United States v. Washington

• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Docket Number: 21-404
• Citation: 142 S.Ct. 1976,213 L.Ed.2d 336
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. WASHINGTON, et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

142 S.Ct. 1976

213 L.Ed.2d 336

UNITED STATES, Petitioner

v.WASHINGTON, et al.

No. 21-404

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued April 18, 2022

Decided June 21, 2022

Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, for petitioner.

Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, for respondents.

Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant, Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark B. Stern, John S. Koppel, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Constitution's Supremacy Clause generally immunizes the Federal Government from state laws that directly regulate or discriminate against it. See South Carolina v. Baker , 485 U.S. 505, 523, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988). Congress, however, can authorize such laws by waiving this constitutional immunity. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller , 486 U.S. 174, 180, 108 S.Ct. 1704, 100 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988).

This case concerns state workers’ compensation laws. Congress has enacted a statute that waives the Federal Government's constitutional immunity insofar as a "state authority charged with enforcing ... the state workers’ compensation laws ... appl[ies] the laws" to land or projects "belonging to the [Federal] Government, in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State." 40 U.S.C. § 3172(a).

The question before us is whether a Washington State workers’ compensation law falls within the scope of this congressional waiver. The state law, by its terms, applies only to federal workers who work at one federal facility in Washington. The law makes it easier for these workers to obtain workers’ compensation, thus raising workers’ compensation costs for the Federal Government. We conclude that the state law discriminates against the Federal Government and falls outside the scope of Congress’ waiver. We therefore hold that the law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.

I

During World War II, the Federal Government acquired a large tract of land in Washington State known as the Hanford site. The Government used the site to develop and produce nuclear weapons, generating a massive amount of chemical and radioactive waste. After the Cold War, the Federal Government began the process of decommissioning and cleaning up the nuclear site. The process has proved to be enormously complex. It is expected to require decades of time and billions of dollars. Most of the workers involved in the cleanup process are federal contract workers—people employed by private companies under contract with the Federal Government. A smaller number of workers involved in the cleanup project include federal employees who work directly for the Federal Government, state employees who work for the State of Washington, and private employees who work for private companies not under contract with the Federal Government.

In 2018, Washington enacted a workers’ compensation law that, by its terms, applied only to Hanford site workers "engaged in the performance of work, either directly or indirectly, for the United States." Wash. Rev. Code § 51.32.187(1)(b). Despite the literal language of this statute, another provision of Washington law makes clear—and all parties here agree—that the statute applies only to federal contract workers and not to federal employees. See § 51.12.060; Brief for United States 8, n. 4; Brief for Respondents 13. This is because Congress’ waiver of immunity does not extend to those whom the Federal Government employs directly. See 40 U.S.C. § 3172(c).

As compared to the general state workers’ compensation regime, Washington's law makes it easier for federal contract workers at Hanford to establish their entitlement to workers’ compensation. In particular, the statute creates a causal presumption that certain diseases and illnesses are caused by the cleanup work at Hanford. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 51.32.187(2), (3), (4). The presumption is rebuttable only by clear and convincing evidence. § 51.32.187(2)(b). And the presumption lasts for a worker's entire life, even after the worker's time at Hanford ends. § 51.32.187(5)(a). Because the Federal Government pays workers’ compensation claims for federal contractors at Hanford, see App. 48–50, Washington's law increases workers’ compensation costs for the Federal Government.

The United States brought suit against Washington, arguing that its law violated the Supremacy Clause by discriminating against the Federal Government. The District Court concluded that the state law fell within the scope of the federal waiver of immunity contained in 40 U.S.C. § 3172 and was therefore constitutional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. See 994 F.3d 994, 1012 (2020). We granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of Washington's law.

II

Washington first claims that this case is moot. After we granted certiorari, Washington enacted a new statute, see S. 5890, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2022), which changed the scope of the original law. The law's causal presumption no longer applies exclusively to Hanford site workers who "work, either directly or indirectly, for the United States." § 51.32.187(1)(b). Instead, under the new law, the presumption applies more broadly to any "worker working at a radiological hazardous waste facility." 2022 Wash. Sess. Laws p. 437. This new law, Washington argues, does not discriminate against the Federal Government, and its enactment thus moots the present dispute.

A case is not moot, however, unless " ‘it is impossible for [us] to grant any effectual relief.’ " Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC , 587 U. S. ––––, ––––, 139 S.Ct. 1652, 1660, 203 L.Ed.2d 876 (2019) (quoting Chafin v. Chafin , 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013) ). If there is money at stake, the case is not moot. See 587 U. S., at ––––, 139 S.Ct., at 1660. The United States asserts that, if we rule in its favor, it will either recoup or avoid paying between $17 million and $37 million in workers’ compensation claims that lower courts have awarded under the earlier law. See Response in Opposition to Suggestion of Mootness 11–12. Some of these claims are not yet final because they are still on appeal. See Reply in Support of Suggestion of Mootness 12. Washington argues that, even if the United States wins, the Government will not recover or avoid any payments because the new statute applies retroactively and is broad enough to encompass any claim filed under the earlier law. But it is not our practice to interpret statutes in the first instance, Zivotofsky v. Clinton , 566 U.S. 189, 201, 132 S.Ct. 1421, 182 L.Ed.2d 423 (2012), and we decline to do so here by deciding the retroactivity or breadth of Washington's new law. Nor do we know how Washington's state courts will resolve these questions. It is thus not "impossible" that the United States will recover money if we rule in its favor, and this case is not moot.

III

A

In McCulloch v. Maryland , 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), this Court held unconstitutional Maryland's effort to tax the Bank of the United States when Maryland imposed no comparable tax on any other bank within the State. Id. , at 425–437. Chief Justice John Marshall explained that, under the Supremacy Clause, "the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." Id. , at 436. The Court thus interpreted the Constitution as prohibiting States from interfering with or controlling the operations of the Federal Government.

Over time this constitutional doctrine, often called the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, evolved. Originally we understood it as barring any state law whose "effect ... was or might be to increase the cost to the Federal Government of performing its functions," including laws that imposed costs on federal contractors. United States v. County of Fresno , 429 U.S. 452, 460, 97 S.Ct. 699, 50 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). We later came to understand the doctrine, however, as prohibiting state laws that either "regulat[e] the United States directly or discriminat[e] against the Federal Government or those with whom it deals" (e.g., contractors). North Dakota v. United States , 495 U.S. 423, 435, 110 S.Ct. 1986, 109 L.Ed.2d 420 (1990) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); id. , at 444, 110 S.Ct. 1986 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that "[a]ll agree" with this aspect of the plurality opinion); see also Baker , 485 U.S., at 523, 108 S.Ct. 1355 ; County of Fresno , 429 U.S., at 462–463, 97 S.Ct. 699. As to the latter, discrimination-related prohibition, a state law is thus no longer unconstitutional just because it indirectly increases costs for the Federal Government, so long as the law imposes those costs in a neutral, nondiscriminatory way.

We have said that a state law discriminates against the Federal Government or its contractors if it "single[s them] out" for less favorable "treatment," Washington v. United States , 460 U.S. 536, 546, 103 S.Ct. 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 264 (1983), or if it regulates them unfavorably on some basis related to their governmental "status," North Dakota , 495 U.S., at 438, 110 S.Ct. 1986 (plurality opinion).

Washington's law violates these principles by singling out the Federal Government for unfavorable treatment. On its face, the law applies only to a "person, including a contractor or subcontractor, who was engaged in the performance of work, either directly or indirectly, for the United States." § 51.32.187(1)(b). The law thereby explicitly treats federal workers differently than state or private workers. Cf. Dawson v. Steager , 586 U. S. ––––, ––––, 139 S.Ct. 698, 705, 203 L.Ed.2d 29 (2019) (...