United States v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 29 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1:12–cr–00042–JMS–TAB–1.,1:12–cr–00042–JMS–TAB–1.
• Citation: 979 F.Supp.2d 865
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Dwan TAYLOR, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

979 F.Supp.2d 865

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Dwan TAYLOR, Defendant.

No. 1:12–cr–00042–JMS–TAB–1.

United States District Court,

S.D. Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

Oct. 29, 2013.

Barry D. Glickman, William Lance McCoskey, United States Attorney's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Stephen G. Gray, Attorney at Law, Todd Eric Ess, Todd Ess, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

ORDER

JANE MAGNUS–STINSON, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court is Defendant Dwan Taylor's Motion to Suppress. [Dkt. 32.] For the reasons explained, the Court DENIES the motion.

I.Background

The parties do not dispute the facts necessary to resolve Mr. Taylor's Motion to Suppress. Accordingly, and with the agreement of the parties, the Court did not hold a hearing with respect to this motion. The Court draws the relevant facts from the parties' briefs and the exhibits attached thereto.

On June 27, 2011, Detective Sergeant Garth Schwomeyer of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department received a tip that Defendant Dwan Taylor was in possession of cocaine and several firearms. [Dkt. 33–1 at 5.] The next day, Sergeant Schwomeyer researched Mr. Taylor's criminal history and found that he had a 1997 conviction for the possession of narcotics. [ Id.] Sergeant Schwomeyer also learned that Mr. Taylor was connected to an Indianapolis residence, where, on June 30, 2011, he believed he observed a drug transaction take place. [ Id. at 5–6.]

On August 15, 2011, Sergeant Schwomeyer received further information from a confidential informant that Mr. Taylor was involved in cocaine trafficking. [ Id. at 6.] After further surveillance and investigation, Sergeant Schwomeyer learned on September 13, 2011, that Mr. Taylor had purchased and registered a silver 2006 Chevrolet Impala. [ Id. at 7.] Six days later, law enforcement sought to track Mr. Taylor's car via a Global Positioning System ( “GPS” ). To this end, Sergeant Schwomeyer submitted an affidavit in support of a Petition to Authorize Installation and Use of a Global Position System Tracking Unit ( “Petition” ) filed with the Marion Superior Court by Marion County Prosecutor Andrea Props. [ Id. at 1–7.]

In the Petition, Ms. Props sought judicial authorization to attach a Global Position System Tracking Unit ( “GPS Unit” ) to Mr. Taylor's Impala for sixty days. [ Id. at 1.] According to the Petition, law enforcement wished to attach the GPS Unit to Mr. Taylor's Impala “while the vehicle was either in a public place or upon private property where members of the general public would have access to such a vehicle” and stated that the GPS Unit “would be powered either by an internal battery or by connecting [the GPS Unit] to the battery of the vehicle.” [ Id. at 1–2.] The Petition was granted by Marion Superior Court on these terms and allowed law enforcement to attach the GPS Unit as requested. [Dkt. 33–3.] Although the record does not reflect where or when the GPS Unit was attached to Mr. Taylor's vehicle—or whether the GPS Unit was powered by the vehicle's battery—it is undisputed that the GPS Unit was attached to his vehicle, and the Government represents that the GPS Unit aided law enforcement in tracking Mr. Taylor to a storage unit he rented at Hoosier Storage. [Dkt. 35 at 3 n. 3.]

On October 6, 2011, Sergeant Schwomeyer sought a warrant from the Marion Superior Court to search Hoosier Storage Unit # 1134, which he believed to be rented by Mr. Taylor. [Dkt. 33–4.] Among other things, Sergeant Schwomeyer's affidavit in support of the search warrant stated that, on October 3, 2011, “surveillance indicated that Taylor went to the Hoosier Storage facility ... [and] accessed a storage locker and left the facility after only a few minutes.” [ Id. at 4.] Sergeant Schwomeyer further attested that a narcotics dog was brought to smell the exterior door of Unit # 1134 at Hoosier Storage and gave a positive indication for the presence of narcotics. [ Id.] Based on Sergeant Schwomeyer's information, a search warrant was issued granting law enforcement the authority to search Unit # 1134 at Hoosier Storage. [Dkt. 33–5.] Law enforcement officers executed the search warrant and, among other things, found 752.61 grams of cocaine and four firearms in the storage unit. [Dkt. 33–6.]

Mr. Taylor was subsequently charged in a five-count Indictment by a federal grand jury of one count of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), and four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). [Dkt. 1.] Mr. Taylor then filed the instant motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the search of Unit # 1134, arguing that the information in support of the search warrant was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and that the search warrant itself was defective. [Dkt. 32.] The Court concludes that law enforcement's use of the GPS Unit violated Mr. Taylor's Fourth Amendment rights, but the evidence obtained as a result of the violation should not be suppressed.

II.Discussion

Mr. Taylor seeks suppression of the evidence obtained during the search of Hoosier Storage Unit # 1134 based on what he contends were several independent violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. First, he contends that the attachment and use of the GPS Unit on his vehicle without probable cause or a search warrant was an unconstitutional search and seizure, and that because the information derived therefrom established his connection with Hoosier Storage Unit # 1134, the evidence obtained from the unit must be suppressed. [Dkt. 33 at 5–10.] Second, he argues that the search warrant for Unit # 1134 was defective because law enforcement omitted the material fact from the affidavit that the “surveillance” that led them to Hoosier Storage was GPS surveillance rather than human surveillance. [ Id. at 15.] Third, he maintains that the warrantless dog sniff of Unit # 1134 was an illegal Fourth Amendment search that, like the GPS Unit, led to the issuance of the search warrant and, ultimately, the discovery of the evidence in Unit # 1134. [ Id. at 15–20.]

The Court begins with a brief overview of Fourth Amendment law before turning to the asserted bases for suppression. In the end, the Court concludes that only law enforcement's use of the GPS Unit constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment, but that, even so, suppression is unwarranted.

The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is well established, however, that a violation of this right does not automatically result in the suppression of the evidence discovered as a result of the violation. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (“We have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905–06, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (rejecting the contention that “the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment”). Therefore, a defendant seeking the suppression of evidence must demonstrate (1) that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred and (2) the evidence discovered as a result of that violation should be suppressed.

A. The Use of the GPS Unit Violated Mr. Taylor's Fourth Amendment Rights, but the Evidence Discovered as a Result of this Violation Should Not be Suppressed

1. The Use of the GPS Unit Violated Mr. Taylor's Fourth Amendment Rights

Mr. Taylor presses two arguments as to why law enforcement's utilization of the GPS Unit violated his Fourth Amendment rights. First, he contends that the order from the Marion Superior Court authorizing the use of the GPS Unit did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(C), which sets forth specific requirements for the issuance of a warrant for a tracking device.¹ [Dkt. 33 at 7–10.] Specifically, Mr. Taylor argues that if “the government wants to prosecute [him] federally, [he] should be entitled to the federal protections provided in Rule 41 and the State officers should not be exempt from following its provisions.” [ Id. at 10.] The Government responds that Mr. Taylor fails to cite any authority in support of the proposition that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “bind [ ] the actions of state law enforcement in what was then a purely criminal investigation.” [Dkt. 35 at 4 n. 4.] Mr. Taylor views this statement as the Government mistaking “who has the burden ... to cite authority that Rule 41 does not bind state officers”; he asserts that the Government should have to justify the search by citing such authority. [Dkt. 39 at 7.]

Mr. Taylor's argument regarding who bears the burden misses the mark. This is not a factual dispute where the failure to meet one's burden results in an adverse ruling. It is a legal one. At issue is whether—as a matter of law, given that the facts are undisputed—Rule 41 applies to actions of state law enforcement when conducting a state-law investigation. The weight of legal authority clearly supports the Government's position that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not govern the actions of state law enforcement officers when, at least at the time of the actions in question, there was no federal involvement in the investigation. See United States v. Claridy, 601 F.3d 276 (4th Cir.2010) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 did not apply because the proceeding granting the warrant was not a “federal proceeding”; even though the investigation was conducted by a joint federal and state task force, the warrant alleged violations of state law, the warrant authorized state officers to exercise the warrant, and the...