United States v. Con-Ui, 3:13-CR-123
| Decision Date | 02 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:13-CR-123,3:13-CR-123 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JESSIE CON-UI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
Defendant Jessie Con-ui is charged by indictment with two capital offenses and one non-capital offense. (Doc. 1). Counts one and two of the indictment allege that, on February 25, 2013, Mr. Con-ui, while an inmate at the United States Penitentiary Canaan Federal Correctional Complex ("USP Canaan"), committed a first-degree murder of federal corrections officer Eric Williams ("Officer Williams"), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1114(1). Count three alleges that Mr. Con-ui knowingly possessed a prohibited object, namely, a sharpened weapon, in violation of §§ 1791(a)(2), (d)(1)(B), and (b)(3).
On March 17, 2017, shortly before the commencement of his capital trial on April 24, 2017, Mr. Con-ui moved to suppress several un-Mirandized incriminatory statements he made to prison staff following the murder of Officer Williams on February 25, 2013. (Doc. 998, at 2).
A hearing on the motion was held on May 25, 2017. The motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition. I will address each statement identified by Mr. Con-ui as violative of his Fifth Amendment rights in turn.
A criminal defendant brings motions to suppress evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C). A defendant may move to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. To protect that right, the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona ruled that police may not conduct a custodial interrogation without first administering the now-familiar Miranda warnings, which include the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney. 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); accord Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (revisiting and reaffirming Miranda ). In general, if a suspect is not so warned, and does not thereafter make a knowing and voluntary waiver of those rights, the prosecution is barred from using statements obtained during the interrogation to establish its case in chief. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990); cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (). Both inculpatory and exculpatory statements fall within the ambit of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. "A defendant's statements made in the course of a custodial interrogation are not admissible as evidence unless the defendant received appropriate warnings, or an exception applies." United States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1999).
Miranda safeguards are required when a suspect is "(1) 'in custody' and (2) subject to 'interrogation' by the Government." 384 U.S. at 444; see also Leese, 176 F.3d at 743. A suspect is in custody when "there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). An "interrogation" has been defined as "(a) conduct intentionally designed to evoke a confession, as well as (b) any conduct an officer should reasonably have foreseen would elicit an inculpatory response." United States v. Bonner, 469 Fed. Appx. 119, 126 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)). The term "interrogation" includes express questioning and any words or actions on the part of the police "that thepolice should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Consequently, an officer cannot be held responsible for an unforeseeable statement by the suspect. Id. at 301-02.
A statement is involuntary when the suspect's "will [is] overborne in such a way as to render his confession the product of coercion." Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991). Whether a statement is voluntarily made is determined from "'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.'" Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
As a general rule, the burden of proof is on a defendant who seeks to suppress evidence. Unites States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). However, once the defendant has established a basis for his motion, the government is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's statements were not the product of custodial interrogation. See United States v. DeSumma, 44 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Pa. 1999); see also United States v. Barnes, 2005 WL 1899502, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2005); United States v. Prince, 157 F. Supp. 2d 316, 324 (D. Del. 2001).
Shortly after 10:00 p.m. on February 25, 2013 at USP Canaan, correctional officer Jeremy Bennett discovered Officer Williams on the floor of prison Unit C-1 (the "Unit"), unconscious and bleeding from wounds on his face, head, and neck. (T.R. 11-13, 31, 67, 107, Doc. 1152). No inmates were in sight; it appeared that all inmates had retreated to their cells, which encircled the unit. (T.R. 13). The doors to their cells, however, were unlocked. (T.R. 32-33, 89-90, 107, 123). Officer Bennett immediately summoned other officers who quickly descended on the unit. (T.R. 13).
Upon entering the unit and learning of Officer Williams's condition, Lieutenant Brian Sudul yelled out: "I'm going to kill one of you motherfuckers." (T.R. 34). All one hundred seventeen (117) inmates housed in the Unit at the time remained in their cells. (T.R. 13, 132). Lt. Sudul then armed himself with a pepper ball gun and ordered officers to lock all cells. (T.R. 33-34, 35). Over the course of approximately ten minutes, all sixty-four (64) cell doors were individually locked without incident. (T.R. 33-35, 68, 107-08; Doc. 998-4, at 2). After all of the inmates were secured, Lt. Sudul left the Unit to assess Officer Williams's condition in the medical unit. (T.R. 37).
As is standard procedure, the officers began conducting visual upper body searches of each inmate. (T.R. 36). Shortly afterwards, following the discovery of blood on the stairs leading to Mr. Con-ui's cell, Officer Ryan Boynton, along with other officers, approached Mr. Con-ui's cell. (T.R. 70, 92, 110, 124).
Officer Boynton performed a visual upper body check and noticed a cut on the palm of Mr. Con-ui's hand. (T.R. 93). Officer Boynton said, "Did you do this?" Mr. Con-ui nodded his head in the affirmative. (T.R. 93). Officer Boynton then said, Mr. Con-ui responded, "Yes, disrespect issue." (T.R. 93-94). Officer Boynton noticed that Mr. Con-ui was holding a clear plastic knife. (T.R. 94). Officer Boynton ordered Mr. Con-ui to slide the knife under the door, but Mr. Con-ui said, "No, I'll keep it." (T.R. 94). Officer Boynton ordered him again to slide the knife under the door and Mr. Con-ui said, "No, you'll kill me." (T.R. 94).
Mr. Con-ui now seeks to suppress the above-cited statements, which, as is undisputed, were un-Mirandized. (See, e.g., T.R. 100). Specifically, Mr. Con-ui argues that he was subjected to "custodial interrogation" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment when he made those statements. (Doc. 998, at 9-11).
As the Supreme Court has held, an inmate is not automatically in "custody" withinthe meaning of Miranda. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012); Burkholder v. Newton, 116 Fed. Appx. 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499, 503 (8th Cir. 1999). Miranda warnings are required in prison interrogations only when there is a "change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement." Burkholder, 116 Fed. Appx. at 361 (quoting United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985)).
It is true that taking a prisoner aside for questioning may necessitate some additional limitations on his freedom of movement. A prisoner may, for example, be removed from an exercise yard and taken, under close guard, to the room where the interview is to be held. But such procedures are an ordinary and familiar attribute of life behind bars. Escorts and special security precautions may be standard procedures regardless of the purpose for which an inmate is removed from his regular routine and taken to a special location.
Howes, 565 U.S. at 513. "Because restraint on freedom is the status quo of a prisoner, the courts examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to ascertain whether the defendant should be deemed 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda." Bruce v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 2d 364, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2006). The relevant factors include "the language or means used to summon the prisoner to the interrogation, the prisoner's freedom to leave the scene of the interrogation, the purpose, place and length of the interrogation, any added imposition on the prisoner's freedom of movement and whether circumstances suggest any measure of compulsion above and beyond confinement." Id. (quoting United States v. Caro, 2006 WL 1594185 at *1 n.1 (W.D. Va. June 2, 2006)); see also Howes, 565 U.S. at 514 ().
As the Supreme Court has explained, Miranda applies to situations when an arrestee is subject to a "sharp and ominous change" in environment when arrested...
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