United States v. Staples, 1:16-cr-82-8
| Decision Date | 26 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:16-cr-82-8,1:16-cr-82-8 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. WILLIAM STAPLES, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Kane)
Before the Court are Defendant William Staples ("Defendant")'s motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (Doc. No. 885), and motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 (Doc. No. 887). For the reasons provided herein, the Court will deny Defendant's motions in their entirety.
On March 30, 2016, Defendant, along with thirteen (13) co-defendants, was charged by indictment with various child pornography-related offenses.1 (Doc. No. 1.) On May 11, 2016, Defendant was charged by superseding indictment with: conspiring to receive and distribute child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1) (Count 11); receiving and distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) (Count 12); conspiring to publish a notice and advertisement seeking and offering to receive, exchange, produce, display, and distribute child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (Count 13); and publishing a notice and advertisement seeking to receive child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (Count 16). (Doc. No. 143.)
Defendant and Defendant Dylan Heatherly ("Defendant Heatherly") were tried before a jury in January of 2018. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the Court denied. (Doc. No. 883 at 11: 7-25, 12: 1-24.) He was convicted on Counts 11, 12, and 13 and acquitted on Count 16. (Doc. No. 845.) Defendant now moves for judgment of acquittal on Counts 11, 12, and 13 pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) (Doc. No. 885), or, in the alternative, for a new trial on Counts 11, 12, and 13 pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 (Doc. No. 887). Plaintiff filed a brief in support of his motion for judgment of acquittal on May 31, 2018 (Doc. No. 886), and a brief in support of his motion for a new trial on June 1, 2018 (Doc. No. 888). The Government filed a brief in opposition to both motions on July 16, 2018. (Doc. No. 894.) Accordingly, the motions are now ripe for disposition.
The charges brought against Defendant stem from actions allegedly taken by Defendant while participating on several dates in 2015 in video chatrooms through the application Zoom where users requested child pornography and streamed videos of adults raping and sexually abusing prepubescent children.2 Detective Constable Janelle Blackadar of the Toronto Police Service entered a Zoom room on July 22, 2015 in an undercover capacity and viewed Defendant William Chandler Augusta ("Defendant Augusta") stream a live video of himself sexually abusing a child to the other Zoom room participants (referred to herein as the "Live Event").(Doc. No. 880 at 67: 6-22.) While Defendant was not present for the Live Event, he logged into the Zoom room shortly after the Live Event ended and spent approximately one hour logged into the Zoom room.3 (Doc. No. 880 at 181: 9-17; Ex. 17.) In addition to the July 22, 2015 Zoom room session, the charges brought against Defendant also relate to other interactions in Zoom rooms, including a Zoom room session on February 28, 2015, in which Defendant participated in a group chat and communicated with Defendant Augusta privately.
Defendant moves for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 11, 12, and 13 on the basis that the Government failed to meet its burden of proving all elements of the offenses charged in those counts. (Doc. Nos. 885, 886.) The Government argues in response that it presented sufficient evidence as to all elements of the challenged counts. (Doc. No. 894.)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the jury has returned a guilty verdict, the [C]ourt may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(2). "A defendant 'challenging the sufficiency of the evidence' pursuant to Rule 29 'bears a heavy burden.'" United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 201 (2014) (quoting United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 421 (3d Cir. 1992)). When a defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a jury verdict, the Court must review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and uphold that verdict if "any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Benjamin, 711 F.3d 371, 376 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993)).
The jury found Defendant guilty of Count 13, which charged him with conspiracy to publish a notice or advertisement seeking child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). (Doc. No. 845.) Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon for his conviction. (Doc. No. 885.)
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) makes it illegal to:
knowingly make[], print[], or publish[], or cause[] to be made, printed, or published, any notice or advertisement seeking or offering . . . to receive, exchange, buy, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce, any visual depiction, if the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).
While the United States Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit has not expressly opined as to what qualifies as a "notice" or "advertisement" for purposes of the relevant statute, other circuits have concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) does not require publication to the general public. See United States v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 2017) (); United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2017) (); United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (10th Cir. 2015) ().
For a defendant to be convicted of conspiracy under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(1) two or more persons agreed to commit [the underlying offense]; (2) [the defendant] was a party to or a member of that agreement; (3) [the defendant] and at least one other alleged conspirator shared a unity of purpose and the intent to achieve a common goal or objective to commit [the underlying offense]; and (4) at some time during the existence of the agreement or conspiracy, at least one of the members performed an overt act in order to further the objectives of the agreement.
See United States v. Dressel, 625 F. App'x 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Rankin, 870 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1989); 3d Cir. Crim. Model Jury Instructions § 6.18.371A). However, unlike under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, "[t]here is no overt act requirement for conspiracy to advertise child pornography under § 2251(d) and (e)." See United States v. Grovo, 653 F. App'x 512, 514 (9th Cir. 2016).
Regarding venue, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) provides that conspiracy can be "prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed." See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a);see also United States v. Lakey, No. 3-08-cr-22, 2016 WL 7475795, at *5 (N. D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2016) (), adopted by 2016 WL 7475792, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2016). Additionally, the Third Circuit has held that venue can be established wherever a co-conspirator has committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Renteria, 903 F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 329 (3d Cir. 2002)). The Third Circuit has declined to adopt a reasonable foreseeability test to establish venue under Section 3237(a). See id. at 331-32. Only essential conduct elements, as opposed to circumstance elements, can provide the basis for venue. See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 533 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 2000)).
Defendant first argues that the Government failed to produce any evidence at trial of an agreement between Defendant and anyone else to publish a notice or advertisement on February 28, 2015. (Doc. No. 886 at 4-5.) He also argues that the Government failed to identify with whom the alleged agreement was made. (Id. at 5.) Defendant contends that the Government likewise failed to specify which notice or advertisement Defendant conspired to post. (Id.)
The Government argues in response that it introduced numerous pieces of evidence at trial from which the jury could conclude that Defendant was guilty of Count 13 beyond a reasonable doubt. (Doc. No. 894 at 21-22.) First, the Government argues that the jury was permitted to find that a conspiracy existed based on inferences drawn from the actions of the alleged conspirators and the context of the alleged scheme. (Id. at 23.) The Government then discusses numerous pieces of evidence that it argues, when considered together, provide more than sufficient evidence from which a jury could draw reasonable inferences to conclude thatDefendant was guilty beyond a reasonable...
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