United States v. Tyson

• Citation: 947 F.3d 139
• Decision Date: 14 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-3804,18-3804
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. William M. TYSON, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

947 F.3d 139

UNITED STATES of America

v.William M. TYSON, Appellant

No. 18-3804

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued: September 11, 2019

Filed: January 14, 2020

John A. Abom [Argued], Abom & Kutulakis, LLC, 2 West High Street, Carlisle, PA 17013, Counsel for Appellant

David J. Freed, William A. Behe, United States Attorney’s Office, 228 Walnut Street, Suite 220, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Francis P. Sempa [Argued], United States Attorney’s Office, 235 North Washington Avenue, P.O. Box 309, Suite 311, Scranton, PA 18503, Counsel for Appellee

Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

William Tyson was indicted for the transportation of a minor to engage in prostitution and the production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), respectively. During pre-trial proceedings, the District Court granted the Government’s motion in limine to exclude mistake-of-age evidence. Tyson and the Government then submitted a conditional plea agreement preserving his right to appeal the District Court’s order. The District Court sentenced Tyson to concurrent terms of 180 months’ imprisonment for each count.

Tyson appeals the District Court’s grant of the Government’s motion in limine precluding him from introducing mistake-of-age evidence at trial. He argues that the District Court erred in precluding the evidence because knowledge of age is an element of § 2423(a) and § 2251(a). He also urges us to read an affirmative defense on lack of knowledge into each statute. We disagree. The statutes’ text, context, and history make it clear that knowledge of age is not an element and mistake of age is not a defense. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

I.

In August 2017, Tyson contacted a seventeen-year-old female on Facebook to engage her in prostitution. After communicating for several days via Facebook and text messages, Tyson traveled from Pennsylvania to New York City. Tyson picked up the victim and her friend and brought them to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He then rented several rooms at a Motel 6 in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania between August 15 and August 20, 2017. Phone records reveal that Harrisburg-area individuals contacted the victim to engage in commercial sexual activity.

On August 22, 2017, after a relative of Tyson brought the victim to a Quality Inn in New Cumberland, FBI agents and local law enforcement recovered her during a sting operation. Investigators interviewed her and reviewed her phone. They found an August 20, 2017 video of the victim performing oral sex on an adult male in a Motel 6 room. The victim identified the man in the video as "Real," whom the investigators identified as Tyson.

On October 18, 2017, Tyson was indicted for knowingly transporting a minor to engage in prostitution in violation of § 2423(a) and producing child pornography in violation of § 2251(a). Before trial, the Government filed a motion in limine to prohibit Tyson "from eliciting evidence to establish ‘mistake of age’ " and from asserting "mistake of age" as an affirmative defense. App. 21. The District Court granted the motion on July 11, 2018. The Court found that evidence of mistake of age is irrelevant to § 2423(a) and § 2251(a) because the statutes do not require proof of defendants’ knowledge that the victim was a minor. As a result, the Court excluded the evidence because "its probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk that the evidence will result in unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury" under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See App. 10.

Tyson and the Government subsequently entered a plea agreement. According to its terms, Tyson and the Government agreed to recommend to the District Court that the sentences be served concurrently for a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. The agreement also preserved Tyson’s right to appeal the District Court’s July 11, 2018 order granting the Government’s motion in limine. On December 19, 2018, the District Court sentenced Tyson to 180 months’ imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently. Tyson filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court on December 24, 2018 challenging the District Court’s order.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

This Court reviews decisions on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Higdon , 638 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2011). District court conclusions on whether "the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value of otherwise admissible evidence" are reviewed under the same standard. Id. We exercise plenary review over legal questions and district court rulings based on interpretations of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Schiff , 602 F.3d 152, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Serafini , 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). Statutory construction determinations are reviewed de novo. United States v. Cochran , 17 F.3d 56, 57 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).

III.

Tyson posits that the District Court erred in prohibiting evidence related to mistake of age because § 2423(a) and § 2251(a) require knowledge that the victim was a minor to find a defendant guilty. He characterizes knowledge of age as an element of each statute. Tyson points to title 18, section 5902 of the Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes to suggest that Pennsylvania law provides a mistake-of-age defense to a prosecution based on § 2423(a). Tyson also turns to a Ninth Circuit decision interpreting § 2251(a) to require a mistake-of-age defense to correct the statute’s supposed constitutional deficiencies. We disagree and join the overwhelming majority of our sister circuits holding that mistake of age is not a defense and knowledge of the victim’s age is not required for a conviction under either § 2423(a) or § 2251(a). Thus, the District Court did not err in prohibiting Tyson from asserting a mistake-of-age defense under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.¹

A.

The grand jury indicted Tyson for "knowingly transport[ing] [the victim], an[ ] individual who had not attained the age of 18 years, in interstate commerce, with the intent that [the victim] engage in prostitution" in violation of § 2423(a). App. 15. The statute provides:

A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with the intent that the individual engage in prostitution , or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.

§ 2423(a) (emphasis added). The District Court agreed with the Government’s position that Tyson need not have known the victim’s age in order to have knowingly transported a minor. Tyson argues that the Government must prove the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age under § 2423(a). He points to the presumption that the mens rea requirement generally extends to each element of a criminal statute.

In Flores-Figueroa v. United States , the Supreme Court explained that "courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word ‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each element." 556 U.S. 646, 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009).² Even though the mens rea typically applies to all the elements, the majority recognized the existence of special contexts where courts may deviate from that general presumption. See id.

Concurring, Justice Alito elaborated on examples of special contexts that rebut the general presumption. He specifically mentioned § 2423(a) as an example of a statute that calls for a contextual approach to statutory interpretation and added that circuit courts "uniformly [hold] that a defendant need not know the victim’s age to be guilty under [ § 2423(a) ]." Id. at 660, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (Alito, J., concurring). The Flores-Figueroa majority referenced Justice Alito’s concurrence with apparent approval. Id. at 652, 129 S.Ct. 1886 (noting that sentences where "knowingly" only modifies a "transitive verb ... typically involve special contexts ... [a]s Justice ALITO notes, the inquiry into a sentence’s meaning is a contextual one"). Tyson does not provide a compelling reason for us to disregard Justice Alito’s concurrence and the majority’s recognition that the general presumption does not apply in all contexts.

An overwhelming number of our sister circuits that have considered § 2423(a) —both prior to and after Flores-Figueroa —have concluded that "knowingly" does not extend to the victim’s age.³ Interpreting a predecessor of § 2423(a), this Court held that "[t]he statute does not state or require knowledge of the victim’s age." United States v. Hamilton , 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). While Tyson is correct that Hamilton is not controlling authority as to the current statutory provision, in light of Flores-Figueroa , we are unconvinced that we should alter our approach.

Arguing that the background presumption articulated in Flores-Figueroa applies to § 2423(a), Tyson ignores Congress’s clear intent that knowledge of age not be required for a conviction pursuant to the statute. Our role in interpreting statutes is to "give effect to Congress’s intent." Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc. , 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998). "We ... look to statutory context for evidence of congressional intent." United States v. Merlino , 785 F.3d 79, 92 (3d Cir. 2015). In considering statutory context, courts interpret statutes in accordance with their overall scheme. Gundy v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126, 204 L.Ed.2d 522 (2019).

Congress did not intend to require knowledge of a victim’s age for a conviction under § 2423(a). Congress’s purpose...