United States v. Thrower, Docket No. 17-445-pr

• Decision Date: 31 January 2019
• Docket Number: August Term, 2017,Docket No. 17-445-pr
• Citation: 914 F.3d 770
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner-Appellee, v. William THROWER, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

914 F.3d 770

UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.William THROWER, Respondent-Appellant.^*

Docket No. 17-445-pr

August Term, 2017

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Submitted: April 19, 2018

Decided: January 31, 2019

Amy Busa, Alexander Mindlin, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Richard P. Donoghue, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, for Appellant.

Jane Simkin Smith, Millbrook, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: WESLEY and CHIN, Circuit Judges, and COTE, District Judge.^†

PER CURIAM:

The Government appeals from a February 13, 2017 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Ross, J. ) reducing defendant William Thrower’s sentence from 180 months to 120 months and ordering Thrower’s immediate release on time served. The Government argues that the district court erred in concluding that Thrower’s prior convictions for the New York offenses of robbery in the third degree and attempted robbery in the third degree do not qualify as predicate "violent felonies" under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), an enhancement that mandates a minimum sentence of 180 months.

We agree with the Government. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of Thrower’s § 2255 petition, VACATE the amended judgment, and REMAND for the district court to reinstate Thrower’s original sentence.

BACKGROUND

In 2005, William Thrower was convicted of possessing a firearm while previously having been convicted of a "violent felony," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A conviction under § 922(g)(1) carries a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120 months. During sentencing in 2008, the district court additionally found that Thrower qualified as an "armed career criminal" under ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), which mandates a minimum sentence of 180 months for anyone convicted of § 922(g)(1) who also has three prior "violent felony" convictions. The district court noted that Thrower’s criminal history included the following felony offenses: (1) a 1981 conviction for first-degree robbery, N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15 ; (2) a 1981 conviction for third-degree burglary, N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20 ; (3) a 1993 conviction for fourth-degree larceny, N.Y. Penal Law § 155.30 ; (4) a 1994 conviction for attempted third-degree robbery, N.Y. Penal Law §§ 160.05 and 110.00 ; and (5) a 2000 conviction for third-degree robbery, N.Y. Penal Law § 160.05. Without specifying which of Thrower’s prior convictions constituted the three predicate "violent felonies" or which ACCA clause(s)—the force clause, the enumerated-offenses clause, or the residual clause—it relied upon in determining that the convictions so qualified, the district court found Thrower subject to the ACCA enhancement and consequently sentenced him to 180 months’ incarceration.

The Supreme Court subsequently struck down ACCA’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, Johnson v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2557, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (" Johnson II "); see also Welch v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016) (holding that Johnson II applies retroactively), calling into question Thrower’s sentence. Consequently, Thrower challenged the ACCA enhancement in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court granted.¹

The district court agreed with Thrower that neither New York robbery in the third degree nor New York attempted robbery in the third degree qualifies as a "violent felony" under ACCA’s force clause.² Because the Government no longer claimed that fourth-degree larceny qualified without the residual clause, only two of Thrower’s prior convictions remained as potential ACCA predicates—a number insufficient to subject him to the ACCA enhancement. Seeing, therefore, no need to determine whether first-degree robbery or third-degree burglary qualifies as a "violent felony," the district court ordered Thrower immediately released on time served.

The Government timely appealed, arguing that because robbery in the first and third degrees and attempted robbery in the third degree qualify as ACCA predicates, the district court erred in granting Thrower’s § 2255 petition.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether the offenses of New York robbery in the first and third degrees and attempted robbery in the third degree qualify as ACCA "violent felonies." See United States v. Brown , 629 F.3d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam ). They do.

1. Armed Career Criminal Act

ACCA mandates a minimum 180-month term of imprisonment for any person convicted of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) who also has three prior "violent felony" convictions. Id. § 924(e)(1). Under the force clause, a "violent felony" is "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, ... that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). As the Supreme Court has explained, " ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." Johnson v. United States , 559 U.S. 133, 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (" Johnson I ") (emphasis in original); see also Stokeling v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 544, 554, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2019) (explaining that " Johnson [I ]... does not require any particular degree of likelihood or probability that the force used will cause physical pain or injury; only potentiality").

Courts apply a "categorical approach" to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a "violent felony." See, e.g. , United States v. Hill , 890 F.3d 51, 55–56 (2d Cir. 2018). Under the categorical approach, "courts identify ‘the minimum criminal conduct necessary for conviction under a particular statute.’ " Id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Acosta , 470 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam ) ). In so doing, they "look only to the statutory definitions—i.e. , the elements—of the offense, and not to the particular underlying facts." Id. (quoting Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254, 261, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) (alterations omitted) ). If the state-law offense categorically requires the elements listed in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), it may serve as a predicate "violent felony."

2. New York Robbery in the First and Third Degrees

Thrower argues that the New York offense of robbery in the third degree does not qualify as a "violent felony" because the requisite force for the offense "can be something less than ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury.’ " Appellee Br. 17 (quoting Johnson I , 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265 ). We disagree.

The New York offense of robbery in the third degree occurs when a person "forcibly steals property." N.Y. Penal Law § 160.05. Forcible stealing—common to every degree of robbery in New York State³ —is defined as:

when, in the course of committing a larceny, [a person] uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for the purpose of: 1. Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or 2. Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.

Id. § 160.00.

By its plain language, the New York robbery statute matches the ACCA definition of a "violent felony." Predicate offenses under ACCA include those that have as an element "the use ... or threatened use of physical force." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). New York requires the "use[ ] or threaten[ed] ... immediate use of physical force." Additionally, the New York robbery statute, like ACCA’s force clause, is modeled on the common law definition of robbery. As the Supreme Court recently explained in Stokeling , "the term ‘physical force’ in ACCA encompasses the degree of force necessary to commit common-law robbery," defined as "the amount of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance." Stokeling , 139 S.Ct. at 555. Like the Florida robbery statute at issue in Stokeling , the New York robbery statute uses the term "physical force." The New York Court of Appeals has explained that "if a statute uses a word which has a definite and well-known meaning at common law, it will be construed with the aid of common-law definitions, unless it clearly appears that it was not so intended." People v. King , 61 N.Y.2d 550, 554–55, 475 N.Y.S.2d 260, 463 N.E.2d 601 (1984). Far from evincing a clear intent to stray from the common law understanding of robbery, the robbery statute explicitly incorporates the common law definition by explaining that "physical force" means enough force to "[p]revent[ ] or overcom[e] resistance to the taking ... or ... [to c]ompel[ ] the owner ... to deliver up the property." N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00 ; see also People v. Jurgins , 26 N.Y.3d 607, 614, 26 N.Y.S.3d 495, 46 N.E.3d 1048 (2015).

None of the cases to which Thrower cites convince us that New York courts interpret the force required for New York robbery as less than that required under ACCA. In People v. Lee , 197 A.D.2d 378, 602 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep’t 1993), a New York intermediate court of appeals found the force element of § 160.05 satisfied where the defendant "bumped his unidentified victim, took money, and fled while another forcibly blocked the victim’s pursuit," because the act of blocking was a form of overcoming the victim’s resistance, id. at 378, 602 N.Y.S.2d 138 (citing People v. Patton , 184 A.D.2d 483, 483, 585 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1st Dep’t 1992) ("[A]ct[ing] as a blocker [is a form of] overcoming the victim’s resistance to the robbery within the meaning of Penal Law § 160.00(1)." (emphasis added) ) ).⁴ Similarly, in People v. Safon , 166 A.D.2d 892, 560 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep’t 1990), a New York intermediate appellate court affirmed a third-degree...