United States v. White
| Decision Date | 09 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15–4096,15–4096 |
| Citation | 836 F.3d 437 |
| Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Desmond Ra'Keesh White, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Jennifer Rada Herrald, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Lex A. Coleman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Before AGEE and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Thomas D. SCHROEDER, United States District Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Wynn
wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Schroeder joined.
, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Desmond Ra'Keesh White pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
. The district court sentenced Defendant under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), imposing the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
On appeal, Defendant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress firearm evidence, an issue preserved for appeal by conditional plea. Defendant also challenges the enhancement of his sentence under the ACCA. Defendant argues that, in light of Johnson v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015)
, a case decided during the pendency of this appeal, the district court erred in finding that his prior West Virginia burglary convictions constitute qualifying predicate crimes for purposes of the ACCA.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's denial of the suppression motion but find that, because of an intervening change in law following sentencing, the district court erroneously sentenced Defendant under the ACCA. We therefore affirm Defendant's conviction, vacate Defendant's sentence, and remand for resentencing.
On July 9, 2013, Corporal Justin Doughty (“Corporal Doughty”) of the Charleston Police Department was on patrol in a marked police cruiser in Charleston, West Virginia when he observed a car veer out of its lane.1 Corporal Doughty initiated a traffic stop to ascertain whether the driver was impaired. Erica Teunis was driving the car. Defendant was in the front passenger seat, and another male, referred to only as “Bone,” was seated in the rear.
When he approached the driver's window, Corporal Doughty smelled an odor of burned marijuana emanating from the car. After obtaining Ms. Teunis's driver's license, Corporal Doughty asked Ms. Teunis to exit the car in order to speak with her outside the presence of the two passengers. Based on his observation of and conversation with Ms. Teunis, Corporal Doughty concluded that she was not intoxicated or otherwise impaired. While assessing whether Ms. Teunis was impaired, Corporal Doughty also inquired about the odor of marijuana. Ms. Teunis responded that she did not smoke marijuana but did not know about the other two passengers in the car.
After speaking with Ms. Teunis, Corporal Doughty requested that Defendant exit the car and then asked Defendant about the marijuana odor. Defendant denied having anything illegal in the vehicle. Corporal Doughty then placed Defendant in his police cruiser, otherwise unrestrained, and returned to the car to speak with Bone. While speaking with Bone, Corporal Doughty observed a firearm tucked in a piece of plastic molding on the side of the passenger seat where Defendant had been sitting. At that time, Corporal Doughty returned to his cruiser, placed Defendant in handcuffs, and radioed for backup.
When backup officers arrived, Corporal Doughty returned to the car and removed the firearm. After being read his Miranda rights, Defendant admitted to Corporal Doughty that the firearm belonged to him.
During the stop, Corporal Doughty also called for an officer to conduct a canine sniff to investigate the marijuana odor. The canine alerted at the passenger door and the car's center console, but it is unclear from the record if the search revealed a detectable amount of marijuana.
Defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm evidence obtained from the traffic stop. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The district court found that reasonable suspicion supported the initial stop based upon Corporal Doughty's observation of Ms. Teunis's car veering out of its lane. United States v. White, No. 2:13–CR–00224, 2014 WL 4629385, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 15, 2014). The court also concluded that the odor of marijuana provided Corporal Doughty with reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and, ultimately, probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the car, where the firearm was recovered. Id. at *6.
Defendant subsequently entered into a conditional plea agreement with the government, in which he agreed to plead guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant preserved his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. Defendant entered his guilty plea on October 1, 2014.
In the presentence report, the probation officer classified Defendant as an armed career criminal under the ACCA, based on a prior West Virginia state robbery conviction and three prior West Virginia state burglary convictions. At sentencing, Defendant did not object to the ACCA designation. Finding Defendant subject to the ACCA sentence enhancement, the district court sentenced Defendant to the mandatory minimum term of fifteen years' imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
. Absent the enhancement, Defendant would have faced a maximum sentence of ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
We first consider Defendant's argument that the district court erred in refusing to suppress the firearm evidence obtained during the traffic stop. In particular, Defendant claims that the evidence was obtained only after Corporal Doughty unconstitutionally prolonged the stop. Regarding this challenge, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004)
.
When a police officer stops a car and detains its occupants, the traffic stop amounts to a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007)
; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Therefore, to pass constitutional muster, the stop must “not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769.
We employ the two-prong standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
, to assess the constitutionality of a traffic stop. United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012). First, we examine whether the officer had a constitutionally adequate basis for initiating the traffic stop. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir. 1992). Second, we examine whether the officer's subsequent actions were “ ‘sufficiently limited in scope and duration.’ ” United States v. Guijon–Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 764 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion)).
As to the first prong, reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred provides law enforcement officers with a constitutionally adequate basis to initiate a traffic stop. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769
; United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 136 (4th Cir. 2009) .
Under the second prong, the scope of the traffic stop must not exceed the “least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time.” Guijon–Ortiz, 660 F.3d at 764
(quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 ). Further, the duration of the stop must be reasonable in light of its purpose. See id.; see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) (). In the context of a stop for a traffic violation, the officer may “request[ ] a driver's license and vehicle registration, run[ ] a computer check, and issu[e] a ticket.” Guijon–Ortiz, 660 F.3d at 764–65 (quoting United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 507 (4th Cir. 2011) ). The officer must limit the duration of the stop to the length of time reasonably necessary to “issue the driver a citation and determine that the driver is entitled to operate his vehicle.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). “[W]hen [the] tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed,” however, the officer's “[a]uthority for the seizure ... ends.” Rodriguez v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).
To prolong the stop beyond the scope of the traffic violation, the officer must obtain the driver's consent or possess reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2015)
; Vaughan, 700 F.3d at 710. “In order to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, a police officer must offer ...
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