United States v. State of Tex.

• Citation: 498 F. Supp. 1356
• Decision Date: 06 August 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 5281.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. STATE OF TEXAS et al. (Gregory-Portland Independent School District Intervention).
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

498 F. Supp. 1356

UNITED STATES of America v. STATE OF TEXAS et al. (Gregory-Portland Independent School District Intervention).

Civ. A. No. 5281.

United States District Court, E. D. Texas, Tyler Division.

August 6, 1980.

Terry Milton, Civ. Rights Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for United States.

Susan Dasher, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for TEA and State of Texas.

Richard A. Hall, Corpus Christi, Tex., for Gregory-Portland.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUSTICE, Chief Judge.

In 1970 and 1971, this court issued orders in United States v. State of Texas, 321 F.Supp. 1043 (E.D.Tex.1970), 330 F.Supp. 235 (E.D.Tex.1971), requiring the Texas Education Agency ("TEA"), inter alia, to minimize racial segregation in the public schools of Texas by refusing to accredit and distribute state monies to those school districts which discriminate on the basis of race. Continuing jurisdiction was retained by this court to oversee TEA's ongoing responsibility to diminish segregation in the state's schools. With slight modifications, these orders were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 447 F.2d 441 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 675, 30 L.Ed.2d 663 (1972). The modifications were incorporated in subsequent orders of this court, dated July 13, 1971, and August 9, 1973. Pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's modification, the August 9, 1973, order permitted any school district to petition this court for relief when faced with a cut off of funds for suspension of accreditation by TEA.

On November 5, 1973, TEA sent a letter to the Gregory Portland Independent School District ("GPISD"). In essence, the letter stated that, by its practice of segregating Mexican American students, the district had violated the standards laid down in United States v. Texas; further, that the district would face suspension of accreditation and withholding of state funds if the violations were not remedied. TEA proposed student assignment plans to remedy the violations, but these plans were not accepted by GPISD. Rather than petitioning this court for relief, GPISD filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent TEA from suspending accreditation and funding, and demanding a declaratory judgment that GPISD had not discriminated on the basis of race. On January 30, 1976, the United States District Court for the Southern District entered judgment granting the relief requested by the GPISD. On appeal,¹ the Fifth Circuit held that the Southern District had no jurisdiction to determine these matters and directed it to dissolve the injunction, vacate all orders, and to dismiss the action or transfer it to this court. Gregory-Portland Independent School District v. Texas Education Agency, 576 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 1423, 59 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979). The transfer was effectuated on March 16, 1979, and the civil action has now been consolidated with United States v. Texas. GPISD now seeks the same relief here as was sought by it from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

I.

A.

Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973), marked the Supreme Court's first encounter with a school desegregation case where racial separation of students had not been previously mandated by a state constitutional provision or statute. In Keyes, the Court held that the touchstone of a Fourteenth Amendment violation in such circumstances is the finding of an intent on the part of school authorities to discriminate. "We emphasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 is purpose or intent to segregate." 413 U.S. at 208, 93 S.Ct. at 2697.² Prior to Keyes, it had been the holding of the Fifth Circuit that intent need not be proven; that even where school segregation was non-statutory, the fact that it was caused by state action sufficed to make out a constitutional violation.³ This court held the same view; therefore, in the prior United States v. Texas opinions, the issue of segregatory intent was never addressed.

The record in this case demonstrates that the policies and practices of TEA in administering the public school system in Texas have frequently—whether inadvertently or by design—encouraged or resulted in the continuation of vestiges of racially segregated public education within the state.

321 F.Supp. at 1057.

The existence of unconstitutional discrimination is not determined solely by intent ....

330 F.Supp. at 244.

As of 1954, the Texas Constitution explicitly required the segregation of Black children in the public schools.⁴ The TEA is thus under a continuing affirmative obligation to eliminate "all vestiges of state—imposed segregation" against Black students. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 2693, Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1275, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Because no further showing of intent need be made, the Keyes holding raises no question as to the continued vitality of this court's orders in United States v. Texas, as they apply to discrimination against Black students.⁵ However, the segregation of Mexican-American students was not mandated by Texas state law. Hence, the effect of the supervening Keyes intent requirement on United States v. Texas, as it relates to Mexican-Americans, is presented for consideration.⁶

Before proceeding further, it is important to note that the problems inherent in Mexican-American desegregation cases are of the same magnitude as those in similar cases involving Black Americans. Clearly, Mexican-Americans are an identifiable ethnic group, historically subjected to many of the same discriminatory deprivations which Black Americans have been forced to suffer.⁷ Segregation of Mexican-American students, like that of Black students, can generate "a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954); see Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195-198, 93 S.Ct. at 2690-2692.

This court dealt specifically with the segregation of Mexican-American students in United States v. State of Texas (San Felipe Del Rio Independent School District), 342 F.Supp. 24 (E.D.Tex.1971), where some intimations of a finding of intentional discrimination against Mexican-American students can be found:

In other words, had it not been for the substantial contributions of the state under the terms of the Texas Minimum Foundation program and under other various additional arrangements, neither the former San Felipe School District nor the former Del Rio School District could have continued in operation. Hence, since the state and its agencies knew, or should have known of the segregated educational system being operated, largely at state expense, ... and in light of this Court's previous findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency in this case citations omitted, this Court believes that the segregated system described above existed as a result of state action.

342 F.Supp. at 25. Despite such intimations, the ultimate determination of a constitutional violation was based on the fact that the segregated system "existed as a result of state action", and the question of intent was not decided.

A brief historical review is appropriate to put the question in perspective. The 1876 Constitution of the state of Texas included the following provision: "Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children and impartial provision shall be made for both."⁸ In 1930, a Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that Mexican-Americans were not to be segregated from white students under this clause of the constitution, but added that, in certain instances, language differences could furnish the justification for separate Mexican-American schools. Independent School District v. Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio, 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 580, 52 S.Ct. 28, 76 L.Ed. 503 (1931). Both before and after the Salvatierra decision, however, many school districts throughout the state, including the predecessor districts to the GPISD,⁹ maintained explicitly separate "Mexican schools."¹⁰

In 1948, the federal district court for the Western District of Texas, writing in Delgado v. Bastrop Independent School District, Civil Action No. 388 (W.D.Tex.1948) (unreported), pronounced the unconstitutionality of the arbitrary segregation of Mexican-American students. The State Board of Education (TEA's predecessor) thereupon promulgated regulations and policy statements reflecting the Delgado decision.¹¹ The Attorney General of Texas occasionally issued opinions, in response to specific school district inquiries, to the effect that Mexican-American students could not be segregated solely on the basis of their ancestry.¹²

The public pronouncements of certain state officials, responding to the Delgado decision, were in opposition to segregation. Nonetheless, the evidence presented in this case in present and prior hearings demonstrates that the State of Texas and its educational administrative agencies have persistently and intentionally segregated and discriminated against Mexican-American children in the public schools.

The most telling evidence against TEA in connection with this issue are its admissions, which were made in the course of this and related litigation. Indeed, in its brief filed in this action, TEA devotes an entire section to the question, headed as follows: "The application of the De Jure remedy set forth in United States v. Texas, No. 5281 (August 9, 1973), is fully justified in the context...