United States v. Villa-Guillen
| Decision Date | 01 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 17-608 (FAB/BJM) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. RICARDO ALBERTO VILLA-GUILLEN, a.k.a. "EL GATO," Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Ricardo Alberto Villa-Guillen ("Villa") was charged with two counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Dkt. 1. Villa filed a motion to suppress evidence found after a search warrant was executed at his residence, Dkt. 28, and a supplemental motion challenging a consent search of his vehicle. Dkt. 34. The government opposed. Dkts. 39, 40. This matter was referred to me for a report and recommendation. Dkt. 36. Hearings were held on December 21, 2018 and February 27, 2018. Dkt. 49; Dkt. 57. Transcripts were created. Dkts. 60, 61, 62. The parties filed post-hearing briefs. Dkts. 68, 69.
For the reasons set forth below, the motions should be DENIED.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The central inquiry is "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Areas in which an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections because "'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). In general, "[a] nonconsensual search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause." Ahern v. O'Donnell, 109 F.3d 809, 816 (1st Cir. 1997).
A warrant to search may be issued where there is probable cause, a fluid standard measured by whether the totality of the circumstances support a reasonable person's belief that a crime has been or is being committed. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). Warrants issued on probable cause must be "supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The affidavit describing the place to be searched and items to be seized must give the issuing magistrate a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause exists. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. An "affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumptively valid," United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2013), but a "defendant may attempt to rebut this presumption and challenge the veracity of the affidavit." United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 208 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015). The Supreme Court established the mechanism for doing so in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
A defendant may overcome the presumption of validity and obtain an evidentiary hearing, or Franks hearing, if he can make a "substantial preliminary showing" that "a false statement or omission in the affidavit was made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth" and that the "falsehood or omission [was] necessary to the finding of probable cause." McLellan, 792 F.3d at 208. This is a heavy burden. To satisfy the first prong, the defendant must make more than conclusory allegations; he must prove knowledge or reckless disregard by a preponderance of the evidence. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171; United States v. Tanguay, 787 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2015). To satisfy the second prong, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged falsity or material omission was necessary to the judge's finding of probable cause. United States v. Rigaud, 684 F.3d 169, 173 (1st Cir. 2012). If, notwithstanding the alleged falsity there remains probable cause to issue a warrant, then a Franks hearing is not required. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72.
Warrants are not the only mechanism by which the government may conduct a reasonable search of a person or property, however. Consent is a "recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, but the government bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant or an authorized third party gave the consent voluntarily." United States v. Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259, 264 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). "The existence of consent and the voluntariness thereof are questions of fact to be determined from all the circumstances surrounding the search." United States v. Winston, 444 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal marks omitted). Factors relevant to voluntariness include but are not limited to: (1) the consenter's age, education, past experiences, and intelligence; (2) whether the police officers informed the consenter of his constitutional right to refuse consent; (3) the length and conditions of the consenter's detention and/or questioning; and (4) law enforcement's use of any inherently coercive tactics. Vanvliet, 542 F.3d at 264 n.2. Consent may be invalidated if an illegal act tainted it by significantly influencing the defendant to give consent. United States v. Delgado-Pérez, 867 F.3d 244, 256-57 (1st Cir. 2017).
Inventory searches are another exception to the warrant requirement. An inventory search is a routine search conducted by law enforcement officers to itemize personal property in law enforcement custody. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 (1976). Probable cause to search is irrelevant; an inventory search is consistent with the Fourth Amendment because it is reasonable for law enforcement to protect owner's property as well as protect police against potential false claims of theft. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369-70; Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983); United States v. Davis, 909 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2018). As with other Fourth Amendment searches, an inventory search is reasonable if the circumstances objectively justify the action. Boudreau v. Lussier, 901 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)). If an inventory search is conducted according to routine, standardized procedure, then an officer's subjective intent is not relevant. Boudreau, 901 F.3d at 73 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)).
Vehicle impoundment falls under a third exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement: community caretaking. Dakota, 428 U.S. at 368-69; Davis, 909 F.3d at 16. Police may constitutionally impound a vehicle if it impedes traffic, risks vandalism, threatens public safety, or causes an inconvenience. Davis, 909 F.3d at 16 (citing Dakota, 428 U.S. at 368-69; Jaynes v. Mitchell, 824 F.3d 187, 197 (1st Cir. 2016)). Where impoundment is reasonable, other investigatory motives for seizing the vehicle are not relevant. Davis, 909 F.3d at 17 (citing Boudreau, 901 F.3d at 72). Police may conduct an inventory search of an impounded vehicle without obtaining a search warrant in order '"to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger."' Davis, 909 F.3d at 17 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372).
During the suppression hearings, the court heard testimony from Puerto Rico Police Department ("PRPD") officer and Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") Task Force member Victor Salgado and from defendant Ricardo Villa-Guillen.
Salgado and his partner, DEA Special Agent Jose Rebollo, were looking for several people with federal arrest warrants. The DEA Task Force gave Salgado a warrant for Villa on June 23 or 24. Salgado had spoken to the administrator of the condominium where Villa lived because he initially had planned to arrest Villa on the day of the indictment, which resulted in that arrest warrant. Salgado visited the apartment in the afternoon a few days after receiving the warrant, but no one answered. He did not break in or force entry. These visits were not included in the search warrant affidavit. Around 5 p.m. on July 17, 2017, Salgado and Rebollo drove to Villa's sister's home to look for Villa. See Ex. 1 (arrest warrant for Villa).
At Villa's sister's home, Salgado saw two men exit; one was Villa and the other turned out to be his son. Villa testified that he left around 5:30 with his son to drive to the mall. The officers recognized Villa. Villa and his son got into a Mercedes SUV that was parked around the corner. See Ex. 2 (). Neither officer interfered out of concern for their safety, believing Villa would be armed. With Villa behind the wheel, he and his son drove to the highway and headed toward San Juan. The officers followed at a distance in their Chevy Tahoe and communicated with reinforcements.
At the exit for the mall, rush hour traffic and their buffer distance caused Salgado and Rebollo to lose sight of Villa, who drove fast and frequently changed lanes. Salgado thought Villa might have noticed him following in the Tahoe, which looks official, in Salgado's opinion. They next spotted Villa entering a multifloor parking garage at the mall and continued to follow him.
Two more agents, "Ruiz" and "Arenas," met Salgado and Rebollo for a total of four officers. Villa testified that there were six or eight agents at the scene. The agents blocked Villa with their cars at either end of an aisle in the parking garage. The officers exited their cars. Salgado shouted, because it looked as if Villa were reaching beneath his seat. Salgado drew his gun and held it at a forty-five-degree angle to Villa....
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