United States v. Stobo

• Decision Date: 18 May 1918
• Docket Number: 2.
• Citation: 251 F. 689
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. STOBO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

251 F. 689

UNITED STATES v. STOBO.

No. 2.

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

May 18, 1918

Charles F. Curley, U.S. Atty., of Wilmington, Del.

Herbert H. Ward, of Wilmington, Del., for defendant.

BRADFORD District Judge.

An indictment has been found against John Stobo charging him with violation of the act of Congress of February 14, 1917 (39 Stat. 919, c. 64). The act is as follows:

'Any person who knowingly and wilfully deposits or causes to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, or who knowingly and wilfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both.'

The indictment contains three counts. The first count sets forth:

'That heretofore, that is to say, on the first day of September A.D. 1917, at Wilmington, in the State and District of Delaware and within the jurisdiction of this court, that John Stobo, late of the District aforesaid, did then and there, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make a threat to take the life of and to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, that is to say, at Wilmington, in the State and District aforesaid, on the said date did make said threat by uttering the language following, namely, 'The President ought to be shot and I would like to be the one to do it,' or words substantially to that effect, meaning thereby to refer to the President of the United States, contrary to the form,' etc.

The second count is in all respects similar to the first save that the date on which the defendant is alleged to have uttered the language attributed to him is 'a day within the period of three weeks prior to the sixteenth day of September, A.D. 1917. ' The third count is in all respects similar to the second save that the place where it is alleged the defendant made use of the language attributed to him is stated as 'the premises known as No. 1811 Washington Street, in the said City of Wilmington, State and District of Delaware. ' It will be perceived that the language attributed to the defendant is precisely the same in each count. The defendant has demurred to the indictment and has assigned fifteen causes of demurrer.

In discussing these causes I find it convenient to depart from the order in which they are numerically arranged and also for the sake of brevity to group them. The 10th, 11th and 15th causes of demurrer are based upon the omission from the indictment of any averment that the supposed threat was made 'in writing' or 'by means of or was contained in any letter, paper, writing, print, missive or document'; the demurrant alleging that the statute does not denounce 'spoken words as a crime punishable thereunder.' It is contended that the words 'otherwise makes any such threat' in the latter part of the act refer to a written or printed threat, and not to an oral one. This position I regard as cleary untenable. The word 'such' has no reference to print or writing, but to 'any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States.' The context leaves no reasonable doubt on this point. The word 'otherwise' as used in the latter part of the section is broad enough to include not only a written or printed threat other than one deposited or caused to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from a post office or by letter carrier, but also an oral threat. I perceive no ground on which the meaning of 'otherwise' can legitimately be so restricted as to exclude an oral threat against the President of the United States. To so limit the term would not only violate the language of the act but largely defeat its broad policy. Causes of demurrer Nos. 10, 11 and 15 must, therefore, be disregarded as insufficient.

The 3d 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th and 14th causes of demurrer all rest upon the assumption that a threat to kill or do bodily harm to the President in order to be punishable under the act must be communicated or intended to be communicated to him. I can find nothing in the act or in any well-considered case to justify this contention. It is argued that a threat, punishable under the act, must be a menace of such a character as to be calculated to 'unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and to take away from his acts that free, voluntary action which alone constitutes consent'; and that the language imputed to the defendant could not have 'any of the effects or influences upon the mind of the person threatened which are necessary ingredients of a threat.' The counsel for the defendant fails to distinguish between threats made for the purpose of inducing action or non-action on the part of the person against whom they are directed, and threats not made for that purpose, but calculated to breed disloyalty or hostility in the community to the constituted authorities and incite a spirit of unrest and sedition. A large number of authorities have been cited to show that in the case of threats of the former class it is necessary that they should be communicated or intended to be communicated to the person against whom they are directed. But these authorities are wholly inapplicable to the case of threats denounced by the act in question. Whatever prior to the passage of the act may have been the essential nature of a criminally punishable threat or its technical significance or description, that act recognizes as punishable an oral as well as a written threat, though not communicated or intended to be communicated to the President. The question whether the threat has a tendency to cause action or non-action on his part is wholly foreign to any proper consideration of a given case. The vital inquiry under the act is whether the threat is of such a nature as to create or tend to create sedition or disloyalty, or to stir up violence toward or resistance to the lawful authority of the President, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, or as chief executive of the nation. It is true that in United States v. French, 243 F. 785, the district court for the southern district of Florida held that under the act in question a threat is a 'menace of such a nature and extent as to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and to take away from his acts that free and voluntary action which alone constitute consent,' and that 'no particular words are necessary to constitute a threat, but these words must be intended for the person threatened.' This holding does not commend itself to the judgment of this court, and is in direct opposition to the doctrine declared in United States v. Stickrath, 242 F. 151, decided by the district court for the southern district of Ohio a month earlier than the decision in United States v. French. In United States v. Stickrath the sufficiency of an indictment under the act in question was challenged upon the...