oil Company, in which it was charged that the defendant company, in the Eastern division of the Western district of Tennessee, and within the jurisdiction of this court, did knowingly accept and receive from the Illinois Central Railroad and the Southern Railway concessions in respect of the transportation of certain property of the defendant company moved in interstate commerce. It was found the defendant company had no place of business in this state, and had no officer or agent in the district on whom process could be served. A summons was issued by this court, addressed to the marshal for the district of Indiana, commanding him to summon the defendant to appear on the fourth Monday in April, 1907, to answer the United States on the indictment which had been found. The summons came to the hands of the United States marshal for the district of Indiana, who executed the same. To this service the defendant company filed a motion to quash, in which it is claimed that at the time of the finding of the indictment, and at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses set out in the different counts in the indictment, and at the time process was served, the defendant was a foreign corporation incorporated under the laws of the state of Indiana and was a resident of the state of Indiana, and not a resident or citizen of the state of Tennessee, and that it had no agent, nor had it any established agency or place of business in the state of Tennessee, nor within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, and at the time process was served it had no agent or representative in the state of Tennessee upon whom service of process could be executed. The written motion sets up that this court had no power to issue the summons addressed to the United States marshal for the district of Indiana, as stated above.

For the purposes of this decision, it must be admitted that the defendant company committed in this district the offenses charged in the indictment. The question therefore resolves itself into this: The defendant having committed the offenses in this district, and an indictment having been found against it, and there being no officer, agent, or representative of the defendant company in this district on whom process can be served, has this court the power to issue a summons to the district of Indiana, where the defendant corporation was chartered, for the purpose of commanding it to appear in this district to answer the indictment? Or, to put it in another shape, the defendant claims that, though it has committed offenses in this district, yet, since no officer, agent, or representative can be found in this district on whom to serve process, it cannot be brought before the court, and made to answer for the crimes charged in the indictment.

Section 1014 of the Revised Statutes provides the method by which a natural person, who may be indicted in the United States court, may be brought from another district into the district wherein he is indicted for trial. But this statute is not effective here. This defendant is a corporation. It cannot be taken into custody and required to execute bond for its appearance, nor on its refusal or failure to do so be committed to jail. Indeed, it can only appear before the court through its agent or attorney.

In Bishop's New Criminal Procedure, Sec. 950a, par. 3, it is said:

'A corporation is an intangible creature of the law, which cannot be seized and held, or imprisoned, or hung like a human being. Therefore the only method for obtaining the necessary control of it is by notice served on its proper officer and steps to force it to appear by attorney. For without an appearance there can be no sentence; judgment by default being unknown in criminal cases.'

Since this defendant cannot be arrested and brought within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, as in the case of a natural person, of necessity it must be brought by summons, if the court obtains jurisdiction of it, unless it shall voluntarily appear. U.S. v. John Kelso Co. (D.C.) 86 F. 304; U.S. v. Correspondence School (D.C.) 125 F. 94.

Sections 738 and 739 of the Revised Statutes provide a method by which a defendant in a civil suit in a United States court may be brought before the court; but this is a criminal proceeding, and these statutes do not apply. Congress has not enacted any special legislation with reference to the issuance and service of process upon corporations in criminal cases.

Section 716, Rev. St. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 580), however, provides as follows:

'The Supreme Court, and the Circuit and District Courts shall have power to issue writs of scire facias. They shall also have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.'

This statute was enacted in 1789, and stands now as amended in 1793. The language used here is broad and general. It would seem that it was intended to cover all cases not otherwise specifically provided for by Congress. Wherever Congress has provided a special method in any particular character of cases for the issuance and service of process, that method must be pursued, and it would seem to be a reasonable conclusion that such special methods would be a limitation on the general power conferred by section 716, Rev. St.

The reason for the limitation of this power as is done in section 1014, Rev. St., is not difficult to understand, but for whatever reason this and similar statutes have been enacted by Congress, wherein are provided specific methods of procedure in any particular class of cases, still section 716, Rev. St., remains the law of the land, and in my judgment is authority for the issuance and service of the process, as has been done in this case.

This court has jurisdiction of criminal offenses against the United States committed within the Eastern Division of the Western District of Tennessee. It has jurisdiction of the particular offense charged against the defendant in the indictment in this case, under and by virtue of section 1 of the act of Congress passed February 19, 1903 (chapter 708, 32 Stat. 847 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1906, p. 599)), commonly known as the 'Elkins Act.' This act provides that prosecutions may be instituted in any court of the United States having jurisdiction of crimes, within the district in which the alleged violation was committed, or within the district through which the property was transported on which the rebates or concessions were made; and whenever the offense is begun in one jurisdiction, and completed in another, it may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in either jurisdiction in the same manner as if the offense had been actually and wholly committed therein. It only remains to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant by summons before it can be legally arraigned and tried upon this indictment.

Since Congress has not specifically provided for the issuance of the writ, nor the method of bringing defendants before the court in this character of cases, and since it is necessary that such writ issue to enable this court to exercise its jurisdiction, and since the issuance...