United States v. La Vallee

• Citation: 191 F. Supp. 455
• Decision Date: 24 January 1961
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 8659.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Edward J. KIERNAN, Relator, v. J. Edwin LA VALLEE, Warden of Clinton Prison, Dannemora, Clinton County, New York, Respondent.
• Court: United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of New York

191 F. Supp. 455

UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Edward J. KIERNAN, Relator, v. J. Edwin LA VALLEE, Warden of Clinton Prison, Dannemora, Clinton County, New York, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 8659.

United States District Court N. D. New York.

January 24, 1961.

C. Joseph Hallinan, Jr., New York City, for relator.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of New York (Raymond B. Madden, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel) and Joseph F. Gagliardi, Dist. Atty., Westchester County, White Plains, N. Y. (Douglas L. McGuire, Asst. Dist. Atty., White Plains, N. Y., of counsel), for respondents.

JAMES T. FOLEY, District Judge.

This federal habeas corpus proceeding involves one of the most serious problems that, in my judgment, can confront a United States District Judge, sitting and deciding alone as is his usual function. It necessitates again the thrust of federal examination by the single judge into a murder first degree conviction rendered in New York many years ago and very recently affirmed unanimously by the highest court of that state, the Court of Appeals. The appraisal on my part of serious impact and disturbance to the delicate balance of federal-state relations by this procedure is not the theoretical one discussed and foreseen by many eminent judges and writers, or one of first impression. It has evolved as a result of a long, practical experience and observation of a substantial number of these matters from their inception and processing in this District Court to the issuance of the writ in several instances with a front-line view of the effect upon the law enforcement personnel of New York and the legal officers who prosecute the crimes and in dedication to society attempt to uphold the conviction. Each one assumes an important role because of the intense public and legal interest generated by federal judicial writings and decisions when the charge is murder, the gravest transgression of the natural and moral law as well as the statutory.

Habeas corpus applications by state prisoners of New York are now numerous and routine in this District and an increasing burden. Of course, the great bulk do not involve murder convictions but there is evident to me, whether rightly or wrongly on their part, determined feeling by the state prisoners in their correspondence and petitions that we are now considered a court of review and appeal empowered to examine into and correct every possible imperfection that might exist in the state criminal procedures of New York. Their attitude reminds me of the humor of the immortal Mr. Dooley that an appeal is where you ask one Court to show its contempt for another. It is immaterial to the state prisoners whether we show our contempt for the lowest, intermediate or highest courts of New York as long as we maintain good discipline and surveillance of them that might some day favor their cause.

I want to make clear that I favor the Great Writ in its present form and am not sure that it needs the proposed legislative changes that mainly seek to avoid the unseemliness of the single judge overturning the highest Court of a State in a criminal matter. (H.R. 3216; House Report No. 548). In my judgment, the writ is the ultimate safeguard that should be preserved and effectively used as it has been throughout our history to remedy manifest injustice. It shall weaken and become dissolute if it is used carelessly, indiscriminately and arrogantly, as another adjunct to appellate procedures to pry into and meddle with the minutiae of state criminal processes. It should never be used as a fault-finding device that might be contrary to the settled principle enumerated by the Supreme Court that the States must have the widest latitude in their administration of their own system of criminal justice. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 468, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed. 2d 913.

I heed with great respect the statement of the most eminent judge of this Circuit, Learned Hand, that it must be remembered that upon habeas corpus a federal court does not in any sense review the decision in the state court, and due process of law does not mean infallible process of law. Schechtman v. Foster, 2 Cir., 172 F.2d 339, 341. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, cautioned some years ago that the possibility that any court in the country may be mistaken is part of the burden of the administration of justice and that there must be an end to the hierarchy of appeals. United States ex rel. Steele v. Jackson, 2 Cir., 171 F.2d 432, 433. Justice Cardozo in his poetic language pictured the problem as one in which the balance must be kept true between the accused and the accuser. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674. Justice Douglas, whom I admire and respect as always in the forefront to protect individual right and freedom, still circumscribes carefully the use of the ancient writ, warning it should be guarded jealously, using it only to prevent gross miscarriage of justice. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 173, 77 S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253.

The question now presented is different from the run-of-the-mill habeas corpus applications because it raises the challenge of the use of a coerced confession in a capital case. The law is well settled by a wealth of writings of our highest authority that independent federal examination must be made as to the merit of such claim. Spano v. New York, 1959, 360 U.S. 315, 321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1206, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 note 2 — Chief Justice Warren lists the many Supreme Court cases; United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 2 Cir., 271 F.2d 364, 378, — Chief Judge Clark dissenting lists the considerable body of similar cases passed upon recently by the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. I have had a substantial number of important cases before me in recent years involving murder first degree convictions of New York and have written, as we do in every habeas corpus application in this District whether it has merit or not, and some of the reported cases beginning in 1955 are: United States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, D.C., 127 F.Supp. 689; 2 Cir., 222 F.2d 698, certiorari denied 350 U.S. 896, 76 S.Ct. 155, 100 L.Ed. 788; U. S. ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, D.C., 144 F.Supp. 458; 2 Cir., 256 F.2d 7, certiorari denied 357 U.S. 908, 78 S.Ct. 1152, 2 L.Ed.2d 1158; United States ex rel. Williams v. Lavalle, D.C., 170 F. Supp. 582; 2 Cir., 276 F.2d 645; United States ex rel. Wolfe v. LaVallee, 179 F. Supp. 939; 2 Cir., 277 F.2d 926; United States ex rel. Murdaugh v. Murphy, D.C., 183 F.Supp. 440, appeal dismissed 2 Cir., 10/3/60; United States ex rel. Martin v. Murphy, D.C., 187 F.Supp. 395, remanded 2 Cir., 12/14/60. There are more reported and unreported, several under process now as to merit, and, of course, Chief Judge Brennan of this District has had his share, a recent noted one being U. S. ex rel. Corbo v. LaVallee, 2 Cir., 270 F.2d 513; certiorari denied 361 U.S. 950, 80 S.Ct. 403, 4 L.Ed.2d 382. The number must be considered substantial in my opinion because each questions a decision of the state's highest court of New York in a capital case and under our present procedures allows their appellate judgment to be set aside by a single federal judge. The case that seems in my judgment to have stimulated the increasing attack upon New York procedures in relation to the admission of confessions was Leyra v. Denno, 1954, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948. This unusual case is the prime example of one going the full circle as the citations show. People of State of New York v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553; 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673, certiorari denied 345 U.S. 918, 73 S.Ct. 730, 97 L.Ed. 1351; rehearing denied 345 U.S. 946, 73 S.Ct. 835, 97 L.Ed. 1371; D.C., 113 F.Supp. 556; 2 Cir., 208 F.2d 605; 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716. In this case on the second time around, Justice Minton dissenting (347 U.S. at page 589, 74 S.Ct. at page 733), stated New York must be mystified in its efforts to enforce its law against homicide to have it said in effect it may not submit a disputed question of fact to a jury. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, seems to be doubtful of the so-called "New York" rule of confessions, and leaves open federal acceptance in this Circuit of its validity. United States ex rel. Rogers v. Richmond, 2 Cir., 252 F.2d 807, 810. Then came the Caminito decision, which was written by the late Judge Frank whose learning and progressive thinking always stimulated discussion, and which received elaborate attention in the metropolitan newspapers and national magazines. I had no quarrel with the finding as to the involuntariness of the confession, but the treatise after review of psychological torture and bestiality by human beings over the centuries concluded that the test of the moral quality of a civilization is its treatment of the weak and powerless. I am sure the weak and powerless want fair, balanced treatment that insures also protection and security from professional, hardened and vicious criminals. New York has a good record for fair criminal procedures and competent trial and appellate courts with concern for individual rights regardless of creed or national origin.

It is not my province, right or function as a District Judge to establish guide lines, policy or approach to these matters, but I feel it my duty to report on the impact of the system as it now exists. I report again an increase in resentment and misunderstanding by the public, law enforcement officers, bar and bench of New York to lower federal court rulings in these tense, impassioned murder cases that in effect override the considered decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York. The danger and delicacy of review by a single District Judge has long been a matter of concern in the United States Supreme Court. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761. In this opinion, page 212, note 34, 70 S.Ct. page 594, reference is made to the article and report of the late Chief Judge...