United States v. Taylor

Decision Date21 June 2022
Docket Number20-1459
Citation142 S.Ct. 2015,213 L.Ed.2d 349
Parties UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Justin Eugene TAYLOR
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Rebecca Taibleson for petitioner.

Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Rebecca Taibleson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Joshua K. Handell, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Michael R. Dreeben, Kendall Turner, Grace Leeper, Jenya Godina, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, DC, Frances H. Pratt, Counsel of Record, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria, VA, for Respondent.

Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Does attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) ? The answer matters because a person convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery alone normally faces up to 20 years in prison. But if that offense qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A), the same individual may face a second felony conviction and years or decades of further imprisonment.

I

After a robbery went awry and his accomplice shot a man, the federal government charged Justin Taylor with violating the Hobbs Act and § 924(c). The Hobbs Act makes it a federal crime to commit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an interstate component. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Meanwhile, § 924(c) authorizes further punishments for those who use a firearm in connection with a "crime of violence."

For purposes of § 924(c), a federal felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it meets either of two definitions. The first definition is found in § 924(c)(3)(A), a provision sometimes called the elements clause. That clause covers offenses that "ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." The second definition, located next door in § 924(c)(3)(B) and often referred to as the residual clause, encompasses offenses that "by [their] nature, involv[e] a substantial risk that physical force ... may be used."

Before the District Court, the government argued that Mr. Taylor's Hobbs Act offense qualified as a "crime of violence" under these definitions. And at that point, Mr. Taylor did not disagree, choosing instead to plead guilty to one count each of violating the Hobbs Act and § 924(c). For his crimes, the District Court sentenced Mr. Taylor to 30 years in federal prison—a decade more than he could have received for his Hobbs Act conviction alone.

Later, Mr. Taylor filed a federal habeas petition. In it, he did not challenge his Hobbs Act conviction. Instead, he focused on § 924(c). Mr. Taylor submitted that his § 924(c) conviction was predicated on his admission that he had committed both conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and attempted Hobbs Act robbery. And, Mr. Taylor argued, neither of those offenses continued to qualify as a "crime of violence" after United States v. Davis , 588 U. S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019). In Davis , this Court held § 924(c)(3)(B) ’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague, and we refused to enforce a conviction and sentence premised on its terms. Id. , at –––– – ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 2336. In his habeas proceeding, Mr. Taylor asked the court to apply Davis retroactively and vacate his own § 924(c) conviction and sentence.

The government opposed Mr. Taylor's petition. In doing so, it did not seek to revisit Davis or oppose its retroactive application to Mr. Taylor's case. Instead, the government observed that Davis declared only the residual clause unconstitutional; even today the elements clause remains in force. And, the government argued, the crime of attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause even if conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery may not. By this chain of logic, the government reasoned, Mr. Taylor's § 924(c) conviction and sentence remained sound.

Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit agreed to hear the dispute and sided with Mr. Taylor. It held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. By way of remedy, the Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Taylor's § 924(c) conviction and remanded the case for resentencing in light of his sole remaining Hobbs Act conviction. In reaching its judgment, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that other circuits have taken a different view, holding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. 979 F.3d 203, 208 (2020). We agreed to take up this case to resolve that question. 594 U. S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 2882, 210 L.Ed.2d 990 (2021).

II

The parties may not see eye to eye on the outcome of this case, but they at least agree on how we should go about deciding it. To determine whether a federal felony may serve as a predicate for a conviction and sentence under the elements clause, they say, we must apply a "categorical approach." We must because the clause poses the question whether the federal felony at issue "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." § 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). And answering that question does not require—in fact, it precludes—an inquiry into how any particular defendant may commit the crime. The only relevant question is whether the federal felony at issue always requires the government to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of its case—the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. This Court has long understood similarly worded statutes to demand similarly categorical inquiries. See, e.g. , Borden v. United States , 593 U. S. ––––, ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1817, 210 L.Ed.2d 63 (2021); Davis , 588 U. S., at ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 2328 ; Leocal v. Ashcroft , 543 U.S. 1, 7, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004).

What are the elements the government must prove to secure a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery? Here again the parties share common ground. Under the portion of the Hobbs Act relevant here, to win a conviction for a completed robbery the government must show that the defendant engaged in the "unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person ... of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force." § 1951(b). From this, it follows that to win a case for attempted Hobbs Act robbery the government must prove two things: (1) The defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property by means of actual or threatened force, and (2) he completed a "substantial step" toward that end. See, e.g. , United States v. Resendiz-Ponce , 549 U.S. 102, 107, 127 S.Ct. 782, 166 L.Ed.2d 591 (2007). What exactly constitutes a substantial step is beyond the scope of today's case. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the parties again agree. They accept that a substantial step demands something more than "mere preparation." Swift & Co. v. United States , 196 U.S. 375, 402, 25 S.Ct. 276, 49 L.Ed. 518 (1905). The step, they say, must be "unequivocal," Reply Brief 3, and "significant," though it "need not be violent," Brief for United States 22.

To know that much is enough to resolve this case. Whatever one might say about completed Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause. Yes, to secure a conviction the government must show an intention to take property by force or threat, along with a substantial step toward achieving that object. But an intention is just that, no more. And whatever a substantial step requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defendant used, attempted to use, or even threatened to use force against another person or his property. As the Model Penal Code explains with respect to the Hobbs Act's common-law robbery analogue, "there will be cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted robbery, where the actor does not actually harm anyone or even threaten harm." ALI, Model Penal Code § 222.1, p. 114 (1980). "If, for example, the defendant is apprehended before he reaches his robbery victim and thus before he has actually engaged in threatening conduct, proof of his purpose to engage in such conduct" can "justify a conviction of attempted robbery" so long as his intention and some other substantial step are present. Id ., at 115.

A hypothetical helps illustrate the point. Suppose Adam tells a friend that he is planning to rob a particular store on a particular date. He then sets about researching the business's security measures, layout, and the time of day when its cash registers are at their fullest. He buys a ski mask, plots his escape route, and recruits his brother to drive the getaway car. Finally, he drafts a note—"Your money or your life"—that he plans to pass to the cashier. The note is a bluff, but Adam hopes its implication that he is armed and dangerous will elicit a compliant response. When the day finally comes and Adam crosses the threshold into the store, the police immediately arrest him. It turns out Adam's friend tipped them off.

There is little question the government could win a lawful conviction against Adam for attempted Hobbs Act robbery. After all, he intended to take property against the cashier's will by threat of force, and his actions constituted a substantial step toward that goal. At the same time, this example helps show why attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. Adam did not "use" physical force. He did not "attempt" to use such force—his note was a bluff and never delivered. And he...

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