United States v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority
Decision Date | 26 September 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 17379.,17379. |
Citation | 307 F.2d 330 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON TOLL BRIDGE AUTHORITY, d/b/a Washington State Ferries, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Melva M. Graney, and Joseph Kovner, Attys., Tax Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Brockman Adams, U. S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., and C. W. Billinghurst, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tacoma, Wash., for appellant.
John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., for State of Washington, and John W. Riley, Deputy Atty. Gen., for State of Washington, Olympia, Wash., for appellee.
George N. Hayes, Atty. Gen., for State of Alaska, and Michael M. Holmes, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of Alaska, Juneau, Alaska, and appearing for State of Alaska as amicus curiae.
Before CHAMBERS, BARNES, HAMLEY, HAMLIN, JERTBERG, MERRILL, KOELSCH, BROWNING and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.
This case draws in issue the constitutional and statutory application of the federal transportation excise taxes to the fares paid for the transportation of persons and property on vessels operated by appellee, Washington Toll Bridge Authority, d/b/a Washington State Ferries.
Specifically, appellant, the United States, instituted an action in the court below to recover unpaid federal transportation excise taxes assessed against the appellee for the first three quarters of 1957. The District Court denied recovery. Its opinion is reported at 190 F. Supp. 95. The jurisdiction of the District Court is founded on § 7402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on Title 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291-4.
The Washington Toll Bridge Authority was established, and its powers and duties prescribed, by the laws of 1937, Chapt. 173, p. 654.1 It is an instrumentality of the State of Washington and exists, for the most part, as a self-supporting entity with all of the rights and liabilities of a common carrier. Since 1951, it has operated an extensive ferry system on the Puget Sound and its tributaries between local and international points. This system is perhaps the largest of its kind in the United States. Its necessity is dictated by the geography of the area and it provides a vital link in the State's highway system, carrying passengers and property over various bodies of water to connect the State highways and thereby avoiding circuitous land travel. The ferry system operated by the Authority is an expansion of services formerly provided, in part, by King County, State of Washington, a municipal corporation, and its successor, King County Ferry District No. 1, and, in greater part, by the Puget Sound Navigation Company, a private corporation.
Since the commencement of the Authority's ferry operations, the United States has pursued it for taxes imposed by §§ 4261, 4271 and 4291, Title 26 U.S. C.A. of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 These provisions are comprehensive in application. They impose a tax upon the "amount paid" for the transportation of persons or property "by water" and other means. The tax is made payable by the person paying for the transportation and the person receiving the payment is obligated to collect the tax. From June 1951 until April 1, 1952, the Authority collected and paid similar taxes under protest. Thereafter, it entered into extended negotiations with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue which culminated in an agreement whereby past claims were compromised. In order to adjudicate the question the Authority agreed to raise its fares in an amount equal to the tax and to place the amount in escrow and, in turn, the Commissioner agreed to promptly initiate litigation. Pursuant to this agreement an amount equal to the tax was collected by the Authority for the first three quarters of 1957 and placed in escrow. The United States made its assessment and filed suit.
The findings of fact by the District Court are based upon a stipulation with exhibits and the testimony of Darrell Hedges, executive secretary of the Authority. These findings are not strenuously disputed and are substantially, though more detailed, the same as heretofore recited. The District Court, following a previous decision of this Court, infra, reached the conclusion that the operation of the ferry system by the Authority was a governmental function and, as such, was immune from federal taxation. In addition, the District Court held that these tax provisions were not intended by Congress to apply to state-operated ferry systems. The correctness of these conclusions of law are the primary concern of this appeal.
In United States v. King County, 281 F. 686 (9th Cir.1922), this Court held that the ferry system operated by King County was immune from a federal tax of the type here involved because it was "an interference with and a burden upon the governmental functions of the state."3
Contrary to the assertion of appellant that the Washington Toll Bridge authority exists as a "separate entity," specially created by the State of Washington rather than as an "agency" of the State in the full sense of that term, we shall consider the questions involved in this appeal on the basis of the District Court's conclusion that the Authority is an instrumentality of the State of Washington authorized to operate the ferry system as an integral part of the highway system of the States.
Further, in the course of its opinion, the Court stated, at p. 422, 58 S.Ct. at p. 976:
In New York v. United States, 326 U.S 572, 66 S.Ct. 310, 90 L.Ed. 326 (1946), the Supreme Court held that the State of New York was not immune from the tax imposed by § 615 of the Revenue Act of 1932 on the sale of mineral waters taken from Saratoga Springs owned and operated by the State. The State of New York contended that it was immune from the tax because it was engaged in the disposition of its natural resources and that such activity was governmental in character. While it can be reasonably asserted that in the sale of mineral waters the State was engaging in a proprietary instead of a governmental function, the Court took occasion to state (at p. 580, 66 S.Ct. at p. 313), as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
DuPont Glore Forgan Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.
...existed, contrary to the exclusive refund provisions of the Code. 37 26 U.S.C. §§ 6672, 7202. 38 Cf. United States v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 307 F.2d 330, 334-35 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911, 83 S.Ct. 724, 9 L.Ed.2d 719 (1963); Sharp & Dohme, Inc. v. United States, 144......
-
Wheaton v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway & Transp.
...or its subdivisions" is "well established" to be the "exercise of an essential governmental function"); United States v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 307 F.2d 330, 332-33 (9th Cir.1962). The other factor raised by petitioner is that the District has no taxing powers. Highways and bridges a......
-
City of New York v. United States
...fully supported by the following cases: Murphy v. O'Brien, 485 F.2d 671, 674-75 (T.E.C.A. 1973); United States v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 307 F.2d 330, 334 (9 Cir. 1962) (en banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 911, 83 S.Ct. 724, 9 L.Ed.2d 719 (1963); Texas v. United States, 722 U.S.Tax ......
-
Air Tour Acquisition Corp. v. US, Civ. No. 88-00575 ACK.
...all indicate that the buyer, and not the seller, of the transportation is liable for the tax. See United States v. Washington Toll Bridge Authority, 307 F.2d 330, 334 (9th Cir.1962) ("The tax involved is ... payable by the persons who pay for the transportation while the seller's only oblig......